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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001818 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016 
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL PGOV ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: A/S HILLEN'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE 
MINISTER JUWONO 
 
REF: JAKARTA 0858 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER RAYMOND RICHHART.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
 (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Assistant Secretary John Hillen February 1 
described to Indonesian Defense Minister the "great 
anticipation" in the U.S. regarding Indonesia and the U.S. 
desired a robust relationship with Indonesia.  Juwono told 
A/S Hillen he would do whatever necessary to strengthen this 
relationship, which had become very important economically 
and politically for Indonesia.  A/S Hillen praised Juwono for 
the reforms the GOI had made in the Indonesian Armed Forces 
(TNI), and explained that the U.S. had a number of ways it 
could assist Indonesia improve TNI's capabilities.  Juwono 
assured A/S Hillen that support from the United States 
safeguarded the foundations of democracy and permitted their 
development into greater substance as a working democracy. 
Juwono described the important role TNI continued to fulfill 
in safeguarding Indonesian territory and noted GOI 
investigation into the killing of a Papuan youth by TNI.  End 
Summary. 
 
Robust U.S. Relationship with Indonesia 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) A/S Hillen praised Juwono for the reforms Indonesia 
had made in the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI).  Juwono 
replied that the credit for the transformation of TNI 
belonged to President Yudhoyono and Coordinating Minister 
Widodo, both of whom had already begun their efforts years 
earlier and continued them today.  Hillen described "great 
anticipation" in the U.S. regarding Indonesia and described 
new geo-strategic thinking in the U.S.  He said Secretary 
Rice wanted a robust relationship with Indonesia, that she 
was determined, and that she had the President's ear.  The 
Secretary considers Indonesia as a pivotal state for 
 
SIPDIS 
geographic, religious, Asian and strategic reasons, and would 
continue to do whatever necessary to make the bilateral 
relationship with the U.S. important to Indonesia. 
 
¶3.  (C) Juwono replied he would also do whatever necessary to 
strengthen this relationship, which had become very important 
economically and politically for Indonesia.  He observed that 
Indonesia had still far to go economically and that 
Indonesia's transition depended on how the "situation played 
out economically."  Otherwise, the country would just "muddle 
through."  Support from the United States safeguarded the 
foundations of democracy and permitted their development into 
greater substance as a working democracy.  Juwono explained 
that Indonesia's middle class amounted to less than 15% of 
the population and that the country's GDP of USD 1300 per 
year was about that of China; Indonesia must quadruple that 
number, he said. 
 
TNI Role in Safeguarding Indonesian Territory 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Juwono said that much of Indonesia's future depended 
on how the GOI managed its transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a full democracy and safeguarding Indonesian 
territory remained an important aspect of such management. 
A/S Hillen noted that the agreement that the GOI signed 
August 15 with the separatist Free Aceh Movement, which ended 
almost thirty years of fighting there, would help put an end 
to such territorial concerns.  Juwono explained that on both 
extremes of the country -- in Aceh in the west and Papua in 
the east -- Indonesia must do more.  Those areas "need to 
feel a part of the Indonesian mainstream on more equitable 
terms," but Papua remained a "triple minority" with different 
religion, ethnicity and culture. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Ambassador noted that Papuan leaders complained 
that the TNI presence had become too large, and that reports 
indicated TNI planed further troop buildups there.  Juwono 
responded that he did not believe this true and that NGO's 
had exaggerated increases.  TNI had relocated 
non-locally-based troops had rotated others out of Papua; 
better airlift capabilities could allow TNI to have fewer 
troops there also.  Juwono added he believed it normal for 
Indonesia to emphasize security in the province.  During the 
conflict in East Timor, TNI was concerned that Papua might 
attempt to break away as well. 
 
¶6.  (C) Juwono said that the GOI had discussed troop levels 
 
JAKARTA 00001818  002 OF 003 
 
 
in Papua and believed that a combined TNI and Indonesian 
National Police (POLRI) presence of 15,000 was appropriate, 
but the GOI could decide to change this.  He acknowledged 
this remained probably "5,000 too many for Papuans."  He 
added that the Ministry of Home Affairs currently was 
discussing the issue.  The Ambassador noted that Papuans 
appeared more receptive to a POLRI presence.  He added that 
he was encouraged to learn of the internal GOI discussion of 
the issue, since the U.S. had heard TNI had increased its 
presence there. 
 
¶7.  (C) Juwono recounted that he had received a delegation of 
20 Papuan leaders to discuss the death of a Papuan boy 
January 20 when TNI soldiers opened fire on a crowd in the 
remote town of Waghete (reftel).  Juwono agreed that the GOI 
should investigate the matter, and the GOI was looking at 
police reports, which claimed the group in which the boy had 
demonstrated had resorted to violence.  Juwono added that the 
GOI was "looking at the issue from both sides." 
 
Uses For U.S. Military Assistance 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) A/S Hillen asked whether bilateral military 
cooperation could assist in stitching such disparate areas of 
Indonesia together by giving TNI greater humanitarian 
assistance capacity.  He added that the U.S. wanted to 
strengthen regional stability, which could also bolster 
domestic security.  Juwono agreed that sea lines of 
communication remained important, noting that 46 percent of 
gas and oil from the Middle East passed through the straits 
of Malacca or Lombok.  Safe passage remained critical for the 
stability of China and Japan, and important for the U.S. as 
well. 
 
