VZCZCXRO0322
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHIHL #0031/01 0581718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271718Z FEB 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0558
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0543
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0605

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HILLAH 000031 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/27/2016 
TAGS: KISL PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: CAR BOMB IN KARBALA KILLS EIGHT, CLERICS CONDEMN ACT BUT 
CALL FOR PEACEFUL RESPONSE, SOME RESIDENTS BLAME U.S. 
 
REF: A) HILLAH 0029  B) HILLAH 0028  C) HILLAH 0026 
 
HILLAH 00000031  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: AFRED FONTENEAU, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO, 
AL-HILLAH, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  A February 25 car bomb in Karbala killed 
eight and wounded 31.  An impromptu protest after the incident 
at the site of the attack included chants of "No, no America." 
Religious leaders in Karbala and Najaf were quiet after the 
incident, with no reports of calls from the mosques for 
demonstrations.  When contacted by local REO staff regarding the 
Karbala bombing, a representative of the senior Shi'a religious 
leaders in Najaf called for a non-violent response and did not 
place blame on the United States.  However, two political 
leaders in Najaf - one a SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq) member and one a Sadrist -- did fault the 
U.S. for the bombing.  The link, if any, between the Karbala 
attack and the February 22 bombing of the Al-Askariyah shrine in 
Samarra is unclear at this point in time.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
KARBALA CALM AFTER DETONATION OF CAR BOMB 
----------------------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) According to the Iraqi Police (IP) in Karbala, at 
approximately 10:55am on February 25, a vehicle concealed 
improvised explosive device (VCIED) was detonated in a 
neighborhood in southwestern Karbala city.  The neighborhood is 
outside the city center, where the twin shrines of Imams Hussein 
and Abbas are located.  The VCIED was parked near a market and a 
Shi'a mosque.  It was also approximately 50 meters from a police 
checkpoint and 250 meters from an IP station.  Eight people were 
killed and 31 wounded.  One IP officer reported that two 
policemen were among those killed.  There was no substantial 
damage to nearby buildings.  The bomb was remote controlled and 
had been placed in a Chevrolet sedan.  Local residents saw the 
bomber leaving the area after the explosion.  They seized and 
beat him before the police arrived and took him into custody. 
IPs and the Iraqi Army closed off streets in the neighborhood 
shortly after the incident. 
 
¶3.  (U) The Karbala Governor, Dr. Aqeel Mahmoud Al-Khaz'ali, 
appeared in a live interview on Al-Arabiya satellite television 
channel within an hour of the bombing and gave the basic facts 
on the incident.  After the attack, a small demonstration broke 
out near the site of the bombing.  Protestors chanted "No, no to 
terrorism," "No, no America," "No, No Saddam" and "Sayyid 
Sistani is a crown on our heads." 
 
¶4.  (C) Karbala IP Chief Colonel Razzak Abed Ali informed REO 
Hillah staff on February 25 that the suspect had an outstanding 
arrest warrant.  Iraqi Security Forces had previously seized 
weapons and explosives at the man's house.  The police have not 
yet indicated if the man is affiliated with any terrorist or 
other violent organization.  IPs believe the man is Shi'a. 
 
