VZCZCXRO8531
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0288/01 0381419
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071419Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1318
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  DARFUR SITUATION UPDATE AND RECENT TRENDS 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  From April 2004 to November 2005, the number of people 
affected by the Darfur crisis has risen from 1.1 million to 
more than 3.5 million.  While the response of the 
international humanitarian community has been successful in 
meeting critical humanitarian needs and saving lives in 
Darfur, the underlying insecurity and political dynamics 
that produced the crisis have yet to change.  Continued 
negotiations to produce a political settlement at Abuja and 
efforts to encourage local reconciliation are essential to 
moving beyond the relief phase in the Darfur response. 
Humanitarian assistance will be needed to sustain the lives 
of conflict-affected populations as long as fighting and 
violence continues in Darfur, and return and rehabilitation 
of villages remains a distant goal due to the current 
climate of widespread insecurity. 
 
¶2.  Moreover, the reduced funding levels of major donors 
also threaten gains achieved by the humanitarian community. 
Malnutrition and mortality rates have dropped to within 
internationally accepted ranges yet are at risk due to lack 
of funding to sustain critical life-saving programs. 
Interventions in health, nutrition, food assistance, and 
water and sanitation reflect high quality services for 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and residents, 
particularly those in or near urban centers.  However, 
reduced NGO budgets are already resulting in the closure of 
vital programs, often without any possibility of handover to 
other entities such as government ministries.  These bodies 
often lack the financial and technical capacity to assume 
operation of facilities established by the humanitarian 
community. 
 
¶3.   Without a change in the conditions that produced the 
crisis, any successes of the humanitarian community will 
remain fragile.  In fact, available data reflects the 
situation some months ago, meaning that the effects of the 
current deterioration in both security and the response 
capacity of the humanitarian community are not yet evident. 
Agencies are implementing quality programs but are unable to 
access many of the areas most in need, particularly in West 
Darfur.  Contingency planning and response by humanitarian 
agencies alone will remain largely ineffective until a 
political solution can be reached.  In recent months, 
humanitarian agencies have been unable to respond to the 
deepening of the crisis due to the disintegrating security 
situation.  It is important to note that under either 
scenario of improving or deteriorating security, basic 
humanitarian needs will not diminish; continued fighting 
will cause new displacements, while an onset of peace will 
allow returns to begin that will require continued support 
from the humanitarian community.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
---------------------- 
Background Information 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  From the start of the current phase of the Darfur 
conflict in April 2004, the number of people affected has 
risen from 1.1 million to more than 3.5 million in November 
2005 - a number representing well over half of the area's 
population.  While the number of IDPs has increased from 1 
million to 1.76 million, the rise in the number of affected 
residents from 100,000 to 1.75 million accounts for the 
large increase in the overall number of conflict-affected 
individuals. 
 
¶5.  Once recognized as the largest humanitarian emergency in 
the world, international humanitarian intervention in Darfur 
has produced aggregate improvements in the lives of those 
affected by the conflict, particularly those people living 
in urban areas and IDPs living in nearby camps.  Key 
indicators such as morbidity, mortality, and malnutrition 
rates have decreased to within acceptable limits.  On 
January 19, the U.N. World Food Program (WFP) released the 
final report of the Emergency Food Security and Nutrition 
Assessment in Darfur that found a reduction in global acute 
malnutrition (GAM) rates among children under the age of 5 
years to 11.9 percent in September 2005 from 21.8 percent at 
 
KHARTOUM 00000288  002 OF 004 
 
 
the same time in 2004.  WFP concluded that the improved 
nutritional status is attributable to humanitarian relief 
including food assistance, water and sanitation, and health 
services.  The same assessment reported a 2005 crude 
mortality rate of 0.46 deaths per 10,000 people per day, a 
figure well below the emergency threshold of 1 death per 
10,000 people per day.  The decreased mortality rates are 
corroborated by a U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) 
survey that indicated mortality levels had fallen below 
emergency threshold for the reporting period of November 
2004 to May 2005.  WHO reported that mortality rates had 
decreased by a factor of two in North Darfur and by a factor 
of three in West and South Darfur since the previous study 
conducted in July and August 2004.  Mortality levels in 
Darfur could now be considered to be within an 
internationally accepted range.  WHO also attributed the 
reduction in mortality levels to humanitarian assistance. 
 
