VZCZCXRO5092
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHIHL #0024/01 0531347
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221347Z FEB 06
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0545
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0530
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0592

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/22/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: JAFARI NOMINATION VARIOUSLY GREETED WITH PRAISE, DISBELIEF, 
DEBATE IN SOUTH CENTRAL IRAQ 
 
HILLAH 00000024  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: GARY ANDERSON, ACTING REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO, 
AL-HILLAH, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The selection of Ibrahim Jafari as the choice 
of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) to serve as Prime Minister of 
the new Iraqi government was greeted by widely divergent 
reactions across South Central Iraq. Most Shi'a Islamist 
contacts praised Jafari, even as some UIA constituent group 
partisans, such as members of the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), expressed their surprise. 
Many contacts praised the man Jafari bested for the post, SCIRI 
Official Adel Abdul Mehdi. Most contacts credited Sadrists for 
securing the candidacy for Jafari, while Islamists and 
secularists differed widely on Jafari's prospects in the Council 
of Representatives (CoR) and his job performance to date. End 
summary. 
 
NAJAF: UIA ACCEPTS JAFARI, DEBATES MINISTERIAL ASSIGNMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Najaf Shi'a Islamists view the Jafari nomination as a 
victory for the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) and the Shi'a, and 
most treat his confirmation by the Council of Representatives 
(CoR) as a foregone conclusion. Najaf Islamic Dawa Member Dr. 
Majeed Zaini praised Jafari and maintained that the current 
Prime Minister enjoys widespread popular support. Sayid Riyadh 
Baher Al-Aloum, a Najaf Provincial Council (PC) member, credited 
Jafari's attempts to bring the Sunnis into the political process 
with creating "widespread acceptance" for his candidacy. The 
head of the student union in the College of Economics at Kufa 
University, Firas Abdul Ameer, a moderate Sadrist, praised 
Jafari and related that Adel Abdul Mehdi's perceived support for 
semi-autonomous regional governments made him less popular than 
Jafari, who supports maintaining one united Iraq. 
 
¶3. (C) The Najaf spokesman for the Fadhila Party, Hassan Hussein 
Allwan, praised the selection process as "legal and democratic." 
Allwan reported that the withdrawal of Fadhila Party Leader Dr. 
Nadim Al-Jabiri, who, he said, ceded the nomination rather than 
make broad ministerial concessions, sealed Jafari's bid for the 
Prime Minister post. Allwan maintained that support for Jafari 
within the UIA was "widespread." He argued that those unhappy 
with the current state of Iraq generally blame difficult 
circumstances rather than Jafari's personal performance. 
 
¶4. (C) One secular politician, however, citing the close vote 
within the UIA to select Jafari and what he described as 
Jafari's poor performance as Prime Minister to date, speculated 
that the "fragile" UIA consensus on Jafari might not hold. Abdul 
Al Al-Essawi, the Najaf leader of the Iraqi National Accord 
(INA), offered that, "we still believe that Jafari's selection 
will cause friction within the UIA." He maintained that Mehdi 
was more popular outside of the UIA, especially among the Kurds, 
and that Jafari's selection would exacerbate sectarian tensions, 
particularly between Sunni and Shi'a. 
 
¶5. (C) With most Islamists resigned to Jafari's assumption of 
the Prime Ministership, much speculation focused on ministerial 
portfolio assignments. Zaini, the Dawa representative, reported 
that the UIA had already formed committees to both internally 
vet minister candidates and to negotiate assignments and 
candidates with other parties in the CoR. Allwan, the Fadhila 
spokesman, avowed that Jalal Talabani had already been selected 
to serve as President, that Iyad Allawi was likely to become 
Defense Minister, that the UIA would maintain the Interior and 
Oil posts, with Oil going to Fadhila, and that a Kurd would 
become Minister of Foreign Affairs. Al-Aloum predicted that the 
UIA would maintain Interior, that Defense and Trade would go to 
the Sunnis, Oil would go to an independent such as Mithal 
Al-Alousi, and that a Kurd would become Vice President. The 
moderate Sadrist Ameer offered that the Shi'a and Kurds would 
retain all key ministries with minor posts such as those of 
Transportation and Human Rights left to the Sunnis. 
 
