This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
DEPT FOR SA/FO, AMBASSADOR QUINN, SA/PAB, S/CT, SA/A 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR AF
SUBJECT: PRT Panjshir: The Security Dimension 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) In Panjshir Province, the security 
environment is permissive.  The PRT is able to move 
about actively in the valley and interact closely with 
its inhabitants.  The main factors shaping the 
positive environment are:  strategic alignment with 
the U.S., a strong governor who works with the PRT, a 
network of former Mujahideen now serving as security 
forces, combat fatigue after decades of war and 
turmoil, no poppy cultivation, and a close-knit 
society that makes outsiders stand out.  That said, 
security challenges still exist, including a renegade 
religious leader, continuing controversy over weapons 
removal, pockets of cultural skepticism, and ANA and 
ANP forces struggling to establish themselves.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) This is the first in a three-part series on 
the Panjshir Province, where we inaugurated our PRT 
last November.  The second message will deal with 
political trends; the third, with economic 
developments. 
 
¶3.  (U) In terms of safety and security, the Panjshir 
is permissive, allowing the PRT to operate throughout 
the main valley.  There are several auspicious 
circumstances, outlined below: 
 
Strategic Alignment 
------------------- 
 
¶4.  (U) The tomb of Massoud, the slain Mujahideen 
leader, dominates the valleys landscape and 
symbolizes its strategic outlook.  Panjshiri officials 
emphasize the Afghan-American partnership forged in 
the struggle against the Soviet invasion and Taliban 
encroachment.  In a speech before several hundred 
Panjshiris December 26, the Governor recalled U.S. 
support for the Mujahideen, pointedly mentioning 
Stingers.  We hear similar themes from Panjshiris from 
all walks:  Americans have come to help and not, like 
the Soviets, to occupy; Americans and Afghans are 
united in the war on terrorism.  (Comment:  The result 
is a climate of political acceptance, although some 
cultural skepticism remains, see below. End Comment.) 
 
Cooperative Governor 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) Haji Bahlul, in office half a year, has 
embraced the PRT and made its security one of his 
central concerns.  Both publicly and privately, he 
calls on Panjshiris to do their part in ensuring PRT 
security.  Indeed, this theme figures prominently in 
his speeches.  He believes the PRT success depends on 
its freedom of movement and closeness of interaction, 
which, in turn, depend on its security.  We find him 
highly accessible, always available to discuss 
security issues.  He says his military background, as 
one of Massouds commanders, makes him sensitive to 
the matter. 
 
Mujahideen Network 
------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) An informal but close network exists among 
the former Mujahideen.  At its pinnacle sits the 
Governor, who can activate it on short notice.  He 
hand-picked former comrades to staff the twelve-man 
guard forces of the PRT and the twenty-four man road 
construction company.  They stay in touch and, as 
weve discovered on several occasions, share 
information with alacrity.  In a pinch, the Governor 
can mobilize them.  A recent example concerns the DDR 
mission that came under fire December 13.  Within 
minutes, the Governor had drawn on his former comrades 
to assemble a security force that augmented the ANP 
contingent. 
 
Combat Fatigue 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (U) Old Soviet armored vehicles litter the valley, 
a reminder of the fierce struggle of the 1980s. 
Panjshiris tell us they are tired of fighting.  A 
member of the Provincial Council, Abdul Wajeb, said 
Panjshiris want to focus now on economic development. 
He told us that Panjshiris, after the years of 
conflict, were supportive of the PRT, optimistic about 
the future and amenable to DDR weapons removal as long 
as economic progress was evident. (Embassy Note: The 
program in the Panjshir is part of the UN-led Anti- 
Personnel Mines and Ammunition Stockpile Destruction 
Program (APMASD), operated by the Afghan New 
Beginnings Program (ANBP), which also runs the DDR and 
DIAG programs. The APMASDs task is to survey and 
safely dispose of the over 100,000 tons of discarded 
ammunition throughout Afghanistan. Although 
technically APMASD is not part of DDR, DDR is often 
used as a catchall for all post-conflict reform 
programs. End Embassy Note.) 
 
Poppy Rejection 
--------------- 
 
 
¶8.  (U) The provincial economy is predominantly 
agricultural.  Yet its crops do not include poppy.  We 
have heard of small poppy plots, but have yet to see 
one.  Farmers report that religious beliefs and 
traditional habits lead to their rejection of poppy 
cultivation.  Panjshiris pride, they add, is also a 
factor.  The Governor makes a point of urging farmers 
to resist the allure of the crop.  (Comment:  As a 
result, we detect none of the corrosive effects on the 
rule of law from trafficking of opium. End Comment.) 
 
Close-knit Society 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) An official of the National Directorate of 
Security (NDS) attributed the security of Panjshir to 
the iron grip of Massoud on the valley, which kept out 
trouble-makers over the years.  The Panjshiris, 
ethnically Tajik, tend to be close-knit.  The history 
and topography of the province have also made them 
insular.  These traits are both positive and negative 
for the PRT (see cultural skepticism, below). 
Outsiders stick out  indeed, starting as they enter 
the valley through the Lions Gate, which sits astride 
the only road access.  An ANP officer, who is in 
charge of the gate along with former Mujahideen, told 
us he guards it carefully.  They stop and check all 
traffic going out, night or day; and all traffic 
coming in during the night.  He allows only government 
officials and the PRT to pass without inspection. 
Departing trucks get special scrutiny, to determine 
whether they are carrying contraband, such as weapons. 
 
