VZCZCXRO2696
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1819/01 0411211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101211Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9333
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 8982
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0561
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 JAKARTA 001819 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016 
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL PGOV ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA-U.S. POLITICA-MILITARY TALKS 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER RAYMOND RICHHART.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
 (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  U.S. and Indonesian delegations held a day 
of political-military talks February 1 to explore expanded 
bilateral cooperation following the U.S. decision in November 
to end restrictions on military-to-military relations.  The 
U.S. delegation, led by Dr. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary 
of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
proposed that the U.S. and Indonesia focus security 
cooperation on interoperability; improvement of capabilities 
of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) for disaster relief, 
maritime security, and regional stability; and defense reform 
and increased civilian control of TNI.  The U.S. team briefed 
on the U.S. relationship with China, the Global Defense 
Posture Review (GDPR), the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and 
Article 98 agreements.  The Indonesian delegation, led by 
Harry Purwanto, Director for North and Central America in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, emphasized in its presentation 
on regional perspectives and security priorities the 
importance of safeguarding Indonesia's territorial integrity 
and Indonesia's "active commitment to world social justice 
and peace."  He described ASEAN's contribution to regional 
security and Indonesia's commitment to strengthen the 
organization. 
 
¶2.  (C) A/S Hillen, when reviewing bilateral 
political-military relations, assured the Indonesian 
delegation that the U.S. had lifted all sanctions. 
Indonesia's hard work to build democratic institutions and 
reform TNI, and the reaction to cooperation between Indonesia 
and the U.S. during tsunami relief efforts, had greatly 
facilitated the U.S. decision.  However, many of the issues 
that caused friction in the past remained and both sides 
should exercise caution that issues not "bubble up" again. 
BG Abdul Cholik, Director of International Cooperation at the 
Department of Defense (DEPHAN), emphasized Indonesia's 
internal security and stability when he briefed on 
Indonesia's defense priorities.  Among the "general policy 
descriptions" to fulfill these interests were improvement of 
TNI professionalism, development of national strategic 
industries, establishment of early warning capability, and 
development of "minimum regular force, reserve and supporting 
forces."  Procurement of weapons should accord with the GOI 
political directive that TNI develop the "minimum essential 
force" necessary to address threats. 
 
¶3.  (C) A/S Hillen underscored the value of the opportunity 
the talks provided for the two delegations to learn from each 
other, and emphasized that the two countries should maintain 
momentum, talk often, maintain transparency and exchange 
information on what is happening in the field.  He also 
stressed that the U.S. and Indonesia should now work to find 
common approaches to global problems -- for example, energy, 
freedom of movement, Iran and DPRK non-proliferation.  To 
maintain support for a normal military-to-military 
relationship, the two countries must also achieve concrete 
results to demonstrate that cooperation pays dividends and 
that we have moved forward and crossed a threshold.  Purwanto 
responded that bilateral relations had "never been better" 
and that Indonesia was now duty-bound to fulfill the promise 
made possible by the window that the U.S. had opened. 
Purwanto opened the door to possible "PSI-like" cooperation 
with the U.S. and a mechanism other than an Article 98 
agreement to address U.S. non-surrender concerns.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Dr. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State for 
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, February 1 led a 
Washington delegation to political-military talks with 
Indonesia that included BG Jeffrey Remington, JCS/J5; LTC 
Phil Clemmons, JCS/J5; Mr. Peter Ipsen, OSD/ISA; and Jane 
Bocklage, DOS PM/RSAT.  Embassy Jakarta DCM Lewis Amselem, 
DATT COL Joseph Judge, ODC Chief Kenneth Comer, and POL 
Officer Pepper Richhart joined the delegation.  Harry 
Purwanto, Director for North and Central America in the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, organized and led the talks 
for the Indonesian government.  He was joined by officials 
from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of 
Defense, TNI Headquarters, TNI's Intelligence Agency (BAIS), 
Indonesian National Police (POLRI), National Intelligence 
Body (BIN), and Department of Communications. 
 
