This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GEORGETOWN 000167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM GY OAS
SUBJECT: A/SYG RAMDIN WANTS STRONG OAS ENGAGEMENT IN GUYANA 
 
REF: A. GEORGETOWN 71 
 
     ¶B. 05 GEORGETOWN 1350 
     ¶C. 05 GEORGETOWN 1271 
     ¶D. 05 BRIDGETOWN 2394 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Roland W. Bullen 
For reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  OAS A/SYG Albert Ramdin visited Guyana 
February 13-14.  Key takeaways from his visit are: a) Ramdin 
wants to increase OAS' involvement in Guyana and will act 
quickly to form a long-term mission of some sort; b) he wants 
any OAS electoral observation mission to act in close 
partnership with CARICOM and/or the Commonwealth; and c) he 
took fully on board donor concerns about Guyana's political 
climate, stating publicly and forcefully that elections must 
proceed as constitutionally due by August 4.  We believe 
Ramdin left with a far greater appreciation for the political 
intransigence, rather than technical problems, that threaten 
Guyana's ability to hold elections that are free, fair, and 
without fear of violence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Ramdin: OAS Wants Strong Engagement in Election Process 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2. (U) During his February 13-14 visit, Ramdin met with 
various stakeholders, including the GoG, opposition parties, 
the diplomatic community, and CARICOM.  He referred to the 
trip as the first official visit of more to come as he and 
OAS SYG Insulza are trying to reestablish stronger engagement 
with OAS members.  Ambassador hosted a lunch February 13 for 
Ramdin and the international donor community (U.S., UK, 
Canada, EU, UNDP, CARICOM, IDB, IMF). 
 
¶3. (C) At the lunch, donors shared with Ramdin their concerns 
that Guyana is on course for a political crisis.  They 
stressed the need for OAS to take an "early prevention" 
approach to Guyana, not only by sending a long-term observer 
mission for the 2006 elections, but also by establishing a 
stronger political presence in the country.  As an aside, 
Ramdin half-joked that his job would be easy if the consensus 
in Washington equaled that around the lunch table. 
 
¶4. (C) Ramdin broadly agreed with donor concerns about the 
elections, saying that OAS wants to be "engaged strongly in 
this process".  He also stated explicitly and repeatedly that 
when OAS gets engaged, it wants CARICOM on its side given 
that organization's "moral authority" in the region.  CARICOM 
A/SYG Granderson sounded a cautionary note, reminding the 
group of CARICOM's extreme prudence regarding its members' 
internal affairs and that regional heads are not seized by 
events in Guyana. 
 
¶5. (C) Ramdin accepted the donor view that delaying elections 
cannot be countenanced as an option and said that OAS would 
deliver that message clearly to political leaders. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Ramdin: No Country should be Held Hostage by Politicians 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶6. (U) Also on February 13, Ramdin and Commonwealth 
Secretariat Special Envoy to Guyana Sir Paul Reeves were the 
 
SIPDIS 
keynote speakers at the Private Sector Commission's 
"Elections and Democracy" lecture.  Both speakers hammered 
home the point that elections must proceed as 
constitutionally due and that any alternative to this would 
be, in Ramdin's words, "counter-productive, costly, and 
damaging". 
 
¶7. (U) In his remarks, Ramdin stated that elections are fair 
if the state provides conditions for a "reasonably level 
playing field" and that "no country should be held hostage" 
by the refusal of political parties and their leaders to 
accept election results.  He then spelled out his key steps 
to a successful election process -- an independent elections 
commission; timely preparations by the commission; clear 
deadlines for well-defined activities; proper training for 
poll workers and robust voter education; a cleaned-up, 
credible voter list; and a secure environment in which to 
vote. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Debriefing Donors and OAS' Next Steps 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Ramdin met again with donors the evening of February 
¶14.  He shared his reflections on the visit and spelled out 
what he sees as his plan for Guyana going forward. 
 
¶9. (C) Ramdin reiterated to donors that he wants OAS to 
partner with CARICOM in Guyana.  He said that after meeting 
with CARICOM, he still did not have a clear understanding of 
how involved they are willing to get in Guyana's elections. 
Nevertheless, he will make his Guyana trip report available 
to them.  He also wants to involve St. Lucia PM Anthony, who 
has the lead on governance and justice within CARICOM. 
Ramdin plans to visit him to advocate for a stronger CARICOM 
role in Guyana. 
 
