VZCZCXRO2715
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0249/01 0331548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021548Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4105
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0047
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0681

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000249 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RSA, PRM, PRM/AFA AND INR/AA 
ABIDJAN FOR REFCOORD 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
ACCRA FOR REFUGEE OFFICER 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  02/02/11 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL PHUM PINR MR SG
SUBJECT:  UPDATE ON AFRICAN-MAURITANIANS IN SENEGAL 
 
REFS: A) NOUAKCHOTT 087; B) 05 DAKAR 0480 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE D'AFFAIRS ROBERT P. JACKSON FOR 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)   African-Mauritanian leaders in northern Senegal 
told visiting Ambassador Joseph LeBaron and Dakar 
Political Counselor January 24 and 25 that they want 
organized repatriation as a group under international 
auspices, and insist on restoration of Mauritanian 
citizenship and full recovery of land and property they 
lost in 1989 expulsions.  They voiced gratitude to local 
villagers, frustration at what they see as neglect of 
their plight by the USG and the international community, 
ongoing if minor annoyance with the GOS, fears about 
returning home and demands for a new UNHCR census and 
provision of adequate documentation.  A new generation 
born, raised and educated in Senegal may be less 
committed to repatriation.  End Summary. 
 
A CHOICE OF REPRESENTATIVE CAMPS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Ambassador LeBaron visited three sites 
(Dagana, Dodel and N'Dioum) among what the African- 
Mauritanians themselves claim to be 283 locations.  These 
stretch from Saint Louis, through Diawara, the island in 
the middle of the Senegal River where villagers last year 
told us the 1989 killings began, to the Malian border and 
beyond.  The sites range from well-populated and settled 
ones on the outskirts of Senegalese villages, like the 
ones we visited, to nomads' overnight encampments of a 
family or single individual.  None that we have seen 
could readily be identified as a refugee camp:  there are 
no fences, no guards, and no UNHCR offices.  A handful of 
families have opted to live in houses in the middle of 
Senegalese villages. 
 
¶3.  (C)  We ascertained that the overwhelming majority, 
like most River Valley Senegalese from Matam to Richard 
Toll, are ethnically and linguistically Toucouleur/Peuhl. 
(Some Wolofs and Soninke also sought refuge in 1989.) 
There is little intermarriage with Senegalese but, as we 
reported last year, many seek and sometimes find work 
locally.  Interaction with the locals is generally 
amicable.  Some children attend school, in buildings 
provided by the GOS and with Senegalese teachers.  A few, 
estimated at 30 or more by a student and at about 15 by 
an older leader, attend university in either Dakar or 
Saint Louis. 
 
THE "REFUGEE" APPELATION 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  The African-Mauritanians demand the status of 
refugees, though one resident of N'Dioum said he felt a 
sense of shame at being called a refugee and, like many, 
prefers to call himself an exile or deportee.  Recalling 
that the Mauritanian government had insisted on treating 
them as displaced persons, another said the GOM had at 
one point allowed returns, but only as individuals, 
without organization or leadership and absent 
international oversight.  Some did return, but were 
allegedly ill-treated.  Former GOM civil servants, for 
example, were not reintegrated, and no land was returned 
to rightful owners. 
 
¶5.  (C)  We were told that UNHCR aid strategy was 
stringent from the start.  One leader in Dodel charged 
UNHCR with attempts to "destabilize" the refugee 
community, refusing aid in 1989 to those in Dakar, and 
ceasing food aid and closing support stations in Dagana 
and Saint Louis in 1995.  They told us other aid 
organizations, such as Medecins sans Frontieres, had 
followed UNHCR in cutting services.  The result, one 
claimed, was life in "draconian conditions." 
 
WHAT LIFE IS LIKE 
 
DAKAR 00000249  002 OF 003 
 
 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  In fact, as we were told in Dodel, Mauritanians 
and Senegalese in the River Valley live in similar 
conditions:  most are poor.  Yet refugees do face some 
special problems, many stemming from lack of official 
documentation that would allow them travel or access to 
Senegalese government services.  The refugees see 
themselves as falling into three categories:  the 
relative few who are UNHCR-registered and receive 
assistance; some who initially received "the wrong 
identity cards" and were sent back to Mauritania; and the 
large majority with no documents at all. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Facts are unclear and there are exceptions, but 
it appears refugees for the most part do not and cannot 
own land locally; they cannot usually gain permanent jobs 
either in the Senegalese civil service or the private 
sector; and the daily agricultural wage jobs available do 
not provide sufficient support for health care or 
schooling.  Local hospitals demand a valid ID card for 
admission.  UNHCR aid, we learned last year and on this 
trip, is minimal.  As a result, we heard, refugees' 
"social fabric is falling apart." 
 
