This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR EI NIPP
SUBJECT: GOI THOUGHTS ON PEACE PROCESS AND SAINT PATRICK'S 
DAY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Kenny for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Begin Summary.  On January 30, the Taoiseach, the 
ministers of foreign affairs and justice, and other senior 
Irish officials told Special Envoy Mitchell Reiss that the 
GOI would like to see the Northern Ireland institutions 
restored in 2006 on the basis of the Good Friday Agreement. 
The foreign ministry painted the rosiest picture; the 
Taoiseach was more realistic about the challenges.  He said 
he did not expect major breakthroughs until after the April 
IMC report, since the February IMC report did not give a 
clean bill of health to Sinn Fein and the IRA.   The 
Taoiseach noted that the White House Saint Patrick's Day 
events were significant.  He said that his meeting with the 
President is what the Irish government most values, but that 
there would also need to be a Northern Ireland dimension.  In 
the Taoiseach's view, the most effective tactic would be to 
invite all the parties as members of a large reception, but 
not to do a special event for them and not to pick a Northern 
Ireland-based theme, as in recent years.  The Taoiseach felt 
that excluding the parties would simply give them an excuse 
to play the martyr card; including them in a larger reception 
would give the President an opportunity to deliver a clear 
message to all parties.  At a private luncheon, President 
McAleese and Dr. McAleese suggested that more involvement by 
the U.S. with loyalist militias (specifically, a meeting with 
the Special Envoy) would help move these groups to 
decommission.  End Summary 
 
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Taoiseach, Collins Discuss the Peace Process and the DUP 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Michael Collins, Secretary General and senior Foreign 
Affairs advisor to the Taoiseach, reviewed the Taoiseach's 
meeting with PM Blair several days previous.  He said that 
the two agreed that the institutions should be back up within 
the year but decided against setting a public deadline.  He 
noted that there was discussion of publicly saying that the 
institutions should be up before the marching season begins, 
but that the risks of not meeting a precise deadline were too 
high.  He said the two prime ministers also had agreed "to 
churn the process" in order to keep Ian Paisely's DUP party 
on edge.  The regular meetings between FM Ahern, Northern 
Secretary Hain and the parties are designed to keep the 
 
SIPDIS 
pressure on the DUP, as are efforts to strengthen North-South 
cooperation. Asked how far down the road the GOI would take 
North-South cooperation, Collins indicated that the Irish 
government would be prepared to have the GOI and HMG make 
more decisions together on administering Northern Ireland but 
is uncertain how far the UK is prepared to go.  The Taoiseach 
joined the meeting at this point, and said that the Northern 
Ireland Office (NIO) would oppose joint Irish-British 
decision making and that to date, "Number Ten does not deal 
with the micro issues" of governing northern Ireland. 
 
¶3. (C)  Discussion about DUP intentions followed, with 
Collins repeating the view that it is hard to read Ian 
Paisley, that one moment he seems to want to see the 
institutions up so that he can be First Minister and the next 
moment, he seems to want to end his days the way he has lived 
them:  railing against nationalists and refusing to share 
power with Sinn Fein.  Practically, Collins agreed, there is 
not much incentive for DUP to engage now.  DUP believes that 
a post-Blair British government would be more in its 
interests and it is not facing any pressure from its 
constituents to stand the institutions up. 
 
¶4. (C) The Taoiseach said there are two ways of moving the 
DUP.  One way is to publicly blame the DUP for lack of 
movement, but that is not the best move tactically.  The 
other way is re-engagement on North-South elements of the 
Good Friday Agreement, including more ministerial meetings 
and using the North-South and East-West bodies to take 
substantive decisions in areas such as fire fighting, 
establishing an all-island register of pedophiles, and 
coordinating infrastructure spending, such as on roads, 
electricity and telecommunications.  Collins added that while 
the GOI was considering points of leverage on the DUP, it was 
not planning to use them until after the talks among FM 
Ahern, Northern Secretary Hain and the parties had gotten 
underway. 
 
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A Deal in 2006? 
--------------- 
 
5.(C)  We asked Collins and the Taoiseach to clarify the 
difference between the GOI's determination in public and at 
the DFA to see the institutions up this year and their own 
seemingly more pessimistic view of bringing DUP along. 
Collins said that they are watching to see if the ongoing 
talks with the parties create a momentum and show the DUP 
that the ship is turning, thereby encouraging them to engage. 
 
¶6. (C)  The Taoiseach said that at this moment, the DUP wants 
to drag talks out until elections in Ireland and the UK, both 
likely in 2007.  He said that the GOI will keep talking with 
the DUP but that the GOI "can only play along so long.  We 
need to make political decisions at some point.  We also need 
to see what nationalists do, especially as they protest lack 
of reciprocity from the DUP."  After the April IMC report, 
the Taoiseach said, "no one will have patience with DUP." 
"Never in their life have the DUP made a positive decision," 
said the Taoiseach. 
 
¶7. (C)  The Taoiseach said that if the DUP did not engage in 
the process, he would consider giving a speech in which he 
reminded people that the Republic of Ireland had changed its 
constitution to relinquish its claim to Northern Ireland only 
on the basis of the promise of the Good Friday Agreement.  If 
that promise is not met, he said, he would indicate that 
Ireland could consider changing its constitution again. 
Comment:  that Ireland relinquished its constitutional claim 
to Northern Ireland was a major change and a cornerstone of 
the Good Friday Agreement.  The Taoiseach's comment that he 
would consider suggesting Ireland could go back on that is 
stunning.  He confided that he has already mentioned this 
scenario to Blair.  While it is unlikely that Ireland would 
revisit the constitutional issue, a speech from the Taoiseach 
even hinting that they might would have major repercussions. 
Given that 2007 is an election year for the Taoiseach, it is 
certainly possible that the Taoiseach would give such a 
speech, strengthening his nationalist credentials before 
voters go to the polls.  End Comment. 
 
------------------- 
Saint Patrick's Day 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C)  The Taoiseach opened discussion of Saint Patrick's 
Day events in Washington by saying that he could "see the 
dilemma" the U.S. might be facing in trying to decide whether 
or not to invite the parties.  He repeated that the most 
important aspect of the day was his meeting with the 
President and an emphasis on the bilateral relationship. At 
the same time, he said, the best way to handle the parties 
was to invite them all, cut out any special Northern 
Ireland-focused ceremony and simply include them in a low-key 
way in the general reception.  The President, he said, could 
address the parties collectively, in an even-handed way.  He 
could offer credit where credit was due, such as on 
decommissioning, but could also send a clear message to the 
parties, including on policing.  In this way, the USG could 
give an impetus to talks to restore the institutions.  On the 
other hand, excluding the parties would simply give them the 
martyr card they both like to play.  "It's always an 
advantage to northern parties to be excluded" he said. 
 
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President and Dr. McAleese Discuss Loyalists 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  Over lunch, President McAleese expressed the view 
that the DUP would not move without pressure, and that the 
"gradual greening of the north" is likely to be the most 
effective pressure.  London's approach, she said, has always 
been appeasement.  Martin McAleese briefed Ambassador Reiss 
on his contacts with loyalist militias, the desire of many 
within this group to play a more positive role, and their 
frustration at being isolated, by the DUP as much as by the 
NIO.   Dr. McAleese broached the idea that a meeting between 
some of the loyalist leaders and the U.S. Special Envoy for 
Northern Ireland could help move the loyalists toward 
decommissioning. 
BENTON