-------------------- 
Introductory Remarks 
 
JAKARTA 00001819  002 OF 008 
 
 
-------------------- 
 
United States 
------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) A/S Hillen described the importance the U.S. placed 
on the talks and told the Indonesian delegation that the U.S. 
wanted to cement unbreakable ties between the two countries 
and maintain the momentum achieved by the Administration's 
decision to normalize the military-to-military relationship 
in November, 2005.  2005 constituted a seminal year for the 
bilateral relationship and the end of the "embargo" had 
allowed the U.S. to move forward.  Such progress only became 
possible because of the significant progress Indonesia had 
made in areas of accountability, cooperation and 
democratization -- issues very important to the U.S.  A/S 
Hillen stressed that the U.S. Congress and the Administration 
would continue to focus on those critical areas and would 
look for ways the U.S. could help Indonesia continue such 
reform. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) A/S Hillen said that U.S. proposed to focus 
security cooperation efforts on three broad principles: 
 
1) Interoperability; 
 
2) Improvement of TNI capabilities, in particular for 
disaster response and engagement to promote maritime security 
and regional stability; 
 
3) Defense reform and increased civilian control over the 
military. 
 
A/S Hillen reiterated that a very positive air now existed in 
the Pentagon and in the State Department that could issue in 
a new era of cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia. 
 
Indonesia 
--------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Purwanto thanked the U.S. delegation for America's 
attention and interest.  He explained that after embracing 
democracy, Indonesia had reached a crucial point at which the 
government must give strong proof to the Indonesian people 
that democracy was the right choice.  This was not easy, he 
added.  Purwanto described the transnational problems facing 
Indonesia: illegal fishing, logging, illicit drugs, 
trafficking in persons.  He explained the challenges posed by 
Indonesia's extensive boarders and coastline.  He said that 
because of Indonesia's limited resources, the GOI welcomed 
assistance from the United States based on equality and 
mutual respect.  He expressed Indonesia's willingness to 
reinforce common values, reduce misperceptions and synergize 
efforts. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
U.S. Views on China, GDPR, GOPI, PSI, Article 98 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
U.S.-China relationship 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) A/S Hillen described the bilateral U.S.-China 
relationship as complex and one in which both partners needed 
to do more to understand the other.  He said the U.S. wanted 
for China to succeed, noted that China was one of the largest 
trading partners for the U.S. and stressed that geopolitical 
competition with China was not inevitable.  He noted that the 
U.S. wanted a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan/China 
relationship and had concerns regarding the lack of 
transparency in the military and China's military buildup in 
Southeast China. 
 
¶9.  (C) Purwanto responded that China made itself felt in 
Southeast Asia, adding that India had also a significant 
presence in the region.  Southeast Asia shared borders with 
both; if China increased its military capacity, it must 
transit the Southeast Asian region wherever it went. 
Likewise, as India expanded, it would want markets and access 
to Southeast Asia.  Purwanto asked for U.S. views on the 
consequences for Southeast Asia of increased Chinese and 
Indian power.  Southeast Asian countries were concerned 
regarding the regional balance of power, he noted, adding 
that the region's "vision" had been good when it established 
ASEAN to avoid conflicts in the region. 
 
 
JAKARTA 00001819  003 OF 008 
 
 
¶10.  (C) A/S Hillen responded that the U.S. had underway an 
important initiative to build a new strategic relationship 
with India, which included defense, political and economic 
cooperation.  He explained that U.S. policies toward India, 
China and Southeast Asia were developed on their own terms; 
while interconnected, these policies dealt with countries on 
their own terms -- and Indonesia deserved that the U.S. do 
this with it as well.  Geopolitics matter -- relations with 
China and Southeast Asia depended on each country's "weight." 
 This presented opportunities for Indonesia to play an 
important role.  BG Remington added that the U.S. and much of 
the world had engaged China to encourage transparency; the 
U.S. hoped its engagement would encourage China not to 
develop a military force that would challenge the sea lines 
of communication in Southeast Asia.  The U.S. wanted by 
engaging China to create a responsible partner; if China were 
to threaten the region it would put at risk political 
structures and econom 
ies in the region. 
 
Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (SBU) A/S Hillen explained that the U.S. was working to 
transform its foreign policy and security apparatus.  He 
noted changes in the Department of Defense and efforts in the 
GDPR to transform the U.S. force position.  He described 
efforts within the State Department to shift the focus of 
activity and positions from Europe to the Middle East, Africa 
and Asia.  BG Remington briefed on the GDPR. 
 
¶12.  (C) Purwanto observed that the threats the U.S. now 
faces were non-traditional -- for example, terrorism -- and 
the U.S. could not prevail with force alone.  Had the U.S. 
changed its strategy when deploying?  Was the U.S. preparing 
for old conflicts or had it developed a new paradigm to fight 
terrorism and to help others?  A/S Hillen agreed with 
Purwanto that non-traditional threats required new responses, 
and that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for 
them.  He added that the war on terror had political, 
economic, informational and operational dimensions; success 
depended on political legitimacy and economic development. 
In one of the most important lines in the QDR the Pentagon 
recognized the importance of non-military aspects of 
conflicts. 
 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) A/S Hillen described the genesis of GPOI in the 
2004 G-8 Sea Island Summit, and explained that the 
initiative's five-year goals are to: 1) train and equip 
global peacekeeping troops; 2) support deployment of 
peacekeepers though assistance for lift and sustainability; 
3) increase gendarme and police capabilities.  He noted that 
Thailand, Mongolia, Malaysia and Bangladesh were already GPOI 
partners. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Purwanto responded that Indonesia had established 
a new task force at the Department of Foreign Affairs and a 
training center to increase Indonesian PKO capabilities.  He 
noted that Indonesia since independence had contributed to 
peacekeeping forces under UN auspices in many parts of the 
world.  The new peacekeeping center would encourage 
Indonesian scientists and others to assist in Indonesian PKO 
efforts; they would also focus on development of equipment. 
He noted that Indonesia until now sent peacekeepers only to 
operations under UN authority, and had not yet considered 
other frameworks. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) A/S Hillen assured Purwanto that GPOI did not 
compete with UN peacekeeping activities.  He explained that 
the U.S. had wanted the UN take over the PKO in Dafur, Sudan, 
but that the OAU currently had the force there.  The UN could 
be one tool, but the U.S. had seen many examples -- the 
tsunami relief effort was one -- in which waiting for the UN 
 
SIPDIS 
to respond would have taken too much time. 
 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) A/S Hillen said Washington needed good news about 
Indonesia for the new mil-mil relationship to endure.  The 
relationship involved mutual commitments.  In that regard, 
the U.S. would like for Indonesia to join PSI.  Doing so 
would send an "important and profound signal" to Congress and 
 
JAKARTA 00001819  004 OF 008 
 
 
would help build mutual trust. 
 
¶17.  (C) Purwanto responded that the GOI appreciated the 
briefings on PSI given by visiting U.S. teams, but the GOI so 
far had not decided to participate.  Because of the high 
value Indonesia placed on the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), and the importance to Indonesia of maintaining 
its territorial integrity and borders, Indonesia did not want 
to join any arrangement it perceived not in line with UNCLOS. 
 
¶18.  (C) A/S Hillen said he appreciated GOI willingness to 
consider U.S. entreaties to join PSI, and emphasized that 95 
percent of PSI activity would occur in port, not on the high 
seas, and UNCLOS would not come into play.  He added that 
many participants in PSI are firm supporters of the rule of 
law and they saw no contradiction between PSI and UNCLOS or 
their own national laws. 
 
¶19.  (C) Purwanto reiterated that Indonesia had long been 
known for its strong commitment in multilateral fora to 
non-proliferation and disarmament.  Indonesia shared the U.S. 
commitment to "eradicate the bad guys" engaged in 
proliferation.  Although Indonesia was not in a position to 
"join" PSI, would there be any possibility for Indonesia and 
the U.S. to develop a "different framework but still do 
everything in PSI without joining PSI," Purwanto asked.  He 
added that "room for Indonesia to cooperate is still open." 
 