¶9.  (C) Juwono said that Indonesia's defense budget amounted 
to only USD 2.8 billion -- one half that of Singapore. 
Indonesia "piggybacked" on Singapore and Malaysia for the 
maritime security of the Strait of Malacca.  A/S Hillen said 
he thought this wise, adding that the U.S. now did everything 
in coalition with others.  He added he found great 
opportunities for Indonesia in such cooperation in terms of 
jointness and interoperability.  Juwono explained that 
Indonesia would focus primarily on improving TNI's 
capabilities in transportation and lift, and that it "did not 
aim for high-profile strike capability."  TNI's C-130 fleet 
was very useful for transporting troops to trouble spots as 
well as providing humanitarian relief.  Juwono expressed 
appreciation for PACOM's recent provision of a fleet hospital 
to TNI. 
 
¶10.  (C) A/S Hillen explained that the U.S. had a number of 
ways it could assist Indonesia to improve TNI's capabilities. 
 In addition to FMF, direct commercial sales had become 
possible, as well as the provision of excess defense articles 
-- which, however, required conclusion of a bilateral 
agreement.  PACOM Commander Admiral Fallon, the Department of 
State, and other U.S. agencies continued to explore many 
avenues for U.S. assistance.  A/S Hillen stressed the 
importance of describing to Congress bilateral activities and 
accomplishments.  Conclusion of an Article 98 Agreement and 
Indonesian support for the Proliferation Security 
Initiative's (PSI) Statement of Principles would signal 
progress in the relationship.  The U.S. and Indonesia could 
work together on programmatic aspects of the normalizing 
mil-mil relationship. 
 
Selling the Relationship in Washington 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  A/S Hillen noted that a shift in emphasis toward Asia 
had occurred in the State Department, and that, as a 
consequence, it was "a good time to discuss how we can lean 
forward in Indonesian-U.S. relations and how to package that 
relationship in Washington so we can sell it."  The 
Ambassador noted to Juwono that the investiture of the new 
TNI Chief of Staff would provide an excellent opportunity for 
the GOI to make clear statements regarding the direction of 
reform in TNI.  Juwono agreed, noted that General Sutarto, 
when he became Chief of Staff three and a half years earlier, 
had expressed sensitivity to civilian control and changes in 
TNI.  Now, TNI is waiting for the civilian government to 
"take up the reins of power and act responsibly." 
 
¶12.  (C) Juwono said that the "biggest issue in Indonesia" 
 
JAKARTA 00001818  003 OF 003 
 
 
was governance by civilian groups; donors had assisted at the 
local level with some success.  The Ambassador said the U.S. 
wanted to know how it could help bolster civilian control of 
TNI, adding that assistance to strengthen civilian 
procurement system could help.  The visit of A/S Hillen and 
BG Remington constituted part of an early effort to determine 
how the U.S. could best become part of the reform process. 
He added that Lt Gen (ret) Edwin Smith, President of PACOM's 
Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (APCSS), would 
visit soon to explore ways the Center could assist in 
improving general education within TNI and with the 
establishment of an NSC-type body in Indonesia.   A/S Hillen 
added that DOD programs could assist in evaluating TNI 
progress and needs.  Juwono replied that Indonesia was "one 
of the most under-managed countries in the world" and well 
behind Thailand and the Philippines. 
 
A Universe of Possibilities Exits 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) A/S Hillen said "everything is on the table" and 
that although detractors would exist, a "universe of 
possibilities" now existed.  He added that Ambassador Pascoe 
was pressing for an ambitious program and that the U.S. 
welcomed the broad recognition of Indonesia as a pivotal 
state.  Juwono emphasized that the U.S. should "not give 
Indonesia too much money" because of its limited absorptive 
capacity and that the "right amount has to be calculated." 
He recalled that during his tenure as Minister of Education, 
the World Bank had provided more assistance to education than 
the country could absorb, with consequent waste and 
distortions.  A/S Hillen assured Juwono that the U.S. wanted 
a program that increased and built capabilities.  Juwono said 
he hoped the U.S. could send more mid-grade officers to the 
U.S. for training; A/S Hillen replied that the U.S. hoped to 
increase funding levels for IMET programs. 
 
¶14.  (C) BG Remington said that the current window of 
opportunity for U.S. assistance to TNI was very large and 
that the U.S. could now undertake a number of rather 
important initiatives.  The U.S. needed to show progress and 
build a strong, active program with Indonesia by the end of 
the current U.S. administration.  He agreed that the U.S. did 
not, however, want to "overwhelm" Indonesia. 
 
¶15.  (C) The Ambassador noted that he was struck that 
Indonesia shared greater similarities in its democratic 
transition with countries in Eastern Europe than with other 
Asian countries.  The U.S. brings to the table fifteen years 
of experience in Eastern Europe, in which it developed a 
variety of approaches, not a "one-size-fits-all" program. 
Countries elsewhere had experienced many of Indonesia's 
needs; the U.S. had successes in its programs with them and 
could discuss with Indonesia bureaucratic transitions.  U.S. 
experience in training Georgia's Coast Guard, when it could 
not train the Navy, was such an example. 
 
¶16.  (C) A/S Hillen repeated that bilateral cooperation must 
outlast the current administrations of either country.  He 
said that when he looked out ten years he could see Indonesia 
comfortable in military coalitions.  The Ambassador added 
that the U.S. would be pleased to assist Indonesia to 
cooperate with Malaysia and the Philippines.  In its combined 
activities in the Sulawesi Sea, for example, the U.S. could 
assist in planning and provide other support. 
 
¶17.  (U) A/S Hillen cleared this cable. 
PASCOE