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Viewing cable 06HANOI244, A/S HILL DISCUSSES BURMA, CAMBODIA, LAOS, CHINA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06HANOI244 2006-02-06 06:55 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO6619
OO RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0244/01 0370655
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 060655Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0662
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0435
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4499
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6628
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0613
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 1627
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 2232
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 3504
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 1311
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 2140
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 3739
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000244 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM CB BM LA VM
SUBJECT: A/S HILL DISCUSSES BURMA, CAMBODIA, LAOS, CHINA 
WITH SENIOR VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATS 
 
 
1. Summary:  In a frank lunch meeting January 13 with 
visiting EAP Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill, senior 
GVN diplomats said that Vietnam is worried about China's 
increasing influence in Southeast Asia, particularly Burma, 
Cambodia and Laos, and urged the United States to engage 
more with these countries.  Hun Sen, they predicted, will 
"not go too far" in his political actions, which are 
designed to protect his efforts to secure public support for 
his coalition in advance of the 2008 elections in Cambodia. 
Incentives will have more of an effect on Hun Sen than 
criticism.  Both sides expressed a desire to pursue dialogue 
in a more formal channel in the future.  End Summary. 
 
2. EAP Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill met three 
high-ranking GVN diplomats for lunch January 13 at the 
Ambassador's residence:  Assistant Foreign Minister for the 
Americas Nguyen Duc Hung; Assistant Foreign Minister for 
Southeast Asia Do Ngoc Son; and, Ambassador Trinh Quang 
Thanh, Director General of the Institute for International 
Relations.  The conversation focused on China's role in Asia 
and U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, particularly 
mainland Southeast Asia.  The Ambassador, POL/C, PolOff and 
A/S Hill's Special Assistant also attended. 
 
3. A/S Hill observed that Vietnam is playing an increasingly 
positive role in the region, and that the potential for a 
close U.S.-Vietnam relationship is building.  Our 
relationship with Vietnam will not be focused on China, he 
predicted, but on our many common interests.  Vietnam's 
transformation into a capitalist economy is evident from the 
vibrant commerce visible on the streets of Hanoi, despite 
the prominent placement of statues of Lenin.  Ambassador 
Thanh responded that though Marxism-Leninism remains the 
ideological underpinning of the Vietnamese State, the people 
of Vietnam care mostly about peace, prosperity, security and 
the ability to send their children to good schools. 
 
CHINESE INTERESTS IN VIETNAM 
---------------------------- 
 
4. Ambassador Thanh acknowledged that Chinese investment in 
Vietnam is low compared to the very high (and growing) 
levels of trade, especially on the border.  The limited 
Chinese investment dollars are focused on natural resources, 
AFM Hung noted, highlighting Chinese interest in an 
investment in a bauxite mining operation in the Central 
Highlands near the Cambodian border.  This investment is 
particularly interesting because the Chinese have also 
purchased a 99-year lease on 40,000 HA of land on the 
Cambodian side of the border opposite the site of the 
planned Bauxite operation, Thanh said, ostensibly with the 
purpose of growing trees for paper pulp. 
 
BURMA AND CAMBODIA 
------------------ 
 
5. The huge land purchase on the border brings Cambodian 
politics into the picture, AFM Son noted, because the issue 
of the Vietnam-Cambodia border has become contentious and 
also because the land the Chinese purchased has an existing 
population of Cambodians that will be displaced.  Cambodian 
Prime Minister Hun Sen's political opponents have used 
sensitive international issues such as the border and the 
Chinese land purchase to inflame public opinion against him, 
Son said.  A/S Hill replied that Hun Sen has demonstrated 
his lack of sophistication in dealing with the opposition by 
treating them so harshly, thus turning local critics into 
international heroes. 
 
6. AFM Son noted that Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party 
(CPP) and FUNCINPEC have worked hard to strengthen their 
coalition and are actively preparing for the 2008 elections. 
The opposition's tactic of focusing on Cambodia's relations 
with its neighbors to fan nationalist sentiment and popular 
discontent is harmful to the CPP and FUNCINPEC.  Vietnam, 
AFM Son continued, solved its border problem with Cambodia 
on the basis of international law and past agreements in 
order to come up with a good, defensible solution.  A/S Hill 
commented that Hun Sen's problem is that he seems unable to 
 
HANOI 00000244  002 OF 003 
 
 
defend his regime's decisions in a public forum, and instead 
resorts to taking action against his critics. 
 
7. AFM Son said that Vietnam has been a frequent target of 
the opposition's efforts to undermine Hun Sen's government 
through criticism of improvements in Vietnam-Cambodia 
relations.  Still, Vietnam has refrained from responding in 
kind, and instead has pursued low-key confidence-building 
measures along the border, providing assistance to 
Cambodians in border areas by allowing them to use 
Vietnamese infrastructure such as hospitals and schools. 
"Cambodian politics are complicated and difficult to 
understand, so we do not try to interfere," he said.  The 
Ambassador noted that there is a big difference between 
interference and constructive influence, and Vietnam is in a 
position to constructively influence developments in Phnom 
Penh.  A good example of constructive influence can be seen 
in the ASEAN statement on Burma, he added. 
 