¶20.  (C) A/S Hillen responded that, in the end, finding an 
alternative to PSI would be better than doing nothing at all. 
 The U.S. and Indonesia should not confuse means and ends, 
and ends are important in this case.  However, Indonesia may 
still want to consider PSI because means take on symbolism. 
In his trips to Congress to request funding for Indonesia, he 
wanted to describe Congress Indonesian commitments, shared 
commitments; PSI and other types of cooperation would matter. 
 The GOI should keep in mind activities we could undertake 
jointly to demonstrate to Congress and to the Indonesian 
Parliament that we are building and sharing trust and 
sacrifice in partnership with each other. 
 
Non-Surrender Agreement or SOFA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (C) A/S Hillen urged Indonesia to conclude a 
non-surrender agreement or robust status of forces agreement 
(SOFA) with the U.S.  He referred to past efforts to come to 
agreement on an Article 98 Agreement, said he understood the 
large number of issues and the complexity of reaching an 
agreement, but said that the U.S. and Indonesia should 
continue their dialogue on this issue.  He noted that the 
Secretary would likely raise the issue during her visit to 
 
SIPDIS 
Indonesia.  The U.S. deemed an agreement important for the 
sake of the relationship and A/S Hillen therefore requested 
the forbearance of the GOI to consider a non-surrender 
agreement with the U.S. 
 
¶22.  (C) Purwanto explained that having just embraced 
democracy, the Indonesian government must reflect the 
positions of all stakeholders -- and some oppose conclusion 
of an agreement that could facilitate impunity for human 
rights abuses.  Further, because Indonesia is not a party to 
the Rome Statute, it need not consider a non-surrender 
arrangement.  Under the Indonesian legal system, the 
government must have the approval of parliament for any 
agreement involving political, security or human rights 
issues.  The GOI needed "time to digest" the U.S. offer 
before responding and presenting such an agreement to the 
Indonesian people.  A/S Hillen repeated that the U.S. and 
Indonesia could also consider a robust and permanent SOFA. 
He noted, nevertheless, that over 100 countries had signed 
Article 98 agreements with the U.S.  Purwanto suggested that 
it might be possible to address U.S. concerns through an 
agreement other than an Article 98 agreement, such as a SOFA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Indonesian Regional Perspectives, Security Priorities 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶23.  (C) Indonesian delegation head Purwanto emphasized in 
his presentation on regional perspectives and security 
priorities the importance of protecting Indonesia's 
territorial integrity and Indonesia's "active commitment to 
world social justice and peace."  He mentioned Indonesian 
peacekeeping efforts in countries with internal conflicts 
(Cambodia and Southern Philippines) and GOI mediation efforts 
 
JAKARTA 00001819  005 OF 008 
 
 
in the South China Sea. 
 
¶24.  (C) Purwanto explained that ASEAN had "re-energized 
itself for stronger cooperation in ASEAN and with its 
dialogue partners" to address issues such as 
counterterrorism, maritime security, infectious diseases, 
disaster relief.  The original ASEAN members established the 
organization to end conflict in the region, and its success 
in doing so had allowed members to focus energies to 
resolving internal problems. 
 
¶25.  (C) Indonesia occupied a strategic location and remained 
a "relatively young archipelagic and littoral country," 
Purwanto said.  Indonesia was in the early stages of assuming 
responsibility for maritime security and welcomed assistance 
from friendly countries.  In the Malacca Strait, Indonesia 
had undertaken joint activities with other littoral states. 
Indonesia had established a new coordinating agency for 
maritime security, "BAKROKAMLA," within the Coordinating 
Ministry; members include representatives from Sea 
Communications, Coast Guard, and the Navy.  User states were 
free to offer assistance "without being intrusive." 
 
