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DE RUEHDM #0517/01 0391547
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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7004
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0624
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL KDEM SY
SUBJECT: THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA; PART I:  COULD THEY 
WIN AN ELECTION HERE? 
 
REF: 05 DAMASCUS 1377 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (U) This is the first of two cables that assess the 
potential political influence of the Muslim Brothers in 
Syria. 
 
¶2.  (U) PART I.  DIFFICULTIES IN ASSESSING MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
POWER; CONSTRAINTS ON MB INFLUENCE 
 
¶3.  (C) Summary:  In the wake of former VP Khaddam's 
flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood's exiled leadership in 
January, and Hamas's recent electoral victory in the 
Palestinian territories, many observers of the Syrian 
political scene are asking themselves what kind of political 
power (or potential) the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
Islamist elements have here in Syria.  While there has been a 
rise in Islamism (with some fundamentalism) in Syria in the 
past 20 years, we assess that the potential political 
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has been 
exaggerated.  Putting aside likely continued SARG opposition, 
the most striking constraint on the potential appeal of any 
repackaged Muslim Brotherhood grouping is the heavy minority 
make-up (35 percent) of the Syrian population that is 
generally opposed to any Islamist domination.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶4.  (C) TALKING ONLY THEORETICALLY:  It is difficult to 
assess clearly the potential power of the Muslim Brothers at 
a time when the Asad regime has destroyed the movement and 
engages in ongoing repression (and reinforcement of the 
exiled status of the MB's leadership) to ensure they are not 
able to rebuild.  It is also difficult to assess their 
potential support relative to other political currents in 
Syria, such as pan-Arabism, Syrian nationalism, and 
Ba'athism, given the current lack of free and fair elections. 
 When asked about the power of the Muslim Brothers, 
interlocutors often inquire whether one is considering a 
situation "of full democracy" or one in which the regime 
still controls elections and the political environment.  In 
free and fair elections, some type of Islamist political 
current would almost certainly play a major role in Syria, 
although it is doubtful that the Muslim Brothers could 
reconstitute themselves to assume that role, given present 
conditions. 
 
¶5.  (C) VARIOUS SCENARIOS TO CONSIDER:  Observers assert that 
if the regime were still in control of the electoral process 
but wanted to make a show of free elections, it would 
manipulate the situation, as in Egypt, to win and to show 
that their chief rivals were extremist MB-type Islamists. 
Some note, in addition, that a sudden collapse of the Asad 
regime, possibly caused by outside intervention,  might 
remove some of the natural restraints on an MB resurgence. 
The result could be a sudden spike in MB/radical Islamist 
power, which would likely be nourished by the group's 
takeover -- from discredited collaborationist Islamic clerics 
-- of the extensive network of mosques and other Islamic 
institutions present in Syria.  The more likely scenario for 
the 2007 elections is that the regime allows new political 
parties but prohibits any based on religion (or ethnic 
factors), preventing an Islamist bloc from forming, whether a 
conservative, MB-dominated one or a more moderate Islamic 
bloc exluding the MB (and possibly allied with some Sunni 
businessmen). 
 
¶6.  (C) MB PARTY ORGANIZATION COMPLETELY DESTROYED:  The 
influence of the Muslim Brothers is limited nowadays because 
they are weak on the ground in Syria.  The SARG destroyed 
their political organization in the early 1980's and they 
have not recovered because of ongoing SARG repression.  An 
entire network of competing Islamic institutions and 
personalities now exists in Syria, which would oppose any 
reasserting of Muslim Brother influence, noted moderate 
Islamist and MP XXXXXXXXXXXX (although many in this 
network, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, support allowing the MB to return 
to Syria).  In addition, the efforts of Muslim Brother 
leaders in exile to moderate their positions to make them 
more politically attractive in Syria (and less threatening to 
minorities and to the regime) has reinforced a perception 
that they are opportunistic, cannot be trusted, and will say 
anything to augment their influence.  Their recent flirtation 
with former Syrian VP Khaddam has reinforced this widely 
shared perception of their opportunism. 
 
¶7.  (C) OTHER CONSTRAINING FACTORS:  In addition to SARG 
 
 
repression, there are some natural constraints on the ability 
of Islamist groups like the MB to dominate Syrian politics. 
There is a developed tradition of nationalist politics in 
Syria, some of it pan-Syrian, some of it pan-Arab, some of it 
practiced by former communists.  Much of it has been 
dominated in the past by, for example, Christian political 
figures and intellectuals.  Hence, there is a tradition of 
minority politicians attracting Sunni Arab voters, according 
to XXXXXXXXXXXX, a Christian MP from Damascus who depends on 
Sunni Arab voters for some of his mandate.  (Note:  He 
belongs to an offshoot of the secular Syrian Socialist 
Nationalist Party.)  Political dissident XXXXXXXXXXXX put it 
somewhat differently to PolChief, noting that "our society is 
predominantly Islamic, but our politics have always been 
diverse.  I am a Sunni, but a Communist." 
 