¶10.  (U) The negative security factors, outlined 
below, are smaller in number and effect.  Each, 
however, bears watching. 
 
Renegade Maolowi 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) According to the local NDS chief, the 
biggest single security concern is Maolowi Mohammed 
Khan (MMK).  A religious leader, he is in charge of a 
mosque and madrassa in Rokah, at the mid-point of the 
valley and close to one of the PRT houses.  MMK stands 
under suspicion of involvement in two security 
y 
incidents, November 15 and December 13, endangering 
DDR convoys.  Local authorities have made several 
arrests in the case; checkpoints remain in the valley; 
but MMK has eluded them.  The Governor told us January 
18 that VP Massoud had issued an arrest warrant for 
MMK, but the arrest attempt January 16 had failed. 
The local NDS chief told us that a hundred Panjshiris, 
including VP Massoud and NDS head Saleh, had gathered 
in Kabul in late November to discuss the matter.  They 
agreed to press MMK to abandon his DDR obstructionism 
and to register his followers as a political party. 
MMK reportedly refused, countering that he would try 
to stop weapons smuggling out of the valley in 
exchange for a halt to the DDR missions.  The standoff 
continues.  (Comment:  Although this tension does not 
directly affect the PRT, it could spark a 
deterioration of security. End Comment.) 
 
DDR Controversy 
--------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Weapons/ammo removal remains a flashpoint, 
as demonstrated by the incidents marring the two 
recent DDR missions.  As noted, many Panjshiris 
support the process to move ahead with economic 
reconstruction.  Others, however, believe it deprives 
the valley of legitimate means of self-defense and is 
premature in that the ANA and ANP are not yet able to 
provide for national security.  Some insist on 
monetary rewards for compliance.  Resistance has 
flared in the village of Paranday, where the two 
incidents took place.  The Governor has tried various 
ways to address popular concerns over DDR.  He has, 
for example, involved VP Massoud in explaining the 
process to the locals; made an offer of reconciliation 
to MMKs followers; coordinated more closely with 
UNDP/ANBP and ANP on security arrangements; and 
conducted a town meeting to educate Panjshiris. 
During the latter meeting, held January 5, the 
divisive nature of the issue was on display. 
(Comment:  All of the Governors steps seem to be in 
the right direction. End Comment.) 
 
Cultural Skepticism 
m 
------------------- 
 
¶13.  (U) Two-thirds of the Panjshiris, according to 
the Governor, were wary at first of the PRT.  Their 
main fear was that foreigners would rob them of their 
religion.  The PRT has overcome this skepticism to a 
great extent, but some pockets remain.  This attitude 
reflects the insularity of Panjshir and the 
traditional nature of its society.  Provincial Council 
member Wajeb told us he had to meet three times with 
the villagers of Anabah, where one of the PRT houses 
is located, to persuade them to welcome us.  Western 
engineers assigned to the main road project tell us 
that their work, with its manifest progress, helps 
dispel local wariness. Locals say attitudes have 
changed the least in those areas where the road work 
has not yet extended  that is, in the upper reaches 
of the valley.  Anti-Coalition propaganda, the 
Governor tells us, feeds on this cultural skepticism. 
 
ANA/ANP Immaturity 
------------------ 
 
¶14.  (SBU) ANA forces total some 20 in Panjshir; ANP, 
ANP, 
about 250.  ANA soldiers are virtually without 
profile.  Their main task, apparently, is to protecta 
smal facility  and not without vigilance, as we 
discovered when we paid an unannounced call.  The PRT 
deals extensively with ANP officers, who are 
cooperative and part of the Governors security team. 
We worked closely with the ANP during a humanitarian 
mission last December and ascertained their need for 
better training and equipment.  For example, when a 
scuffle broke out among Afghans, the head of the ANP 
contingent was nowhere to be seen.  He later 
apologized for an untimely tea break. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) On balance, the positive factors outweigh 
the negative ones, making the security situation 
permissive and allowing the PRT to operate actively. 
The PRT is attempting to reinforce matters by pushing 
for progress on projects; reaching out and being 
accessible to Panjshiris; coordinating closely with 
the Governor, including on a possible bid for 
r 
reconciliation with MMK followers; working behind the 
scenes to improve DDR missions; and observing our own 
security precautions so as not to tempt fate. (End PRT 
Comment.) 
 
¶16. (SBU) Embassy Comment: The view of the D and R 
Commission (the Kabul interagency body that deals with 
DDR/DIAG issues) on the cooperation of Governor Bahlul 
with the Afghan New Beginnings Programs efforts to 
secure ammunition in the Panjshir is more negative 
then that of the PRT Commander. Bahlul has been called 
to Kabul several times by VP Masood to discuss this 
issue at the Commissions request. End Embassy 
Comment. 
 
NORLAND 
D