¶26.  (C) Purwanto expressed appreciation for steps by the 
U.S. Administration to support democracy in Indonesia and to 
end restrictions on military-to-military relations.  He noted 
that with the Armed Forces Law of 2004 civilian control over 
the military had been firmly established.  He said that 
Indonesia wanted to "go past arms exports from the U.S." and 
sought closer collaboration to include joint development and 
co-production of weapons in Indonesia.  He concluded that 
Indonesia had much left to do to reorganize its armed forces. 
 
¶27.  (C) The U.S. delegation asked about future developments 
in ASEAN.  Purwanto said he believed that the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF) could help with confidence building measures, 
through more dialogues, to prevent potential conflicts and 
build trust and stability in the region if connected to the 
Strait of Malacca.  This could provide real and practical 
cooperation.  Purwanto repeated the suggestion he made in the 
earlier session that Indonesia was willing to work with the 
U.S. outside the framework of PSI and was "looking for ways 
to build a mechanism" to do so. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Review of U.S.-Indonesia Pol-Mil Relations 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶28.  (C) A/S Hillen opened the U.S. review of bilateral 
political-military relations by assuring the Indonesian 
delegation that the U.S. had lifted all sanctions.  He 
emphasized that the President and Secretary had put their 
political reputations at stake by doing so.  The U.S. was 
aided in its decision to normalize military relations by 
Indonesia's hard work and by the reaction to cooperation 
between Indonesia and the U.S. during tsunami relief efforts. 
 However, many of the issues that caused friction in the past 
remained and both sides should exercise caution that issues 
not "bubble up" again.  A/S Hillen suggested, for example, 
that there were some security units that the U.S. would be 
unable to work with. The Embassy had submitted a robust plan 
for increased military assistance to Indonesia, which the 
State Department supported.  Several programs were available 
to bolster assistance, for example provision of excess 
defense articles (EDA).  In the current fiscal year, USD 1 
million was available for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
and USD 792 thousand for IMET.  Vetting of individuals/units 
receiving training remained a legal requirement.  It may 
become necessary, as we map out the mil-mil relationship, to 
make some tough decision, A/S Hillen cautioned, because 
considerable congressional scrutiny remains. 
 
¶29.  (C) The Defense Resource Management Study Program could 
serve as an important tool for TNI reform, and could help the 
Administration demonstrate Indonesian seriousness in reform. 
The U.S. and Indonesia needed to address some logistical 
issues -- such as completion of an Access and Cross Servicing 
Agreement (ACSA) and a 505 Agreement -- as well.  A/S Hillen 
noted that the defense cooperation ideas Purwanto had 
proposed earlier seemed intriguing; cooperation could begin 
government-to-government and the two governments could 
subsequently press for industrial cooperation.  ODC Chief LTC 
Comer noted that the Embassy had already set in motion 
discussion of an ACSA with the Indonesian Department of 
Defense (DEPHAN); BG Cholik responded DEPHAN Secretary 
General Syfrie Samsudin had concurred with conclusion of an 
 
JAKARTA 00001819  006 OF 008 
 
 
ACSA.  Purwanto observed that such practical considerations 
constituted the "heart of the matter," and asked for further 
details on a 505 Agreement, which Embassy officers promised 
to provide. 
 
¶30.  (C) BG Cholik asked whether the lifting of restrictions 
would be permanent, because this would affect planning and 
budgeting for the Defense Department and TNI.  A/S Hillen 
replied that lifting of the "embargo" was permanent and no 
time limit applied.  However, the two governments needed to 
"rush through the open window with good news and actions" to 
demonstrate progress in outstanding issues and the value of a 
normalized relationship.  He repeated that the Administration 
would not revisit the decision, unless a major event -- to 
include human rights problems -- drove such a review.  A/S 
Hillen reiterated that the Administration had moved past the 
decision to lift the embargo -- but significant scrutiny of 
the relationship would continue.  This applied as well to 
vetting, done in accordance with the Leahy amendments, the 
application of which a number of critics of Administration 
policy would examine closely.  The Administration would 
continue to push, but the better it could demonstrate 
concretely the wisdom of the decision to normalize, "the 
better off we will be."  A/S Hillen added that at times 
disappointment would arise or decisions from the U.S. side 
would appear unfair; however, both sides must exercise 
caution and not risk the overall program by pushing through 
an activity that could jeopardize it. 
 