¶8.  (C) THIRD OF POPULATION ANTI-ISLAMIST MINORITIES:  Most 
observers assess that the potential power of the Muslim 
Brothers (and other similarly inclined Islamist political 
groups) in Syria will also be constrained because of Syria's 
population mosaic.  They note that minorities constitute at 
least 35 percent of the Syrian population.  Although 75 
percent of the population is Sunni, ten percent of that total 
is Kurdish, rather than Arab.  The Kurdish population, in 
general, identifies more with strains of Kurdish nationalism 
than with Sunni politics and considers itself part of the 
minority population of Syria, along with Christians (ten 
percent), Druze (three percent), Alawites (12 percent), and 
smaller groups, including Shiites, Ismailis, Yazidis, and 
others.  In greater Damascus alone there are some one million 
Christians, representing 20 percent of that important 
population center. 
 
¶9.  C) Although some of these minorities are Muslim, all 
oppose Sunni Arab domination and would not support any 
conservative Islamist political current dominated by a group 
like the Muslim Brotherhood.  (Note:  In the Palestinian 
territories, by point of contrast, where Hamas, an offshoot 
of the Muslim Brothers, recently won an overwhelming 
political victory, Sunni Arabs make up some 97 percent of the 
Palestinian population.) 
 
¶10.  (C) CLEAVAGES IN ANY ISLAMIST BLOC?:  Politicians and 
other observers disagree about the potential level of support 
for an Islamist bloc.  Some, such as MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, posit 
relatively high overall potential support for overtly Islamic 
political alternatives (up to 50 percent of potential 
voters), while others, like former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, provide 
lower assessments of the size of any potential Islamic 
current.  Nonetheless, many point to significant cleavages 
within this potential bloc of (largely Sunni Arab) voters. 
XXXXXXXXXXXX points to divisions between conservative Muslims, 
reform-oriented Muslims, secular Sunnis, and a tiny segment 
(one percent or less) of fundamentalists (with only a 
minority of them advocating violence).  Others like XXXXXXXXXXXX (and former political prisoner) XXXXXXXXXXXX say that fundamentalists probably represent a larger 
group, perhaps as much as ten percent of the total, but 
concur that significant cleavages exist and that elections 
would compel competition among these groups for Muslim 
voters. 
 
¶11. (C) MUSLIM-MINORITY COALITIONS CREATING SPLITS?:  There 
is also a long tradition in Syrian politics of Sunni 
politicians straddling cleavages between these different 
Muslim tendencies, for individual political gain, and a 
related tradition of these politicians building individual 
coalitions with non-Muslim voting blocs (who would oppose any 
Sunni Islamist domination).  These traditions, according to 
former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX (a Sunni politician well-practiced in both 
traditions), could exacerbate existing cleavages in any 
potential Islamist bloc. 
 
¶12.  (C) SYRIAN POLITICAL TRADITION ALSO A LIMITING FACTOR: 
Modern Syrian political history and tradition also point away 
from any MB/radical Islamist takeover in future elections. 
While the MB or their forerunners have been around in Syria 
since the 1920's, they have never been very successful in 
Syrian politics, and certainly have never come close to 
attaining a majority in any election, note observers such as 
historian XXXXXXXXXXXX and dissident XXXXXXXXXXXX.  Also, 
Sunni political and business elites, who tend to have 
community influence through their employment power and 
prestige far beyond their actual numbers, have no tradition 
of supporting calls for the full implementation of Sharia law 
or the formation of an Islamic state.  Finally, there is no 
history of a decades-long foreign military occupation of the 
 
type endured by Palestinians that would radicalize the Syrian 
population, added XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
¶13.  (C) AS IS DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM IN SYRIA:  In addition, 
Islam in modern Syria (unlike in neighboring Turkey, with its 
decades-long Kemalist tradition in the early 20th century of 
official suppression of Islam) has been allowed to flourish 
and develop at its own pace, notes xxxxxxxx.  This has allowed 
moderate, dissident, and skeptical tendencies within the 
Islamic community to develop and provide buffers against 
radical Islamic doctrine.  There have also been no violent 
societal upheavals, of the kind that Iraq has recently 
witnessed, that would encourage frightened, mass lurches 
towards more extreme Islamic tendencies, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. 
 
SECHE