VZCZCXRO9863
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1374/01 0331120
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021120Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8809
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8921
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0520
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 2935
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
XMT AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 001374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON EINV EFIN KDEM KISL ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT TAKES UP DRAFT ACEH LAW 
 
REF: A. JAKARTA 1176 (FEW LEGISLATIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS) 
     ¶B. 05 JAKARTA 15860 (RESHUFFLE) 
     ¶C. 05 JAKARTA 13111 (FUEL SUBSIDY CUTS) 
     ¶D. 05 JAKARTA 12822 (RETIRED GENERALS) 
     ¶E. 05 JAKARTA 12416 (OPPOSITION FOCUS ON ACEH) 
     ¶F. 05 JAKARTA 11124 (SIGNING OF PEACE ACCORD) 
     ¶G. 05 JAKARTA 9749 (ASSESSMENT OF AGREEMENT) 
     ¶H. 05 JAKARTA 4027 (RESPONSE TO FUEL SUBSIDY POLICY) 
     ¶I. 03 JAKARTA 2360 (ELECTION LAW) 
     ¶J. 02 JAKARTA 7294 (POLITICAL PARTY LAW) 
 
JAKARTA 00001374  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason 1.4 (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Yudhoyono administration on January 26 delivered 
its draft Law on Governing Aceh (LOGA) to the House of 
Representatives (DPR) for debate.  The August 15, 2005 
GOI-GAM MOU, which ended the armed conflict, requires the 
law's passage by March 31 -- a deadline that would require 
legislative deliberation at a pace never before seen in the 
post-Suharto era.  The administration's bill appears 
generally consistent with the provisions of the MOU.  Up to 
this point, opposition to the MOU (and provisions in the 
draft law) has most often focused on the legalization of 
local political parties.  Other important aspects of the law 
cover economic activity and enhance the role of Islamic Law 
to a greater extent that the 2001 Law on Special Autonomy. 
Although the administration has won most of its recent 
battles in the legislature, and eventual passage of the LOGA 
appears likely, we see no basis for believing that opposition 
politicians will pull their punches or allow expeditious 
passage.  End Summary. 
 
TIMEFRAME 
--------- 
 
¶2. (U) Having received the draft LOGA, the DPR leadership 
will raise it at a plenary session scheduled for February 7. 
Under normal procedures, the plenary session would send the 
draft law to the Steering Committee, which would then 
determine whether to send the bill to one of the DPR's 11 
substantive committees, or to set up a Special Committee 
(PANSUS) for deliberations.  If the latter option is chosen 
-- as appears likely, given that the issues covered by the 
bill do not fit neatly into the mandate of any one existing 
committee -- legislators would require further time to 
establish a PANSUS, elect its leadership, and carve out time 
for its proceedings.  (Note: Yudhoyono has designated State 
Secretary Yusril Mahendra and Minister of Home Affairs 
 
SIPDIS 
Mohammad Ma'ruf to represent the administration's position 
during hearings at the DPR.  Lead Aceh negotiator and 
Law/Human Rights Minister Hamid Awaludin, who helped draft 
the Aceh MOU, told the Ambassador that Ma'ruf, and not Hamid, 
had responsibility for the LOGA.  End Note.)  As noted in ref 
A, the DPR has moved slowly in its 2004-2009 term, passing 
only two substantive laws in 2005.  Passage of as important 
and high-profile a bill as the LOGA prior to the March 31 
deadline would appear unprecedented in the post-Suharto era. 
 
LOGA GENERALLY TRACKS WITH MOU 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) The administration's bill appears generally 
consistent with the provisions of the MOU (ref F and G).  It 
defines Aceh as a province with "special authority to 
regulate and manage by itself affairs of administration and 
local community interests in accordance with the legal 
regulations in the system and principles of the Unitary State 
of Indonesia."  Article 7 provides the authority for Aceh to 
administer itself "in all public sectors," except for those 
in the central government's realm: "international affairs, 
defense, security, certain judicial matters (justisi), 
national monetary and fiscal matters, and certain affairs in 
the religious field."  This list tracks closely with the 
provisions of the MOU (1.1.2), but Article 7 (3) also opens 
the door to removing from the Aceh government's realm other 
matters "that are determined by legal regulations as within 
the authority of the (central) Government." 
 