¶31.  (C) Purwanto said that Indonesia needed to guarantee the 
security and safety of its waters and would focus on maritime 
security.  A gap in equipment -- particularly the lack of 
compatible equipment -- could hinder maritime security 
cooperation with other countries.  Purwanto asked that U.S. 
ensure compatibility with army equipment for any equipment it 
provides for maritime security.  Further, the U.S. (through 
the ICITAP program) has provided Indonesia's Maritime Police 
small boats, but that trained personnel remained inadequate; 
he asked that the U.S. consider additional training for 
trainers -- to include programs in the U.S. -- for the 
Maritime Police.  A/S Hillen agreed with the importance of 
supporting Indonesia's maritime security efforts:  this was 
clearly in U.S. security interests, given the importance of 
Southeast Asia; it helps deter aggression and enhance 
security; and it would improve interoperability, enabling 
Indonesian forces to work better among each other and with 
allies and partners. 
 
----------------------------- 
Indonesian Defense Priorities 
----------------------------- 
 
¶32.  (C) BG Cholik, Director of International Cooperation at 
DEPHAN, emphasized Indonesia's internal security and 
stability when he briefed on Indonesia's defense priorities. 
The "threats and disturbances" to Indonesia he listed 
included "sea and air security threats" and international 
terrorism, but were far more focused on internal threats: 
separatism; radicalism; communal conflicts; destruction of 
the environment; natural disasters and their impact; 
international crime; illegal immigration.  Cholik broadly 
sketched broad Indonesia's "national interest" as 
guaranteeing "the welfare of all of the Indonesian people who 
are within the 'unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI)' which is 
based on Pancasila and the 1945 constitution." 
 
¶33.  (C) BG Cholik said Indonesia's "permanent strategic 
interest" was to "guard and protect the country's sovereignty 
and the unity of Indonesia and the country's honor from every 
threat, form outside as well form inside the country." 
Indonesia's "urgent strategic interests" include:  fighting 
and overcoming the international terrorist threat; overcoming 
the threats and disturbances of armed separatism; counter 
radicalism; solve communal conflict and help rehabilitation; 
overcome and prevent international crime; assist civil 
government (local government). 
 
¶34.  (C) Among the "general policy descriptions" Cholik 
described to fulfill these interests were improvement of TNI 
professionalism, developing national strategic industries, 
establish of early warning capability, and develop the 
"minimum regular force, reserve and supporting forces." 
Procurement of weapons should correspond to actual and 
potential threats, the GOI political directive that TNI 
develop the "minimum essential force" necessary to address 
them, and the capabilities of national defense industries. 
 
JAKARTA 00001819  007 OF 008 
 
 
 
¶35.  (C) Weapons procurement priorities for the TNI Army are 
purchase of arms and tactical vehicles; human rights 
simulator for shooting training; and engineering equipment. 
For TNI Navy DEPHAN prioritized patrol craft; transport 
ships; and corvettes.  Air Force procurement priorities are 
maritime patrol aircraft; transport aircraft; and radar.  For 
the TNI generally, DEPHAN prioritizes counterterrorism 
equipment.  Cholik noted that "international terrorism is the 
enemy of all the world community and must be fought together 
by the international community," noting that terrorism had 
become a threat to the safety of the nation and a threat to 
democracy and civil society.  He described the 
counterterrorism units within TNI and POLRI and the role of 
the Counterterrorism desk within the Coordinating Ministry 
for Political, Security and Legal Affairs (MENKOPOLHUKAM). 
 
