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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR P, R, EUR, SA, S/P 
NSC FOR MERKEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/6/2016 
TAGS: PREL PROP KDEM KPAO RS ZK
SUBJECT: THE CIS NEEDS A CNN RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE SERVICE 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy 
Dushanbe. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) This message is Central Asia specific, but it is 
relevant to the other countries of the former Soviet Union, 
including Russia, as the other U.S. ambassadors to CIS countries 
agreed during a January 4 meeting in the Department with U/S 
Burns. 
 
¶2.  (C) Russia is increasingly flexing its political and 
economic muscles in the region.  In principle, there is nothing 
wrong with this, but it is doing so as a way to carve out a 
"sphere of influence" - a concept that the United States 
rejects.  A World Bank study released on January 31 warned that 
two blocs are forming in Europe-Eurasia - a relatively rich and 
traditionally liberal bloc identified with Western values, and a 
poorer, authoritarian bloc in the former Soviet Union led by 
Russia. 
 
¶3.  (C) It has become clear that Russia's goal is to limit the 
influence and presence of the West in "Russia's bloc" to the 
fullest extent possible.  The unrelenting Kremlin attack on U.S. 
democracy NGOs over the past 18 months, asserting they are U.S. 
intelligence-agency tools working to overthrow existing 
governments in order to encircle, isolate, and weaken Russia, 
has been especially harmful.  Russia's promise, yet to be 
delivered, of massive investments in Central Asia gives these 
governments less reason to pursue economic reform to meet 
international standards.  And so, both our political and 
economic agendas for this region are increasingly challenged. 
 
¶4.  (C) In Central Asia, 90 percent and more of the population 
rely on television and, to a slightly lesser extent, radio for 
news, information, and general world-view.  Even poor villages 
bristle with satellite dishes.  What is available to these 
populations is state-controlled broadcast media and, most 
popular of all, Russian television broadcasts.  Russian 
television is now state-controlled, and the Russian press is 
increasingly state-influenced.  Because of this, it is 
increasingly hard to get the U.S. message to the general public 
in Central Asia.  What the people know about the United States 
and its policies is largely what the Kremlin wants them to know 
- and that is not to the benefit of the United States. 
 
¶5.  (C) Traditional U.S. public diplomacy will always have a 
role to play, but it relies increasingly on Internet-based 
products.  Internet is still not broadly used in Central Asia, 
especially at home, and users who do access our sites are a 
specialized, self-selecting audience likely to be already 
well-disposed toward the United States.  Speakers, artists, and 
other special programs are one-off events.  They are almost 
always extremely well-received and make a momentary splash, but 
they reach a miniscule portion of the population. 
 
¶6.  (C) RFE/RL radio broadcasts reach at very best 15 percent of 
the population, VOA radio much less, and VOA TV programs, where 
they are rebroadcast (not in Tajikistan), reach even fewer.  In 
theory, the United States could mount a major new broadcast 
effort, but considering priorities and budget limitations we 
acknowledge that is most unlikely.  Further, the generally 
literate adult populations of Central Asia lived under the 
Soviet media regime, and the younger part of the population has 
grown up with rigidly controlled, and head-bangingly boring, 
state broadcasts.  All want something independent from 
government, including from the U.S. government. 
 
¶7.  (C) We need to think outside the box.  One way to achieve 
this would be through a Russian-language service of CNN 
International.  CNN already has language services - e.g., 
Arabic, Turkish, Spanish - and in theory could initiate a 
Russian service.  The demographics would seem to be promising, 
with an increasingly wealthy Russia, and also Kazakhstan.  In 
fact, EUR DAS Bryza is aware of a generally progressive (for the 
region) broadcasting corporation in Kazakhstan that might 
welcome a joint venture with CNN that could broadcast direct by 
 
DUSHANBE 00000239  002 OF 002 
 
 
satellite throughout the CIS. 
 
¶8.  (C) CNN Russian service would be beneficial for the entire 
CIS, not the least Russia, especially as Moscow moves toward the 
2008 presidential election, and beyond.  The World Bank report 
emphasizes that the emergence of two blocs in Europe-Eurasia is 
not yet necessarily a given.  We should do everything possible 
to ensure that we do not drift into an ideological Cold War-II. 
 
¶9.  (C) If the Department decides it is worthwhile to pursue a 
CNN Russian option, the point of contact is CNN International 
Managing Director Chris Cramer (404-827-3491).  We would suggest 
that the best contact from the Department to initiate this 
discussion would perhaps be U/S Hughes or U/S Burns. 
HOAGLAND