ARMED FORCES, SECURITY PROVISIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The LOGA bill also appears to stop short of the MOU 
 
JAKARTA 00001374  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
(1.4.5) provision that "all civilian crimes committed by 
military personnel in Aceh will be tried in civil courts in 
Aceh."  Instead, Article 154 of the draft LOGA simply states 
"crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces in Aceh will 
be tried in accordance with legal regulations" and that these 
trials will be conducted "in an open and public manner."  The 
draft LOGA does not cover demobilization or the withdrawal of 
troops (which was accomplished by the end of 2005, in 
accordance with the MOU).  Article 153 does, however, specify 
that the TNI "is responsible for implementing national 
defense and other missions in Aceh, in accordance with legal 
regulations... (including) defending, protecting, and 
safeguarding the unity and sovereignty of the state (of 
Indonesia) in Aceh."  Article 155 specifies that the Police 
are responsible for maintaining security and order, and the 
LOGA reinforces that the Aceh Police are a component of the 
National Police.  (Note: The LOGA does not cover aspects of 
the MOU dealing with amnesty, reintegration, the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission, or dispute resolution and the GOI and GAM 
had not intended to cover such issues in the LOGA.  End Note.) 
 
LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES: A HOT BUTTON ISSUE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) While the MOU required a Law on Governing Aceh to be 
promulgated by March 31, it allowed the government up to 18 
months from the signing of the MOU to create "the political 
and legal conditions for the establishment of local political 
parties in Aceh."  Given the controversy surrounding this 
issue, the administration might have sought to postpone 
consideration of local parties until a later time.  Instead, 
though, the administration has confronted the issue head-on 
in the draft LOGA, with a 10-article chapter defining local 
parties and their rights and responsibilities.  Although 
their participation in elections for local legislatures is 
explicit, it remains unclear from the draft whether local 
parties would be entitled to participate in national 
elections.  The only hint that they might be able to is in 
Article 73, which specifies that these parties are entitled 
to "equal and fair treatment by the (central) Government." 
 
¶6. (U) In the immediate aftermath of the MOU's signing, 
political party leaders principally focused their opposition 
to the peace agreement on the MOU's provisions for local 
political parties.  Former President Megawati's Indonesian 
Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P) and former President 
Abdurrahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB) led the 
charge.  Together, these parties control roughly one-third of 
the seats in the House of Representatives.  Opponents of the 
MOU cited the requirements in existing law that all political 
parties have a national presence.  Aiming specifically to 
prevent the establishment of local parties, Article 2 of the 
2002 Law on Political Parties (ref J) required that parties 
have Executive Boards in half the country's provinces, half 
of the cities or regencies in those provinces, and half of 
the subdistricts in those cities or regencies.  Article 6 (1) 
(a) of the same law specified that political parties must 
have as their goal the realization of "Indonesia's national 
aspirations." 
 
¶7. (U) The 2003 Law on General Elections (ref I) went 
further, requiring that political parties contesting a 
national election must have boards of administrators in 
two-thirds of Indonesia's provinces, two-thirds of the cities 
or regencies in those provinces, and at least 1,000 members 
(or membership equal to 1/1000th of the population) in the 
subdistricts in those cities or regencies (Article 7). 
Article 9 of that law also barred from participation in 
subsequent elections any political party that failed to win 
at least three percent of the seats in the national 
legislature, or four percent of the seats in various local 
legislatures in half of the country's provinces, 
cities/regencies, or subdistricts.  Due to this threshold 
requirement, numerous parties that currently hold seats in 
the legislature will have to reincorporate themselves to 
participate in 2009's election. 
 
¶8. (C) PDI-P, which has remained a consistent opposition 
force in the legislature, is likely to continue to oppose 
provisions for the establishment of local political parties. 
This issue resonates deeply with many Indonesian 
nationalists, who genuinely see the MOU as eroding the 
supremacy of national unity, one of the core principles of 
Indonesia's "Pancasila" ideology, which has sacred status for 
many.  PKB's opposition is uncertain; Wahid was a leading 
 
JAKARTA 00001374  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
critic of the MOU (ref E), but he has become more closely 
aligned with Yudhoyono's administration since the December 
2005 cabinet reshuffle (ref B).  (Ref D explained the 
importance of opposition by retired military figures to the 
MOU; this opposition could resurface.) 
 
WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION IN PARTY LEADERSHIP 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) Article 67 of the draft law specifies that local 
political parties must have women in 30 percent of their 
leadership positions.  There is no similar requirement for 
national level parties.  The closest provision one can find 
on the national level is weak language in the 2003 election 
law requiring that parties consider selecting women for at 
least 30 percent of the candidate slots on their party lists 
(ref I). 
 
INDEPENDENT ELECTION COMMITTEE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) Expanding on the political provisions in the MOU, the 
draft LOGA provides for the establishment of an Independent 
Election Committee (KIP), to be formed by the Acehnese 
legislature, that would take on many of the functions 
performed in other provinces by regional branches of the 
General Election Commission (KPU).  The bill specifies that 
the KIP will administer the elections of the Governor, 
Regents, and Mayors.  It also provides that the KIP "may be 
given tasks" for the national elections and elections of the 
local legislatures in Aceh. 
 
