VZCZCXRO4531
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0287/01 0481643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171643Z FEB 06 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3730
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 1186
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000287 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y  (MISSING PARAGRAPH) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE BILL SILKWORTH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 
TAGS: PREL ECON PBTS MD UP RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN AND UKRAINIAN VIEWS ON PRESIDENT 
BASESCU'S RECENT VISIT TO KIEV 
 
BUCHAREST 00000287  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY DCM MARK TAPLIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B), (D) A 
ND (E) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary: Romanian MFA officials expressed cautious 
optimism that the new bilateral commission set up by 
President Traian Basescu and Ukrainian President Yushchenko 
could yield concrete results in resolving historic problems 
between the two countries such as competing territorial 
claims over Snake Island.  The two presidents officially 
established the commission during Basescu's February 2-3 trip 
to Kiev.  At the same time, the MFA noted that Basescu viewed 
the trip generally as "outreach" to help pull Ukraine towards 
NATO and the EU.  A local Ukrainian Embassy officer 
acknowledged that Kiev is "trying to figure out" how to deal 
with these issues and Romania may indeed be able to play a 
helpful role.  Whether or not the Yushchenko-Basescu 
commission actually proves effective, as a reliable NATO 
partner and soon-to-be EU member, Romania could provide a 
useful partner for Ukraine and other countries in the region 
that aspire to follow a similar path to membership in the two 
institutions. End Summary. 
 
 
Yushchenko-Basescu Commission to "Tackle Tough Problems" 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶2. (C) MFA Director General for Eastern Europe Razvan Rusu 
and Director Raluca Neculaescu, gave poloff relatively upbeat 
readouts of Romanian President Basescu,s February 2-3 visit 
to Ukraine. Rusu said Basescu had two primary goals: to 
launch a new joint presidential commission, with 
subcommittees to tackle "tough problems" and seek ways to 
deepen the bilateral relationship; and second, as a broader 
form of "outreach" to help pull Ukraine towards NATO the EU 
by encouraging concrete actions to strengthen westward ties. 
The two presidents also signed an agreement to open up 
several new customs checkpoints along their common frontier 
and pledged to open more consulates to serve their respective 
minorities on either side of the border. 
 
¶3. (C) Rusu said the MFA "had already begun" efforts to put 
the new Yushchenko-Basescu presidential commission for 
addressing bilateral issues into action.  He noted that the 
commission would have three subcommittees led by cabinet 
ministers focused on: 1) regional, European and Euro-Atlantic 
security; 2) cooperation on cultural, educational, and 
minorities-related issues; and 3) environmental protection 
and sustainable development.  Specific issues to be addressed 
in the committees included human trafficking, Transnistria, 
Euro-Atlantic cooperation, delimitation of the continental 
shelf, restoration of the Danube-Black Sea navigation 
channel, cultural exchanges, humanitarian cooperation, and 
regional economic interests in regional development.  A 
special working group on Transnistria, chaired within the 
security subcommittee, will be co-chaired by Ukrainian 
Special Envoy for Transnistria, Dmytro Tkach, or his 
successor, and Romanian State Secretary Lucian Leustean. Rusu 
said Romania agreed to explore Yushchenko,s proposal of 
jointly exploiting natural gas and oil resources that may be 
found in the Black Sea. Yushchenko also offered to help store 
Romania,s spent nuclear fuel -- an offer Basescu suggested 
could also provide a possible alternative to domestic mining 
as a source of uranium. 
 
¶4. (C) Turning to what Rusu called the broader "outreach" 
objective of the trip, Rusu said Basescu sought to encourage 
Ukraine to work towards meeting the "ideals of the Orange 
Revolution."  This included actions toward liberalizing the 
economy, eventually meeting the EU acquis, and strengthening 
relations with its western neighbors. Rusu said that, in 
Romania's view, Ukraine needed to "show that it knows how to 
cooperate" in the region.  Rusu said that if Ukraine stays on 
this road to the west, Romania would offer Ukraine its help 
to meet EU standards and serve as an advocate for Ukraine in 
Brussels. Despite these positive overtures from Bucharest, 
Neculaescu cautioned that the GOR "took a firm line on 
Romanian issues," including the environmental impacts of 
Ukrainian dredging in the Bystroe canal, minority rights, 
Snake Island, Transnistria, and Ukraine's ostensible $600 
million debt to Romania linked to an investment in a 
metallurgical facility. She commented that by starting this 
commission, they are "re-launching a dialogue on sensitive 
issues" that have long histories. But she expressed hope that 
the Yushchenko-Basescu commission would provide a forum for 
discussing the issues in a "constructive and deliberative 
manner." 
 