¶10. (C) Ramdin described three key areas in the election 
process that he felt require far greater attention.  First, 
the political leaders themselves (President Jagdeo and PNC/R 
opposition leader Robert Corbin in particular) need to 
establish a dialogue, preferably informal and agenda-free. 
Second, the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) must do more 
to facilitate ongoing dialogue with the political parties and 
the public at large, working specifically to settle the 
dispute over the voter list.  Third, civil society must 
participate more actively in the process, holding more events 
like the previous evening's "Elections and Democracy" lecture. 
 
¶11. (C) As for OAS' plans, Ramdin will discuss his findings 
with Insulza and define their position in advance of an 
Insulza visit.  Between Monday noon and Tuesday evening 
Ramdin changed from saying that he hoped to get Insulza to 
visit Guyana, to saying that Insulza would visit, hopefully 
soon. 
 
¶12. (C) Ramdin clearly wants to increase OAS' involvement in 
Guyana, concentrating on crisis prevention, and preferably in 
close cooperation with CARICOM and/or the Commonwealth.  He 
envisions the OAS observer as someone who is actively 
involved in the election process -- the political as well as 
technical aspects.  Ramdin intends to move very quickly on 
getting a long-term observation mission to Guyana (i.e., by 
early March, before the March 19 end of continuous 
registration).  This was after getting assurances from 
President Jagdeo and from the major political parties that 
they all would welcome a long-term mission.  (Note:  Post 
subsequently learned that SYG Insulza had received a letter 
from the GoG  inviting OAS to send long-term observers, about 
which Ramdin was apparently unaware.) 
 
¶13. (C) Ramdin laid out a range of options for what the OAS 
observer mission might look like: a) Special Envoy, as in 
Haiti, although Ramdin felt this was the least likely option; 
b) Permanent Mission; c) Technical mid-level staff; or d) 
High-level person from the region who would come to Guyana 
periodically, although Ramdin said it would take at least two 
months to prepare this last option. 
 
¶14. (C) Ramdin sounded a little skeptical that the technical 
preparations for the election are entirely satisfactory.  He 
intends to put someone at OAS to work assessing GECOM's 
activity timeline and progress to date.  Post has e-mailed 
the Joint International Technical Assessor's monthly reports 
to Ramdin's advisor to assist. 
 
¶15. (C) The Canadian High Commissioner repeated to Ramdin 
that his government is willing to fund 2 or 3 long-term 
observers, but needs to obligate its money quickly before the 
March 31 end of Canada's fiscal year.  He also gave Ramdin a 
copy of the Terms of Reference they are using for these 
observers. 
 
¶16. (C) As the meeting wrapped up, Ramdin suggested a 
bargaining chip that might be used to mollify the opposition 
-- a pre-election agreement signed between the political 
parties, and with the international community as a guarantor 
in some fashion.  This agreement would contain an agenda of 
important issues that the political parties would be 
committed to discuss and resolve after the elections.  This 
would address one of the opposition's principal grievances -- 
that the governance reform process agreed to in 1997 is still 
unrealized.  Donors responded favorably to the concept. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶17. (C) Before moving to OAS, Ramdin lived and worked for two 
years in Georgetown as A/SYG of CARICOM (Granderson's 
predecessor), including the period of the last election.  He 
is very familiar with the players and issues in Guyana, as 
well as with the history of OAS' 2001 observation mission. 
He didn't say anything directly, but did just once allude 
briefly to "issues" that need to be worked out with the OAS 
bureaucracy regarding OAS' involvement in Guyana.  He also 
described how he and Insulza are "shaking up" OAS, including 
by traveling frequently to the field rather than staying in 
Washington. 
 
¶18. (C) Ramdin seems to be a realist when it comes to 
elections.  He repeatedly alluded to the fact that no 
election is perfect, but should be the best possible given 
local circumstances.  He referred specifically to his 
experience observing the December 2005 election in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines (ref D).  The voter list there 
contained 91,000 names -- demographically impossible given a 
general population of 110,000.  But Ramdin walked away from 
that experience confident that the will of the electorate had 
prevailed.  Such common sense does not prevail in Guyana's 
political opposition, which makes unrealistic demands while 
discrediting simple solutions like properly using indelible 
ink on election day.  End Comment. 
BULLEN