ECONOMIC PROVISIONS 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The draft LOGA includes the central economic 
provisions of the MOU: 
 
- The draft LOGA allows Aceh slightly greater authority than 
the MOU stipulated; Article 123 provides for the Aceh 
Government to manage all natural resources in Aceh and its 
territorial waters.  However, while Article 128 stipulates 
that the Aceh Government can grant rights for fishing, 
mining, and forestry ventures, there is no parallel language 
on the exploitation of oil and gas reserves.  In addition, 
Article 199 stipulates that the contracts between the central 
Government and foreign countries or other parties related to 
oil and natural gas in Aceh remain valid. 
 
- While the MOU had simply stipulated that Aceh would retain 
70 percent of its revenues from hydrocarbon deposits, Article 
141 of the draft law specifies that it also would receive 80 
percent of the revenues from mining, fishing, and forestry. 
The 80 percent figure tracks with language from the 2001 Law 
on Special Autonomy.  That law stipulated that Aceh would 
receive, through a special fund, 15 percent of oil revenues 
and 30 percent of natural gas revenues. 
 
- Article 135 requires that the Aceh Government give 
"opportunity and protection" for workers from outside of 
Aceh, but it also requires them to register with the 
authorities.  Article 136 applies stricter standards for 
foreign workers in Aceh. 
 
- The Aceh Government's ability to borrow funds from domestic 
or foreign sources requires the agreement of the Finance 
Minister and "consideration" of the Minister of Home Affairs 
(Article 143). 
 
- The Aceh Government controls the right to lease or use 
property, for both domestic and foreign investors, "in 
accordance with existing norms, standards, and procedures" 
(Article 162). 
 
ROLE OF ISLAMIC LAW 
------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Although the MOU made no mention of Islamic Law, the 
draft LOGA has numerous provisions mandating or supporting 
the imposition of Islamic Law in Aceh.  These include: 
 
- Assigning the Aceh government responsibility for "arranging 
religious life, (by) implementing Islamic Law for (Islam's) 
adherents in Aceh, while protecting inter-religious harmony," 
and providing for a "clerics' role in the determination of 
 
JAKARTA 00001374  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Aceh policy" (Article 15). 
 
- Requiring that any candidate for Mayor, Regent, or Governor 
"carry out the religious law of his faith" (Article 61). 
 
- Requiring that local political parties "reflect" the 
"religion... of the Acehnese people," "put into effect and 
advance Islamic values," and "strive for the implementation 
of Islamic Law" (Articles 70, 71, and 74). 
 
- Recognizing the Court of Islamic Law for Muslims (Chapter 
XVII). 
 
- Requiring all Muslims to follow Islamic Law, and for all 
people in Aceh to respect the implementation of Islamic Law 
(Article 107).  (This will be further regulated in the Qanun 
Aceh, a form of provincial law that takes into account Aceh's 
culture and traditions.) 
 
¶13. (SBU) The 2001 Law on Special Autonomy had also provided 
for a Court of Islamic Law (Article 25).  Abdullah Puteh, the 
then-Governor of Aceh, announced in 2002 that the province 
would adopt Islamic Law, and the provincial legislature on 
numerous occasions took steps to advance and institutionalize 
the role of Islamic Law in Aceh.  While the draft LOGA's 
Islam-related provisions will not dramatically change the way 
of life in Aceh, they nevertheless would represent the 
strongest endorsement yet provided by the national 
legislature for Islamic Law in a part of Indonesia.  The 
religious provisions of the draft LOGA go significantly 
beyond the provisions of the 2001 Law on Special Autonomy, 
which did not explicitly require Muslims to follow Islamic 
Law.  Unlike the Law on Special Autonomy, the draft LOGA 
makes numerous scattered references to Islamic values and 
Islamic Law, beyond those listed above. 
 
OUTLOOK 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) The administration has secured a favorable result in 
recent high-profile parliamentary debates -- e.g., on fuel 
subsidy cuts (ref C and H) and rice importation (ref A). 
Given the commitment of President Yudhoyono and Vice 
President Kalla (concurrently the Chairman of Golkar, 
Indonesia's largest political party) to the Aceh peace 
agreement, we believe that the draft LOGA will eventually 
pass.  We doubt that the bill will enjoy a smooth or easy 
process, however, and passage within the time frame specified 
by the MOU would be extraordinary, given the DPR's extremely 
slow legislative pace.  Only budgetary bills and amendments 
have passed under tight deadlines.  GAM or Acehnese civil 
society concerns about delays in promulgating the LOGA might 
be assuaged somewhat if the DPR's debate and modification of 
the bill's controversial provisions take place in a 
transparent and open fashion. 
 
PASCOE