¶8.  (C)  Refugees are grateful to local villagers who 
have allowed them space and provide some help when they 
are able, but often feel annoyed by Senegalese police. 
When trying to travel, a student complained, they are 
often caught at security checkpoints without papers and 
police cause them "trouble."  When we asked for details, 
he explained, "they'll try to get bribes from us, and if 
we don't give them, they'll hold us for hours, until they 
get tired of us; then they'll tell us either to go on or 
go back." 
 
...AND COULD BE 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Ambassador LeBaron asked refugees how their 
lives would be better in Mauritania.  Answers included: 
"we will be able to be better organized there," "we want 
water, medical care, schools and development projects to 
create jobs," and "more space."   It is clear, they 
believe, that they would live better back home.   No 
refugees ever cross the narrow and often shallow river 
back to Mauritania, one speaker tried hard to convince 
us, but relatives from their old home villages do cross 
into Senegal to bring supplies from home.  Ambassador 
LeBaron also asked refugee leaders if they would accept 
being returned to land in Mauritania other than that 
which they had previously occupied.  At first, they 
seemed unable even to process the question.  Once they 
had considered it, though, they adamantly rejected return 
to any place other than their old family homes. 
 
¶10.  (C)  The problem, many argued, is that Mauritanian 
armed forces and police who forced them out in 1989 
confiscated or destroyed all proof that they were indeed 
Mauritanian citizens.  One village chief lamented that, 
"without papers, if I go back, someone will slaughter 
me!"  Opinions varied on whether chances for peaceful and 
safe repatriation have improved since the August coup. 
In Dagana, we heard, "Taya was responsible for the 
killings, but the new leader also played a role as chief 
of police."  In N'Dioum, though, there was hope for 
positive change with the new leadership and hope for a 
democratic election.  Indeed, refugee leaders ask "don't 
we have the right to participate in the transition?" and 
declare, "any election we don't take part in will be 
unfair." 
 
¶11.  (C)  Because of these fears, refugees believe 
repatriation can be possible only under five conditions: 
 
-- there must be an accord for repatriation between UNHCR 
and the governments of Mauritania and Senegal; 
 
--  refugees must be returned as a group rather than 
individually; 
 
 
DAKAR 00000249  003 OF 003 
 
 
-- return must be under the sponsorship and supervision 
of international organizations including UNHCR and the 
African Union, with the close attention of western 
countries and especially the U.S.; 
 
-- Mauritanian citizenship must be returned; and, 
 
-- there must be a return of all property lost, or, 
failing that, adequate compensation. 
 
IN THE MEANTIME:  CENSUS AND ID CARDS 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  No one really knows how many Mauritanian 
refugees are in Senegal.  We heard that 68,000 had been 
expelled in 1989, but that, after virtual cutoff of UNHCR 
aid in 1994 and subsequent return by many individuals and 
families, some 20,000 remained.  In 1995, we heard, a 
census was begun but then suspended.  In the intervening 
10 years, however, while there have been many deaths 
"because of poor health conditions," the birth rate has 
been "heavy .. the usual big African families .. on 
average seven children."  UNHCR continues to use 20,000 
as its best guess. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Refugee leaders say "we don't want to apply for 
Senegalese citizenship," but they do want to be counted 
and to receive UNHCR identity cards to allow more 
privileges within Senegal and eventual repatriation.  The 
only oblique reference we heard to any potential solution 
other than repatriation was a leader who demanded safety 
guarantees from the GOM, but conceded that if that were 
not possible, "then we'll wait in Senegal until another 
event moves us to another place." 
 
¶14.  (C)  In fact, refugee children have been born in 
Senegal for 16 years now, and even some young adults have 
been largely raised and educated here.  While not ready 
to question their leaders' disciplined pro-repatriation 
message, they would clearly be comfortable continuing to 
live in Senegal, though they would prefer adequate 
documentation and greater privileges than they now enjoy. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶15.  (C)  Refugee leaders in northern Senegal consider 
themselves Mauritanian, want to repatriate, and would 
like to participate in the transition from the Taya 
government to its successor.  Yet demands for full 
restitution of all property lost in the 1989 expulsions 
mean that they will only be able to return with the full 
support of the Mauritanian government.  That, in turn, 
will depend on political developments in Nouakchott, and 
we wonder if the refugees would be easily or quickly 
satisfied with the incremental approach which UNHCR 
Nouakchott Head of Mission Laye laid out to Ambassador 
LeBaron (Ref A). 
 
¶16.  (C)  While waiting for a solution, refugees insist 
on a new census to count their real numbers, and 
documentation which will allow them fuller privileges 
while they remain in Senegal.  End Comment. 
 
JACKSON