KARBALA: JAFARI'S BID LIKELY SECURE 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Karbala contacts reported that the selection of Jafari is 
likely to hold, but that intense jockeying would ensue over 
support for Jafari in exchange for ministerial appointments. 
Shaykh Ali Komonna, a former governor, political independent and 
prominent tribal leader, pointed to the Sadrists as the key to 
Jafari's selection. He reported that Sadrists used harsh 
propaganda to discredit Jafari competitors Mehdi and Al-Jabiri 
of the Fadhila Party, such as the circulation of documents 
alleging a connection between Mehdi and the Baathists and 
pro-Saddam Hussein articles allegedly written by Al-Jabiri. 
Komonna predicted that in spite of alienating Fadhila members 
 
HILLAH 00000024  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
with such tactics, Jafari would remain the UIA's choice. Karbala 
Editor Ali Al-Janabi, also an independent, argued that Jafari 
will become the next Prime Minister and offered that the UIA 
would control over half of the ministerial  positions. 
 
 
DIWANIYAH: SCIRI SHOCK AT JAFARI SELECTION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) In Diwaniyah, surprise, and in some cases shared 
condolences, greeted the selection by the UIA of Jafari to be 
Prime Minister. Shaykh Hussein Al-Khalidi, Diwaniyah Head of the 
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), 
allowed that "of course I cannot deny that all indications were 
giving the [nomination] to Dr. Adel [Abdul Mehdi.]" Dr. Haider 
Hamza Obaid, a religious independent, maintained that "many 
people were surprised, because the media and the public pointed 
to Mehdi as the most likely candidate." Obaid said that many of 
his friends with close ties to SCIRI offered one another 
condolences upon hearing the news. Obaid also reported that 
Diwaniyah tribal leaders were unsatisfied with the selection. 
Liberals concurred. Dr. Mazen Lilo, a law professor at Qadisiyah 
University, offered that "most of the people were looking for 
another person." 
 
¶8. (C) All contacts, religious and secular, credited the 
Sadrists with offering Jafari the support he needed to outpoll 
Mehdi among the UIA. Farhan Murad, the political editor of 
Diwaniyah newspaper, cited the connection Sadrists feel with 
Jafari's Dawa Party because Dawa's founder, Mohammed Baqr 
Al-Sadr, is an uncle of Moqtada Al-Sadr. Others cited the belief 
that Mehdi, were he to become Prime Minister, would grant Kirkuk 
to the Kurds, an act opposed by Sadr. And many contacts, 
religious and secular, noted their belief that Mehdi was the 
early favorite because of widespread public perceptions that he 
would be more favorable to the international community and to 
the United States. 
 
¶9. (C) Still, UIA contacts maintained that Jafari would be a 
strong Prime Minister. But most contacts, secular and religious, 
agreed that the issue is not yet over. Shaykh Hussein, of SCIRI, 
described Jafari as a strong leader and said that any failures 
attributed to him from his current stint as Prime Minister were 
the fault of circumstances beyond Jafari's control. (Note: 
Shaykh Hussein is a savvy politician and likely praised Jafari 
to REO Al-Hillah staff in large part to maintain a united UIA 
front before a U.S. government official. End note.) He added, 
"there is a small chance that the Council of Representatives 
will not vote Jafari in, and in that case Dr. Adel Abdul Mehdi 
will be the next choice."  Shaykh Hussein was firm in stating 
that the Prime Minister, whether Jafari or Mehdi, must be from 
the UIA and at least half of the key governmental positions and 
ministries must go to UIA members. Saad Madhloom, Diwaniyah Head 
of the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) and a 
political independent, said that the real test of Jafari's 
candidacy would take place outside of the UIA, on the floor of 
the CoR. "No one can say it is finished," he avowed. 
 
