This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000219 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/PD, NEA/ARPI; S/CT FOR MARK THOMPSON FROM RYE 
INFO NSC FOR ABRAMS, DOD/OSD FOR SCHENKER AND MATHENY 
LONDON FOR ARAB MEDIA OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/12/2011 
TAGS: PREL KPAO QA ALJAZEERA
SUBJECT: AL JAZEERA AND KIDNAPPING TAPES 
 
REF: DOHA 104 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Chase Untermeyer, reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary: Officials from Embassies Doha and Baghdad 
met with Al Jazeera leadership on Feb 11 to discuss Al 
Jazeera,s handling of videos that Al Jazeera receives from 
terrorist hostage takers, its broader editorial polices, and 
the media,s role in hostage and terrorist crises.  Al 
Jazeera officials defended their policy of showing but not 
sharing hostage videos, but agreed to raise the issue with 
the Al Jazeera Board of Directors for reconsideration after 
hearing technical arguments about how the videos can be used 
in a hostage case.  Al Jazeera impressed upon the U.S. side 
the breadth and scope of its reach, its impending growth and 
reorganization, and its sincerity in its struggle to be 
accepted as a global, independent, legitimate, mainstream 
media network, while protecting its desire not to be "held 
hostage" to the agendas of either governments or terrorist 
groups. End Summary. 
 
¶1.  (S/NF)  Embassy Doha Public Affairs Officer Mirembe 
Nantongo and Embassy Baghdad Hostage Working Group Director 
Erik Rye met with Wadah Khanfar, Managing Director for Al 
Jazeera on Feb 11, primarily to convince Al Jazeera to share 
copies of hostage videos delivered to them by what are most 
likely terrorists organizations in Iraq.  Khanfar is an 
urbane and smooth spokesman who dealt directly with the issue 
at hand.  Embassy Doha has built cooperative personal 
relationships within Al Jazeera that resulted in a hostage 
video being passed to the Unites States once, but that was an 
exception to official policy, which is to allow Embassy 
officials on-site viewing and note-taking from the tape. 
Khanfar articulated a video policy that was case-specific, 
but based on the principles of not giving free advertising to 
propagandists--terrorists or otherwise; not showing suffering 
or humiliation; protecting the safety of the hostage 
foremost; and showing only those portions of the tape deemed 
newsworthy--such as proof of life of the hostage.  Khanfar 
said that for these reasons they will note editorially that 
the origins of the tape cannot be confirmed nor the content 
corroborated; they will usually not show either the 
terrorists nor the hostage speaking, but will note in a 
voice-over the contents of the tape. (Note:these voice-overs 
have included the demands and claims of responsibility of 
hostage-taking groups in the past.  End note.)  Khanfar also 
stated that Al Jazeera would make an editorial statement 
condemning the kidnapping and calling for the victim's 
release when the victim was a journalist, but would otherwise 
maintain journalistic objectivity when running stories on 
other hostages.  Khanfar noted that in the Jill Carroll case, 
they had worked with Islamic and Arab community leaders to 
publicize statements of condemnation. 
 