¶6.  Nearly two years on, the Darfur response is still in the 
relief phase of operations due largely to the unchanged 
security and political context.  Armed conflict is still 
ongoing and continues to create aditional displacements 
throughout Darfur.  In January, violence in South Darfur 
displaced an estimated 55,000 people from Mershing, 15,000 
to 20,000 people from Shaeria, and an unknown number in the 
Gereida area.  USAID partner GOAL has suspended activities 
in the Jebel Marra region of West Darfur after losing a 
staff member while evacuating from the villages of Golo and 
Daya in response to heavy fighting between the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). 
The U.N. Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) has moved 
to a "phase 4" security determination in most areas of West 
Darfur, dramatically curtailing the ability of humanitarian 
organizations to implement life-saving programs.  In the 
current climate of widespread insecurity, a large-scale 
return of IDPs is unlikely. 
 
--------------------- 
Operating Environment 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  The security environment in Darfur is extremely complex 
with the mosaic of armed factions continually in flux.  In 
addition to the parties at the Abuja peace talks - the 
Sudanese government, SLA, and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) - groups such as the National Movement for 
Reform and Development (NMRD), Janjaweed, non-government 
Arab militias, other ethnically based militias, and criminal 
units destabilize Darfur and prolong the humanitarian 
crisis.  SLA clashes with SAF have increased notably in 
January with attacks in:  the town of Golo in the Jebel 
Marra region of West Darfur; Kabkabiya in North Darfur; and 
Donkey Dereisa and Gereida in South Darfur.  In addition, 
the rift in leadership of the SLA has reportedly solidified 
with the recent announcement by the Zaghawa faction of the 
SLA, led by Mini Minawi, of its union with JEM forces.  Fur 
commander Abdel Wahid responded publicly that forces under 
his control are not involved with the announced union. 
Recent reports indicate that Abdel Wahid's deputy, a 
Massalit, broke away to join Minawi's Zaghawa faction. 
 
¶8.  The NMRD has been militarily active in the Kulbus 
corridor of West Darfur.  The group has threatened to shoot 
down any helicopter in the area, resulting in the suspension 
of U.N. flights to Sirba, Seleah, and Kulbus.  These flight 
cancellations have had significant curtailed humanitarian 
activities throughout the area given the standing road 
closures throughout the area.  NMRD forces have also been 
responsible for attacks on the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) troops based in Kulbus.  As a result of the 
compromised security environment, USAID partners Concern and 
Catholic Relief Services were forced to withdraw staff in 
December 2005, affectively ending essential programs in 
food, water and sanitation, shelter, and relief commodity 
distribution.  ICRC suspended operations in October 2005 
following the theft of several vehicles by NMRD. 
 
¶9.  The SAF continues to be directly involved in the 
fighting in Darfur with the U.N. reporting the use of 
helicopter gunships in at least one instance near Jebel 
Moon, West Darfur.  SAF have also been directly involved in 
the fighting in Golo, West Darfur and Gereida, South Darfur. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000288  003 OF 004 
 
 
In addition, U.N. and other reports point to continued 
government use of Janjaweed forces throughout Darfur.  Field 
reports on January 29 indicate that large numbers of 
Janjaweed are amassed outside of Gereida in preparation for 
a counteroffensive against the SLA.  While the government is 
utilizing Janjaweed forces to fight SLA, it is also clear 
that the active destruction of villages continues.  AMIS 
forces reported that 26 villages near Gereida had been 
looted and burned in November. 
 
¶10.  In some cases, Arab militias do not appear to be acting 
on the direction of the Sudanese government.  In a few 
notable instances, SAF have clashed with Arab militias or 
Arab militias have openly challenged the authority of 
Sudanese government officials.  In addition, many local 
conflicts are occurring based largely on ethnic dimensions, 
although often with higher-level support.  Bandits and 
cattle looters also thrive due to the large degree of 
impunity that currently exists in Darfur. 
 
¶11.  A relatively new trend of attacks against IDP camps has 
begun to emerge.  The first such reported attack occurred on 
September 28 when armed militia launched simultaneous 
attacks on Aro Sharow IDP camp near Silea in the Kulbus 
Corridor of West Darfur, forcing an estimated 2,000 camp 
residents to flee for safety.  On January 29, AU and U.N. 
sources reported that Arab militias and Sudanese government 
police acted jointly to attack and loot Mershing IDP camp in 
South Darfur, displacing the entire camp and town population 
estimated to be 55,000 people in the direction of Menawashi. 
Large numbers of residents have also fled Al Salaam IDP camp 
near Nyala, South Darfur over the past month due to 
intimidation and harassment by armed Arab men.  According to 
U.N. sources, Arab militia also entered Fata Borno camp 
southeast of Kutum, North Darfur on November 16 and fired at 
IDPs, killing two and injuring an additional two.  During 
the week of January 23, Kalma camp IDPs organized a peaceful 
protest against what they see as systematic attacks against 
IDPs in camps across Darfur. 
 