8. Responding to A/S Hill's statement that Burma has become 
an embarrassment to ASEAN, Ambassador Thanh said that the 
result of the international pressure on Burma, from ASEAN 
and other countries, has been to drive Burma "into the arms 
of the Chinese."  The United States, Ambassador Thanh said, 
needs to engage Burma more.  AFM Son agreed.  "The more 
pressure we put on Burma, the closer the Burmese get to 
China," he said, pointing out that the Chinese Foreign 
Minister skipped the July 2005 ASEAN Post-Ministerial 
Conference (where Burma was forced to give up the 2006 
Chairmanship of ASEAN) and instead went straight to Rangoon. 
The Burmese regime is defensive and wary of Western 
countries, Ambassador Thanh pointed out, because it believes 
that its legitimacy and survival are in jeopardy.  The 
Burmese are close to China, he continued, but their only 
alternative to balance China has become India.  AFM Hung 
opined that the United States should engage more with 
Southeast Asia in general, and mainland Southeast Asia in 
particular.  Burma, Cambodia and Laos are all moving closer 
and closer to the Chinese orbit because of perceived 
hostility or indifference from the United States, he said. 
 
9. A/S Hill asked about the potential influence Thailand and 
Vietnam could have over Hun Sen and the regime in Burma. 
AFM Son observed wryly that Hun Sen is very shrewd and 
listens to Vietnam only when it is both convenient and 
profitable for him to do so.  Hun Sen is also very capable 
of manipulating his neighbors and other countries in the 
region, Son said.  Hun Sen knows that the top priority for 
regional countries is stability in Cambodia, with the 
secondary concern being growing Chinese influence.  These 
concerns restrict the degree to which regional countries can 
pressure Hun Sen.  Thailand could conceivably have a larger 
role to play, but the Thai are still recovering from the 
breakdown in relations that occurred between Cambodia and 
Thailand in January 2004 (following the torching of the Thai 
Embassy in Phnom Penh).  In general, Thailand lacks the 
goodwill and trust of its neighbors, but Vietnam and 
Thailand have coinciding interests in the region. 
 
10. AFM Son noted that in Hun Sen's mind, the opposition 
uses his accomplishments and the things he does to build the 
country as tools to discredit him.  He is both pragmatic and 
nationalist, AFM Hung observed, and as a result, confronting 
him bluntly on any issue is likely to fail.  AFM Son said 
that the top priority of Hun Sen and FUNCINPEC is to improve 
their popularity in advance of the 2008 elections, and their 
strategy for doing that is to "build the country and develop 
the economy."  Anything the United States could provide to 
assist with that will have a positive effect on Hun Sen, he 
predicted.  China knows this, he said; in August 2005, Hun 
Sen visited China and came away with USD 200 million in aid 
and low interest loans for infrastructure development.  A/S 
Hill observed that Hun Sen's actions in Cambodia have become 
a real problem, generating serious negative attention and 
creating a situation where Cambodia could become as much of 
a pariah state as Burma is.  AFM Son predicted that Hun Sen 
"will not let it go too far" because he is, in the end, 
practical and reasonable. 
 
 
HANOI 00000244  003 OF 003 
 
 
LAOS 
---- 
 
11. AFM Hung said that one constant for all Southeast Asian 
countries is the understanding that they need good relations 
with both the United States and China, and that excessive 
closeness to either is not in their best interests.  With 
that in mind, the United States can expect both Cambodia and 
Laos to open up to better relations, unless, due to 
excessive pressure, they become completely alienated like 
Burma.  Ambassador Thanh noted that Laos is not opposed to 
better relations with the United States, but has been 
disappointed with the results of its efforts so far.  Laos 
expected to see much more benefit from signing the BTA with 
the United States, but the signing did not lead to 
additional projects to alleviate poverty, Laos' top 
priority.  Ambassador Hill replied that the allocation of 
U.S. resources to a country is a function of that country's 
strategic importance to the United States and U.S. domestic 
interest.  Unlike, Afghanistan, for example, Laos has 
neither strategic importance nor U.S. domestic interest. 
AFM Son replied that Laos does have importance to China, and 
as a result, the Chinese are moving in fast, especially on 
the economic front. 
 
U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS 
---------------------- 
 
12. A/S Hill noted that policy discussions on regional 
issues are very useful for the United States and suggested 
the United States and Vietnam think seriously about how to 
pursue dialogue more systematically.  AFM Hung said Vietnam 
is ready and willing to pursue a strategic dialogue with the 
United States at the Vice Minister level.  Turning to WTO 
negotiations, A/S Hill urged the three senior officials not 
to let talks drag on over small points of contention because 
the end benefits for Vietnam will dwarf any small 
concessions made now. 
 
13. A/S Hill has cleared this message. 
 
BOARDMAN