¶2.  (S) Rye explained that minute details in such tapes, such 
as colors and patterns of background materials, can be used 
to corroborate other information that could break open a 
case, and can,t possibly be described accurately enough with 
any amount of note-taking.  Rye also explained that any such 
information is most useful only if it has not yet been 
broadcast, since once hostage-takers know the tape has aired, 
they can cut off connections to information and individuals 
in the tape.  Information on tapes is time-sensitive, and 
thus getting access to them immediately is critical.  Also, 
given the number of people involved in working on hostage 
cases within the USG, often remotely located, it is necessary 
to be able to transmit copies of the tape in order to 
"connect the dots" of useful information.  Having one USG 
observer view the tape simply isn't effective.  Rye also 
commented that statements of condemnation are desirable in 
general, but in a specific hostage case can be a double-edged 
sword if they have an unpredictable impact on kidnappers, and 
thus in an ideal situation, any media messages would be 
coordinated with those handling the case.  Rye noted that 
hostage tapes were different from tapes of other news events, 
since they held information pertaining to an ongoing 
crime--the kidnapping--as well as also holding potential 
clues to a future crime--the killing of a hostage.  For those 
reasons, hostage tapes should be subjected to a more nuanced 
"tape policy".  Lastly, Rye noted that Al Jazeera had an 
interest in not making concessions to hostage-takers in the 
form of airing their videos on-demand, since it would only 
encourage further attempts by terrorist groups to manipulate 
Al Jazeera. 
¶3.  (S) Khanfar appeared to take these arguments to heart, 
and noted examples when Jazeera had refused to air certain 
tapes, and described how the propaganda portions of videos 
were excised.  He appeared sincere about nurturing Al 
Jazeera's journalistic independence and integrity, and 
defending it from being seen as the mouthpiece of extremism. 
He articulated in detail Al Jazeera's desire to remain free 
of influence from terrorists groups.  Khanfar agreed to raise 
the issue of hostage tapes with the board of directors at 
their next meeting.  But he also noted that their lawyers had 
been advising them to avoid handling tapes in a manner that 
would lead to subpoenas and possible court appearances by Al 
Jazeera staff.  Whatever their next decision, the potential 
of tapes to be considered evidence in legal proceedings will 
remain a crucial factor in determining the level of 
cooperation Al Jazeera will offer.  Khanfar also was 
sensitive to the idea of being asked to do something 
particularly for the United States, and clearly did not want 
to be in a position where they would be seen doing favors. 
The U.S. side suggested that other governments with hostages 
in Iraq would most likely be appreciative of increased access 
to videos, and any hostage video policy should be applied 
equally to all countries with hostages. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. team also met with Editor-in-Chief Ahmed 
Sheikh, who unlike Khanfar digressed into historical and 
political arguments for Arab nationalism and Palestinian 
statehood.  He seemed to have a genuine concern for hostage 
survival, however, and noted that they feared not airing 
tapes could provoke a killing, but that airing the tapes with 
deadlines would "start the clock running".  Rye noted that 
third parties were never responsible for the actions of 
terrorists or hostage takers, and could not go too far down 
the road of restricting or taking actions to influence the 
hostage takers, since that ultimately led to making 
concessions and opening Al Jazeera to further manipulations. 
Skeikh said that he wished they never received any tapes, and 
was glad that a recent Jill Carroll video ended up with a 
Kuwaiti TV station and not Al Jazeera. (Note: Although the 
tapes are no doubt a headache, his remark is probably 
somewhat disingenuous since Al Jazeera continues to make a 
name for itself in the Arab and Western worlds breaking 
stories of this nature.  His remark also conflicts with an 
offhand admission by Khanfar that they see other stations 
such as the Kuwaiti channel that aired the Carroll video as 
competitors.  Sheikh speculated that the Kuwaiti 
channel--which aired Carroll speaking--was probably given the 
tape because Al Jazeera ran the last Carroll video with a 
brief clip and voice-overs only and that Al Jazeera had 
effectively driven the hostage takers to another channel to 
get the amount of coverage they desired.  End note.) 
 
¶5.  (S/NF) Comment: these and other Al Jazeera officials also 
explained the coming expansion of Al Jazeera into a truly 
global network, including an English language channel and an 
over-arching management structure that will enforce uniform 
policies across its several outlets.  As Al Jazeera continues 
to define its place in the media world and its relationship 
with the West, its role in influencing popular perceptions of 
terrorist events and groups will only increase.  This 
increasing responsibility has already resulted in a clearly 
defined code of ethics and editorial policies, and increasing 
transparency in how those guidelines are carried out.  They 
know they are under the microscope, and want to be taken 
seriously.  Al Jazeera's growing globalization will only 
increase the pressure upon them to adhere to international 
standards of journalism and result in an organization that 
can be dealt with upon familiar ground, and within a 
framework already established by the mainstream media.  End 
Comment. 
UNTERMEYER