¶12.  Another disturbing issue that continues to affect the 
humanitarian response in Darfur is the harassment of 
individuals and organizations by the government, and to a 
lesser extent, the SLA.  The Sudanese government's 
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) is pursuing a number of 
new initiatives including demanding not only program 
information, but also detailed budget information about NGO 
activities funded by donors and withholding travel permits 
if reports are not submitted.  HAC identity cards are still 
required of all NGO staff.  In addition, the issue of a 
Khartoum-imposed moratorium on Darfur travel permits has not 
changed despite significant diplomatic pressure.  Travel 
permits expire every three months, with all travel permits 
of NGO staff working in Darfur having just expired on 
January 31. (Note:  with nearly 1,000 international aid 
workers assigned to Darfur, this is a significant 
administrative burden for the Sudanese government, but also 
a lucrative source of revenue with each visa renewal costing 
USD 240.  End note).  In addition to government-imposed 
bureaucratic hurdles, armed groups impede the work of the 
humanitarian community by refusing to allow safe by passage 
by road and/or air.  JEM forces have recently announced that 
any vehicle traveling through territory north of El Fasher 
must receive prior authorization from the movement, and NMRD 
has threatened to shoot own any helicopter in its area of 
operation in the Kulbus corridor of West Darfur.  In the 
last month, unidentified armed men have stolen 15 vehicles 
rented by NGOs in North Darfur. 
 
¶13.  During 2005, USAID has received reports of more than 
200 incidents of harassment, arrest, or attack against U.N., 
NGO, or AMIS personnel.  A high-level Sudanese staff member 
of a USAID partner remains in detention after being arrested 
in Nyala in late October.  Attacks on NGOs have experienced 
a disturbing increase in recent months, particularly in 
terms of armed men entering NGO compound in order to steal 
vehicles and loot money.  Between late August and December, 
armed men attempted to enter at least seven NGO compounds in 
Geneina town.  It is notable that West Darfur once enjoyed 
the greatest humanitarian access in Darfur, but is now 
largely inaccessible to the humanitarian community. 
Tensions between Chad and Sudan have increased considerably 
 
KHARTOUM 00000288  004 OF 004 
 
 
in recent months, with both countries reinforcing military 
resources along the border.  Both countries also accuse each 
other of supporting opposition groups in the other country. 
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) reports that more than 150 NGO staff and 60 to 70 
U.N. staff have relocated out of West Darfur as the result 
of present insecurities.  The USAID Darfur Field Office 
(USAID/DFO) has followed this trend and removed USAID field 
officers from Geneina for the time being. 
 
¶14.  The cumulative effect of all of these factors is that 
the people of Darfur suffer.  Where the safety of NGO and 
U.N. staff is in question, either due to targeted harassment 
or general conflict, the humanitarian community will be 
unable to access populations in need and deliver life-saving 
assistance in Darfur. 
 
------------------ 
Funding Shortfalls 
------------------ 
 
¶15.  Most major donors have either reduced or straight-lined 
budgets available for Darfur in 2006.  The resulting lack of 
funding for humanitarian programs will impact the successes 
achieved to date in stabilizing the humanitarian situation. 
The immediate impact will be a reduction in service delivery 
in some key areas, possibly causing morbidity and mortality 
to slip back into the critical zone.  NGOs are operating on 
smaller budgets and are therefore closing heath and 
nutrition centers often without any possibility of handover 
to others.  The NGO International Rescue Committee is 
closing its office in Mukjar, West Darfur, where the 
organization has been providing essential water and 
sanitation interventions.  The NGO International Medical 
Corps recently closed its Community Therapeutic Care (CTC) 
nutrition program in the village of Deleig in the Garsilla 
locality of West Darfur due to funding shortages.   While 
the government's operating budget is slowly increasing, the 
financial ability - as well as technical capacity and 
commitment in some cases - of government ministries is 
generally lacking to assume the operation and maintenance of 
facilities established by the humanitarian community for 
water and sanitation, health and nutrition, and coordination 
of IDP camps, among others. 
 
HUME