VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0392/01 0331508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021508Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6841
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0608
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000392 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: AN ALAWITE-SUNNI CHAT ON KHADDAM, FUTURE OF REGIME 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1.  (C)  The criticisms and maneuvering of former VP Khaddam 
continue to generate intense private discussion in Syria. 
According to Sunni politician XXXXXXXXXXXX on January 30, a 
retired senior Alawite military officer pribvately endorsed 
Khaddam's views and noted fears that he and other former 
Alawite security officers might be arrested for sympathizing 
or conspiring with Khaddam.  This officer pressed XXXXXXXXXXXX to 
find out if the U.S. wanted to get rid of Bashar al-Asad or 
preferred to maintain his minority regime in Syria. 
Separately, XXXXXXXXXXXX touched briefly on the political strength 
of recently released detainee Riad Seif and on the potential 
political power of the Muslim Brotherhood.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) A SUNNI-ALAWITE CHAT:  Sunni politician XXXXXXXXXXXX
recounted for Polchief January 30 a discussion he had earlier 
in the day with XXXXXXXXXXXX, an Alawite who served as a former 
senior Syrian army officer XXXXXXXXXXXX and still maintained close contact with former SMI 
head XXXXXXXXXXXX, considered the most influential of retired 
Alawite military officers in Syria.  XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX he 
had come on behalf of XXXXXXXXXXXX, whom he had seen at lunch the day 
before.  (Note:  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX was Ghazi 
Kana'an's chief deputy in Lebanon for several years.) 
 
¶3.  (C) ALAWITE ENDORSEMENT OF KHADDAM:  XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX 
discussed the implications of the press campaign launched by 
former VP Khaddam in Paris.  XXXXXXXXXXXX had described Khaddam as 
"my friend" and noted somewhat cryptically that "he is 
depending on us."  XXXXXXXXXXXX had also noted that when he and 
other former (Alawite) security officials like XXXXXXXXXXXX and 
XXXXXXXXXXXX, and 
XXXXXXXXXXXX 
and others got together, they talked about "the same 
problems, in the same tone," that Khaddam had used.  These 
included Bashar al-Asad's mistakes in Lebanon, his mistakes 
in handling internal affairs in Syria, his misguided 
rapprochement with Iran, as well as his ill-advised embrace 
of Hamas leader Khalid Misha'al.  XXXXXXXXXXXX described XXXXXXXXXXXX as 
angry about Bashar's mistakes. 
 
¶4.  (C) KHADDAM'S LAST NIGHT IN SYRIA:  XXXXXXXXXXXX told XXXXXXXXXXXX 
that Khaddam had spent one of his last nights in Syria 
playing cards and discussing the situation with XXXXXXXXXXXX, who now fears that the regime is lying in wait for 
him.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said he thought Khaddam had contacted XXXXXXXXXXXX by 
phone in late January.  XXXXXXXXXXXX had reached out to XXXXXXXXXXXX and 
asked him, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX to stand behind him if the 
regime tried to move against him, reported XXXXXXXXXXXX.  In 
XXXXXXXXXXXX view, Khaddam is planning more steps.  XXXXXXXXXXXX described 
Khaddam's actions as a conspiracy against the regime. 
 
¶5.  (C) BASHAR'S POPULARITY AMONG ALAWITES:  XXXXXXXXXXXX told 
XXXXXXXXXXXX that Asad was not popular at all among most Alawites, 
most of whom remain mired in poverty.  He had also probed 
XXXXXXXXXXXX about whether the U.S. wanted to maintain the Alawites 
in power as a minority regime and if it had objections to a 
Sunni regime in Syria, which in his view would provide more 
stability.  He had also noted that the Israelis wanted a 
minority regime.  XXXXXXXXXXXX said he countered that in his view 
the Americans did not favor continued rule by the Alawites, 
given Washington's support for democratization.  Both men had 
agreed that it would be impossible for an Alawite to become 
President of Syria after Bashar al-Asad, who had arrived to 
power under unique circumstances. 
 
¶6.  (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX IMPRESSIONS OF XXXXXXXXXXXX:  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted to 
Polchief that XXXXXXXXXXXX had wanted to convey his fear that the 
regime might try to imprison him because of his contacts with 
Khaddam.  Further, he had wanted to convey that "we are not 
with the President," said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  XXXXXXXXXXXX also wanted XXXXXXXXXXXX 
to try to determine whether the Americans wanted Bashar to 
continue in power or not.  XXXXXXXXXXXX had expressed concern that 
Khaddam was not accepted by the U.S. and at one point had 
complained that it seemed that the U.S. wanted Bashar to 
continue. 
 
¶7.  (C) RIAD SEIF; MUSLIM BROTHERS:  On other subjects, 
XXXXXXXXXXXX described recently released Damascus Spring detainee 
Riad Seif as a good man and as someone XXXXXXXXXXXX could work 
with, but noted that his political support beyond the elite 
level was very thin.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, there is still a 
strong perception that Seif is a leftist, which would hurt 
him with conservative religious people in Syria, the vast 
majority.  On a separate issue, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that an Islamist 
political movement in Syria led by the Muslim Brothers or 
some like-minded group would not have more than 10-20 percent 
support in Syria (see septel for a fuller discussion of his 
and others views on this subject.) 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT:  Although XXXXXXXXXXXX is one of our more 
reliable political contacts, it is still a bit difficult to 
know what to make of his conversation with XXXXXXXXXXXX.  It does 
seem to reveal some of the nervous fissures that Khaddam's 
press antics and maneuvering have opened up, at least on the 
outer fringes of the regime.  XXXXXXXXXXXX continues to nurse 
grander political ambitions, seeing himself as a conservative 
but broad-minded Sunni (and prominent businessman) with 
long-standing support in minority communities like the 
Alawites, Christians, and Kurds.  XXXXXXXXXXXX has created family ties and affiliations over 
the years that have helped him nurture special relations with 
senior Alawite regime figures, especially in the security 
services, even when his opposition politics led him to 
criticize the regime and call for change.  These affiliations 
also probably kept him out of prison over the years.  He is a 
harsh critic of Bashar and has refused repeated entreaties to 
meet with him since the young Asad took power.  XXXXXXXXXXXX 
assessed that the internal situation in Syria remained stable 
and the regime was weakened but still in control, with 
"outside permission" to remain in power. 
 
 
SECHE