This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000444 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO, SA/A, EB/OTP, EB/CBA 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, AMEND 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A 
TREASURY FOR PARAMESWARAN 
COMMERCE FOR AADLER 
TRANSPORTATION FOR DMODESITT 
FAA FOR JHANCOCK AND TMARZIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016 
TAGS: EAIR ECON AF
SUBJECT: ARIANA UNSCHEDULED FLIGHT DIVERSIONS ON JANUARY 
23, 2006 
 
 
Classified by Economic Officer Michael Kidwell.  Reasons 1.4 
(b,d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) On January 23, 2006, Minister of Transport Qasimi 
requested expedited landing clearance at Kandahar Airfield 
for two flights from Ariana Afghan Airlines, the state-owned 
carrier.  While the Minister gave no details to justify the 
request, Post learned from Ariana that passengers (pilgrims 
returning from the Hajj in Saudi Arabia) on one or both of 
the flights had threatened the crew if the planes did not 
proceed directly to Kandahar Airfield (operated by Combined 
Forces Air Component Command (CFACC)) instead of to Kabul. 
Ariana eventually rerouted the flights to Kandahar and Post 
obtained landing clearance for the aircraft.  Post does not 
believe there were terrorist motives to the attack, but 
rather that an unruly group of Afghan pilgrims, fed up with 
Ariana service, was desperate to get home as soon as 
possible.  Still, the Minister's unwillingness to disclose 
the details of the incident (both to the Embassy and the 
Afghan Presidency) raises serious concerns about the 
transparency and safety of aviation operations in 
Afghanistan.  Post recommends that the USG keep this incident 
in mind when considering Afghan requests for Ariana service 
into the US (operated by wet-lease via a European stopover). 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Minister of Transport Enayatullah Qasimi contacted 
Embassy FAA officer just before 17:00 on January 23 to 
request landing clearance in Kandahar for Ariana aircraft 
carrying pilgrims returning from Saudi Arabia after the Hajj. 
 (Note:  Due to ongoing runway refurbishment at Kandahar, the 
airport is currently only open from sunrise to 12:00 noon 
each day.  Clearance for returning Hajj flights has been 
granted at different times provided that the Ministry of 
Transport requests such clearance 24 hours in advance.)  The 
Minister declined to provide a justification for the 
expedited clearance.  Consequently, Embassy FAA officer 
contacted Ariana Airlines directly to find out the details 
about the aircraft and why they needed expedited clearance 
for Kandahar.  Lufthansa Consultant and acting CEO of Ariana 
Hanns Marienfeld informed him that pilgrims on two Ariana 
A300 aircraft had "threatened to kill the crew" if they were 
not taken directly to Kandahar.  (Note:  Given that Hajj 
pilgrims on board Ariana flights have previously killed two 
ministers, such threats must be viewed as credible.  While 
Ariana could not specify whether the threat was directed at 
the flight crew or cabin crew, it is likely that it was aimed 
at the cabin crew as the pilot was in constant contact with 
Ariana and appeared relatively calm.  End note.)  It was 
unclear initially where the two planes were and for most of 
the evening January 23, Post understood that the planes were 
on the ground at Ras Al Khaima airstrip in the United Arab 
Emirates.  On January 24, Post learned that one aircraft had 
indeed been in Ras Al Khaima (UAE), but that the other had 
been in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
 