¶5.  (U) After the detonation of the VCIED on the morning of 
February 25, there were no calls from the twin shrines or from 
other mosques in Karbala for demonstrations against the attack. 
On February 26, Karbala was quiet.  Local REO staff reported 
there were no demonstrations, or speeches or statements from 
religious leaders.  IPs and IA members prevented people from 
entering the city center, where the twin shrines are located. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
NAJAF CLERICS, LOCAL LEADERS CALL FOR CALM; SOME BLAME U.S. 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶6.  (C) Local REO staff contacted several Najaf religious and 
political leaders on the afternoon of February 25 to get their 
reaction to the car bombing in Karbala.  Sheikh Ali Rubaiee, the 
office manager for Ayatollah Mohammed Ishaq Al-Fayadh (one of 
the four high-ranking Marja, or senior Shi'a clerics, in Najaf, 
of which Sistani is the leader) condemned the attack, blaming 
Wahhabis and other extremists who he said were using the 
security situation to attack the Shi'a.  He stated that the 
Ayatollahs (the four senior Marja) always call for peace among 
all Iraqis, and offered that Sistani said, "that even if half of 
the Shi'a were killed, he [Sistani] will not legitimize the 
killing of one Sunni."  The office manager said the Ayatollahs 
always call for peaceful protest and mourning, and for respect 
for the property and lives of all Muslims. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Sheikh Khalid Al-Noumani, a member of SCIRI and the 
Deputy Chairman of the Najaf Provincial Council, condemned the 
attacks and placed blame on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). 
Al-Noumani said he wanted "the people" to protect holy sites if 
the government could not do it.  He also criticized U.S. forces 
for poor coordination and information sharing with the ISF, and 
argued that this "crippled" the latter, preventing it from doing 
its duty.  Al-Noumani asked that the U.S. government take a 
 
HILLAH 00000031  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
clear position on the authority of the ISF and on Iraqi 
sovereignty. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Sahib Al-Ameri, a Sadrist political leader who is the 
head of the Shaheed Allah (God's Martyr) organization, 
criticized the Iraqi government for its handling of the 
situation.  He said that the Sadrists will continue protesting 
in order to apply pressure on the national government to require 
"the invaders" to withdraw from Iraq "after all the crises this 
country has witnessed because of them."  Al-Ameri blamed Zarqawi 
for the attack in Karbala, calling him an "American agent." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶9.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Given that the South Central region of Iraq 
is still tense after several days of large-scale protests and 
scattered violence after the February 22 attack in Samarra, 
which seriously damaged the Al-Askariyah shrine but resulted in 
no casualties, the lack of any substantial demonstrations 
despite the killing of eight people in Karbala highlights the 
fact that the Shi'a region's response will be most forceful when 
terrorists target significant holy sites. 
 
¶10.  (C) Responses from political and religious leaders to the 
Karbala attack mirrored those after the February 22 bombing of 
the Al-Askariyah shrine in Samarra.  The Marja'iyah in Najaf 
condemned the attack in Karbala and called for a non-violent 
response.  In addition, the senior Shi'a clerics around Sistani 
did not fault the U.S. for the February 25 bombing.  In 
contrast, two political leaders in Najaf placed at least partial 
blame on the U.S., with a local Sadrist blaming Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
leader Zarqawi for the VCIED in Karbala and declaring him to be 
an "American agent," much as Sadrists faulted the U.S. for the 
Samarra attack. 
 
¶11.  (C) The extent to which the Samarra bombing and the 
resulting violence has affected Iraqis' - both leaders and 
regular citizens - views of the Coalition is unclear.  The 
impromptu demonstration after the Karbala bombing with its 
anti-American message is likely an indicator of the increasing 
frustration Iraqis feel with the continuing violence and the 
slow pace of reconstruction, among other things, with the U.S. 
carrying a substantial portion of the blame for these problems 
among Iraqis.  The Samarra bombing seems to have substantially 
increased the level of frustration and anger among the Shi'a, 
who feel the things they value the most - key holy sites and the 
past and current religious leaders they represent - are under 
siege. 
 
¶12.  (C) Local political leaders seem increasingly willing to 
tap into this anger by blaming the Coalition for problems in 
order to appear more independent and to raise their own 
profiles, with Moqtada Al-Sadr serving as a successful model for 
this approach.  Increasingly, local leaders - even if they are 
on very good terms with the U.S. - see close relations with the 
U.S. as a political liability.  As an example, a senior member 
of the Karbala Provincial Council recently (prior to the Samarra 
bombing) asked REO staff to visit him in the governate complex 
only on Saturdays, when there would be few people in the 
building.  This PC member, an independent Islamist, has been and 
remains on very friendly terms with U.S. civilian and military 
officials in the region.  With provincial elections just over 
the horizon, Iraqi officials, and the religious leaders they are 
close to, will likely seek to put additional distance between 
themselves and the U.S., at least in the eyes of voters.  END 
COMMENT. 
FONTENEAU