¶36.  (C) A/S Hillen expressed interest in further discussion 
of Indonesian strategic thinking and for the Indonesian 
delegation to expand its description of the threat 
environment.  Indonesia's focus on maintaining the country's 
territorial integrity was clear, but with the end of the 
conflict in Aceh, what concerns did Indonesia have in 
addition to Papua?  A/S Hillen asked whether the government 
would own national strategic industries or did the GOI 
contemplate private/public ownership?  A/S Hillen noted that 
BG Cholik had described weapons procurement priorities for 
each service; based on U.S. experience, combined procurement 
programs had benefits. 
 
¶37.  (C) Purwanto replied that despite the costs associated 
with national strategic industries -- which compete with 
other priorities for national resources -- Indonesia "as an 
independent country wanted to be as independent as possible" 
and meet its own needs.  He noted that Indonesia had such 
industries, but the larger among them needed assistance. 
Also, for economic reasons -- Indonesia had 36 million 
unemployed -- Indonesia needed to restore its economy and 
sourcing defense materiel in Indonesia would assist.  Further 
development of these industries would also provide experience 
and allow creativity. 
 
¶38.  (C) Of the threats facing Indonesia, separatism is the 
most important, followed by "infiltration" of the country for 
political reasons and economic reasons (e.g., illegal logging 
or smuggling), Purwanto explained.  The potential remained 
for "horizontal conflicts," a third type of threat, because 
of political or economic reasons (competition for economic 
resources).  A fourth threat, according to Purwanto, was the 
accessibility of "ideas" made possible through globalization: 
 individuals could become radicalized through exposure to 
foreign ideas; terrorism, for example, had been built up 
because of foreign ideas.  Fifth, natural disasters and 
pandemic diseases that "appeared inexplicably" in Indonesia 
posed threats, too.  Sundawan, from the National Intelligence 
Service (BIN), added that a potential threat could arise from 
competition over natural resources in the sea; Indonesia 
needed to strengthen the Navy to protect from illegal fishing 
and other attempts to take Indonesian resources.  He added 
that Indonesian sovereignty over its outer islands remained 
problematic and the GOI needed to take measures to 
exercise/demonstrate sovereignty there.  Strategic planning 
for counterterrorism remained important, and intelligence 
exchanges and information sharing could assist in this 
effort.  Indonesia needed U.S. assistance to improve 
professionalism, although interoperability remained 
difficult, Sundawan concluded. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Moving the Mil-Mil Relationship Forward 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶39.  (C) In concluding, A/S Hillen underscored the value of 
the opportunity for the two delegations to learn from each 
other during the day's meetings.  He proposed several 
principles that Indonesia and the U.S. could follow as they 
moved forward: 
 
1) Keep up momentum, talk often, let the political system 
know that we are talking; 
 
2) Maintain transparency; exchange information on what is 
happening in the field; 
 
3) Find good news, package it, sell it to build support for a 
continuation of programs; 
 
JAKARTA 00001819  008 OF 008 
 
 
 
4) Work toward interoperability -- to facilitate Southeast 
Asian security cooperation, PKOs, and to enable our two 
democracies to help solve problems; 
 
5) Work to find common approaches to global problems -- for 
example, energy, freedom of movement, Iran and DPRK 
non-proliferation; the U.S. and Indonesia will build 
understanding of each other by work together on such issues; 
this may involve some risk-taking as we find common 
approached; we need to become "entrepreneurs" in this; 
 
6) Achieve concrete results to demonstrate that cooperation 
pays dividends; as a practical matter, when the Secretary 
visits Indonesia soon we should have results we can deliver 
to demonstrate we have moved forward and crossed a threshold. 
 
 
¶40.  (C) Purwanto seconded the recommendation that the U.S. 
and Indonesia should maintain momentum.  This first pol-mil 
meeting provided a good start.  Thanking the U.S. delegation, 
he said that bilateral relations had "never been better" and 
that Indonesia was now duty-bound to fulfill the promise made 
possible by the window that the U.S. had opened. 
 
¶41.  (U) A/S Hillen cleared this cable. 
PASCOE