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DE RUEHKH #0282/01 0381100
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1298
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0032
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0152

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000282 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D, AF - A/S FRAZER, AND IO - A/S SILVERBERG, FROM 
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HUME 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO MOPS EAID US UN AU SU
SUBJECT: ACTION NEEDED TO STEM WORSENING SECURITY IN DARFUR 
 
KHARTOUM 00000282  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) A February 4-5 visit to Darfur confirmed that the 
security situation in Darfur is getting worse.  A companion 
message will report on separate meetings with the local 
governor, the new AMIS commander, UN staff, U.S. military 
observers, and international NGOs.  All are worried what will 
happen next.  The deteriorating situation is characterized 
by: 
 
-- More frequent violence throughout the area:  along the 
border with Ch`d, io the" 
ebed Mea,{oUt( nf(OYclq.`a`Kp gQN!lc6`~jboBpWg3LOnufNeSbf^9%Q9H{s rD#~3~*2*Qv4YQQDo[6humanitarian vehicles; 
 
-- Disappearing command and control:  The political 
leadership of the SLA and JEM have faltering control of their 
units and no control over splinter groups active in banditry 
and hostage-taking.  The government has enlisted 
undisciplined Arab militiamen into popular defense forces and 
allowed renegade operations by some commanders.  Worse, some 
reports indicate the government may be actively instigating 
Reizegat tribesmen to take up arms against neighboring Fur; 
and 
 
-- Overall, lawlessness is spreading. 
 
¶2. (C) The current peace process is based on a cease-fire 
agreement between the parties, supported by AMIS.  The 
parties ignore their commitments to the cease-fire; and, the 
cease-fire commission lacks any vigor in investigating 
incidents.  While AMIS has registered success in decreasing 
the scale of violence in Darfur, over a third of the entire 
population has abandoned their homes in the countryside for 
the relative security of the IDP camps.  AMIS cannot deliver 
improved security by simply working with the parties to 
maintain the often violated cease-fire.  AMIS should redirect 
its efforts away from &observing8 a cease-fire to which 
neither party demonstrates much commitment toward a phased 
strategy to provide security and to re-establish order. 
 
¶3. (C) The Darfur crisis, once essentially an internal 
conflict of a failing state, is now also an international 
conflict between Chad and Sudan.  In violation of the bedrock 
obligation not to use force or the threat of force against 
other states, both governments arm and harbor insurgent 
groups that attack across the international border.  The AU 
talks in Abuja ignore these threats to international peace 
and security, despite the presence of an official Chadian 
&mediator.8  On the ground NGOs and military observers 
report rising tensions in the border area, increased levels 
of armament, and greater restrictions on travel.  The UN 
security threat level is now just one step short of mandatory 
evacuation of all humanitarian personnel; at current levels 
of staffing operations will be curtailed within three weeks. 
The risks are serious and require immediate attention. 
 
¶4. (C) On February 4, AU mediator Salim Salim painted a 
troubled picture of the negotiations.  Around the table in 
Abuja the parties were making progress in discussing wealth- 
and power-sharing, but on the ground in Darfur they were 
responsible for a deplorable escalation of violence.  Each 
month since October the fighting has worsened and forced 
severe restrictions on humanitarian operations.  Salim stated 
that the international community was drawing the conclusion 
that Darfur was lawless and that the parties were not serious 
about making peace.  The facts on the ground confirm Salim,s 
conclusion. 
 
¶5. (C) The new AMIS commander, General Ihekare, told CDA Hume 
that he was determined to &dominate the area8  to improve 
security, rather than simply to rely on the good will of the 
parties or the faulty cease-fire mechanism.  He said he 
needed to reshape the operation in the border area, where the 
risks were higher, and he saw a need to redeploy CIVPOL in 
order to make most efficient use of his troops.  He wanted to 
begin live-fire training for his troops, to step up training 
in use of the Canadian APCs, and to deploy an increased 
number of U.S. military observers.  Ihekare is planning to 
improve AMIS operations.  He is not waiting for possible 
decisions about UN-rehatting. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000282  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶6. (C) Recommendations:  Despite positive inputs, the current 
framework for solving the Darfur crisis is not working.  We 
need to redirect efforts in three areas: 
 
-- First, security plans ought no longer to be based solely 
on the parties, insincere commitment to their agreed 
cease-fire.  AMIS or a follow-on UN force must plan to extend 
security and to protect civilians; perhaps the success of the 
UN operation in Sierra Leone could provide a model.  The USG 
should respond positively and immediately to the AMIS 
commander,s request for additional U.S. military observers 
and open a dialogue with him regarding other support he could 
use now.  On the diplomatic front we should still support the 
Abuja process, but no longer be held hostage to it.  The 
facts on the ground confirm the need for more independent 
action; 
 
-- Second, the U.S. should lead the call for action to stem 
the risks of conflict along the Chad-Sudan border, a concern 
not adequately covered by current AMIS operations.  Regional 
peace efforts, such as the consultations now convened in 
Libya, may be helpful, but will not be sufficient.  An early 
response could include a UN mandate, perhaps initially for 
AMIS operating under Chapter VIII with outside support, to 
monitor the border and to report to the UN Security Council 
as well as to the AU; and 
 
-- Third, the USG cannot afford a hands-off posture with 
regard to the planning for the eventual UN mandate or the 
AMIS transition to that mandate.  We should not allow the 
wishes of the parties negotiating in Abuja to dictate the 
terms of a mandate, nor should we simply await the proposals 
and plans of UNDPKO.  Initially we need to work with the new 
AMIS commander on the ground to improve performance, creating 
a more satisfactory base-line.  Simultaneously, to produce 
the right &range of options8 called for in the UNSC 
presidential statement, we should engage AMIS and the UN in 
the field to offer solid military advice and planning 
assistance.  The dangers in Darfur are rising and call for 
prompt and effective measures. 
 
¶7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
HUME