BABIL: JAFARI'S HARDLINE ON KIRKUK SEALS BID 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Babil Province officials and observers generally praised 
the Jafari nomination and predicted dire consequences were he to 
fail to gain the post. Kadhum Majeed Tomam, a Sadrist member of 
the Babil Provincial Council, praised Jafari for his strict 
stance against yielding Kirkuk to the Kurds, an act that many 
contacts across the region suggested that Jafari's competitor, 
Mehdi, would consider. Saad Al-Haddad, a pro-UIA journalist with 
Al-Hillah-based newspaper Al-Fayhaa, praised Jafari in almost 
the exact same words, calling the Prime Minister "more strict," 
a description also used by Babil Communist Party Head Dr. Ali 
Abdul Kareem, who favored the nomination of Mehdi because of his 
flexibility. 
 
¶11. (C) Others, while expecting the Jafari nomination, preferred 
the alternative. Bassem Jassem Al-Humaidi, a member of the 
Transitional National Assembly from the UIA slate who did not 
win a seat in the current CoR, offered that, "I wouldn't have 
hesitated for one minute to chose Mehdi." He reported that he 
favored Mehdi because of his perceived flexibility, versus the 
strictness of Jafari. Because of this, Al-Humaidi maintained, 
Mehdi is more capable of dealing with the Kurds and Sunnis, and 
is more acceptable to the international community. 
 
¶12. (C) None of the contacts saw much chance of Jafari failing 
to win the position. Tomam maintained that there was "zero 
expectations" that the CoR would not approve Jafari. Dr. Ali, 
the Communist leader, conceded that the Prime Minister should be 
a member of the UIA, and said that Jafari has a "great chance" 
to win the post. He predicted a "parliamentary crisis" if Jafari 
did not. Al-Haddad, the journalist, related that a surprise was 
 
HILLAH 00000024  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
not unthinkable in the political machinations surrounding the 
Prime Ministership, but said that if Jafari is not approved by 
the CoR, "the whole political process is going to fall apart." 
 
 
WASIT FADHILA AND INA: JAFARI'S BARGAINS WILL NOT HOLD 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶13. (C) In Wasit, CoR representatives both inside and outside 
the UIA doubted that Jafari's victory would last. Basim Sharif, 
presently a Fadhila TNA member and incoming CoR member, 
expressed his skepticism over the UIA's selection of Jafari. In 
Sharif's opinion, SCIRI's Mehdi is still well positioned to 
emerge as the UIA's nominee.  Though he conceded that Jafari's 
negotiating skill is formidable, he avowed that the Sadrist and 
Shi'a independent support that carried the day for Jafari is too 
unstable to be relied upon in the long term. According to 
Sharif, Jafari's selection cannot withstand the pressure of 
negotiation with Kurds, Sunnis and secularists in the search for 
a governing majority in the CoR.  Sharif asserted that the poor 
record of the current Jafari government in providing basic 
services and security and his weak record as an administrator 
would eventually cause the tide to turn against the Prime 
Minister. 
 
¶14. (C) Shaykh Jamal Al-Batik, the sole Allawi list 
representative from Wasit in the CoR, speculated that Jafari had 
offered a cabinet position to a member of the Wasit UIA list in 
order to gain their support. (Note: The Wasit UIA slate won 
seven of Wasit's eight allocated CoR seats. End note.) According 
to his (unconfirmed) information, Jafari offered Mohammed 
Al-Khateeb, the Wasit Deputy Governor and lead Wasit UIA 
candidate in the December 2005 election, a ministerial level 
position in a Jafari-led government. In spite of these efforts 
by Jafari, Al-Batik argued, his nomination would not survive. 
Al-Batik speculated that the Sadrists' refusal to cooperate with 
Allawi and his supporters, a seemingly necessary plank in the 
formation of a national unity government, would shatter the UIA 
coalition, and Jafari's support, and open the door to another 
nominee. 
ANDERSON