¶3.  (C) Embassy staff liaised with appropriate CFC-A and 
CJTF76 staff to obtain clearance at Kandahar and to 
coordinate a response.  Post was unable to obtain manifests 
for the flights at the time.  (Note:  Post believes that 
Ariana may not have even created detailed manifests for the 
flights.  However, Post  believes it unlikely that any Amcits 
were onboard.  End note.)  After Embassy FAA officer 
clarified with Ariana that the aircraft were on the ground in 
Ras Al Khaima (only partly true as it turned out), Post 
informed AmEmbassy Abu Dhabi, and FAA Kabul coordinated 
further actions with FAA Abu Dhabi. 
¶4.  (C) Embassy FAA officer confirmed landing clearance with 
the Kandahar Airfield.  When Combined Forces Air Component 
Command (CFACC) staff confronted Minister Qasimi about the 
unfolding events, the Minister reluctantly acknowledged that 
passengers had "threatened bodily harm" if they were not 
taken to Kandahar.  However, according to Ariana staff in 
Kabul (who were in touch with the flight crew by radio), the 
passengers made death threats against the crew.  Information 
available at the time indicated that this was a not a planned 
hijacking or terrorist action.  Most of the pilgrims had been 
in Saudi Arabia for almost six weeks, and many had been 
delayed when transferred from Kandahar to Kabul as they 
departed for Hajj in early December.  Post believes that 
these were tired, unruly pilgrims that wanted to get home and 
had no other agenda.  The Charge also informed President 
Karzai's chief of staff about the incident as the Ministry of 
Transport had not informed the Presidency.  The chief of 
staff asked for U.S. support in facilitating landings at 
Kandahar.  (Note:  Subsequently, the President's chief of 
staff confirmed that the Ministry of Transport never 
responded to his request for more details on the incident. 
End note.) 
 
¶5.  (C) Post is unable to confirm how the incident began. 
Initial reports from Ariana indicated that both aircraft were 
making scheduled stops in Ras Al Khaima before proceeding to 
Kabul.  Passengers on one aircraft then threatened the crew 
and demanded to be taken to Kandahar directly.  Passengers on 
the second plane heard about the first incident and then made 
the same threats and demands.  Another, perhaps more 
plausible, report suggests that the first A300 was en route 
to Kabul, as the pilot had determined before take off that he 
did not want to land an A300 at night in Kandahar (Note:  The 
airstrip is narrow and the approach is more dangerous at 
night.  Landing would have been safer at Kabul.  End note.) 
Though Post confirmed that Ariana had determined earlier that 
week not to use A300s for flights into Kandahar, Ariana may 
not have announced that decision to its passengers. 
In-flight, when the pilot announced that the aircraft was en 
route to Kabul, the passengers became unruly and threatened 
the crew.  The aircraft then made an unscheduled stop in Ras 
Al Khaima.  Based on lack of action by UAE authorities and 
reports from the DATT in Abu Dhabi, it appears that Ariana 
never informed the airport tower or airport authorities in 
UAE about the situation.  It is unclear how the second 
aircraft heard of these events or if, in fact, the passengers 
of the second plane (which Post now knows was in Jeddah at 
the time) even made similar threats and demands. 
 
¶6.  (C) At approximately 19:30, Embassy FAA officer confirmed 
that two Ariana-operated 727s were en route to Ras Al Khaima. 
 The smaller planes are easier to land in Kandahar and were 
piloted by different crews.  Ariana transferred all 220 
passengers from the A300 in Ras Al Khaima onto the two 727s. 
Both planes flew directly to Kandahar with local landing 
times of approximately 02:00 and 03:00.  The second A300 
arrived from Jeddah into Kandahar at local time 06:00. 
Ariana reported no further unrest from the passengers.  At 
the request of Minister Qasimi, Kandahar Airfield granted 
24/7 landing rights for Hajj flights for the next few days. 
This should expedite return of the Afghan pilgrims from Saudi 
Arabia and reduce the likelihood of further incidents. 
 
Comment 
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¶7.  (C) This incident raises serious concerns about the 
transparency of flight operations on the part of Ariana and 
the Ministry of Transport.  The Minister was quite willing to 
request landing clearance without informing the airfield 
about the unruly, threatening passengers onboard the incoming 
aircraft.  Further, neither Ariana nor the Ministry were 
willing to provide a manifest of the flight, though both 
maintained that no Amcits were onboard the flights.  The 
Ministry and Ariana seem to be more concerned about public 
perceptions than about the safety of their passengers.  Post 
anticipates that, if pressed, Ariana and the Ministry may 
deny that the incident took place.  Post recommends that this 
incident be a strong factor in considering whether or not to 
support Ariana's and the Minister's request for a wet-lease 
flight into the US (with a European stopover).  End comment. 
NORLAND