 
A View from the Ukrainian Embassy: A "Step Forward" 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
BUCHAREST 00000287  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶5. (C) Ukrainian Embassy first secretary Vitalii Timis 
characterized Basescu's trip to Kiev as a "step forward" for 
establishing future collaboration, settling long-standing 
conflicts, and  helping guide Ukraine toward Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  He opined that Yushchenko,s team is trying to 
figure out how to better interact with NATO and the EU and 
acknowledged "Romania knows how to deal with these issues.8 
As for the specifics, Timis discounted the need for a 
subcommittee to look into minorities, rights. He asserted 
that this was simply Basescu,s way to play up a popular 
Romanian nationalistic theme. He said minorities, rights are 
not a problem for the 150,000 Romanians in Ukraine, or for 
the 100,000 ) 200,000 Romanians and Moldovans in Ukraine. 
He mentioned as proof that there were 94 schools for that 
community taught entirely in Romanian, whereas there was only 
one school in Romania for its 70,000 Ukrainians, with only 
partial teaching in Ukrainian. 
 
¶6. (C) With regard to Snake Island, Timis expressed hope that 
that delimitation of the continental shelf would eventually 
be resolved with the help of the International Court of 
Justice in the Hague, and he believed that Ukraine would have 
"no problem" with the court,s findings. However, Timis also 
mentioned that Yushchenko,s proposal to develop a joint 
venture gas company to explore in the currently forbidden 
zone of the continental shelf was a Ukrainian attempt to 
resolve the border dispute outside of court. He mentioned 
that this joint venture, composed of Naftohaz Ukraine or 
Chernomor Naftohaz would also distribute gas to Romania. He 
said Ukrainian research estimates all point to significant 
gas deposits within the disputed area on the continental 
shelf. 
 
¶7. (C) Timis characterized the emerging Ukrainian-Romanian 
relationship as being focused on future cooperation rather 
than on old technical problems. Timis commented that these 
goals are &real, not just diplomatic declarations.8 As for 
whether this westward trend would continue after Ukraine,s 
upcoming parliamentary elections, Timis said it was difficult 
to judge. He expressed his view that there was &much more 
pressure from Russia than last time during the presidential 
elections,8 and added that  Russia had &already done its 
homework8 to ensure that there would not be a similar 
outcome this time. 
 
¶8. (C) Regarding Ukraine,s recent gas deal with Russia, 
Timis said candidly that Russia insisted on RusUkrEnergo 
(RUE) being the intermediary company, that Russia did not 
want to disclose who were the shareholders of the firm, that 
only a few people in the Ukrainian government knew the 
details, and that there were suppositions that the ownership 
structure would trace back to Gazprom. Timis said Ukraine was 
just happy with the price. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  GOR interlocutors emphasize their policy 
towards Ukraine reflects a strong interest in resolving 
bilateral problems and helping draw Ukraine Westward. 
Basescu has also taken pains to cultivate a close connection 
to Yushchenko, which includes -- at least according to the 
Romanian president -- a regular dialogue by telephone with 
the Ukrainian leader.  That said, our Romanian contacts at 
all levels continue to view with caution and skepticism 
developments taking place to the north. According to his 
Cotroceni advisors, Basescu is generally pessimistic about a 
positive outcome in Kiev's upcoming parliamentary elections, 
although he recognizes that the stakes are enormous and he 
has his fingers crossed for a Yushchenko-Tymoshenko 
reconciliation.  But even during the heady days following 
Ukraine's Orange Revolution, Romanians remained skeptical 
while Romania itself experienced its own "orange" victory 
with the election of Basescu and his reform-oriented 
center-right government.  This wariness, with roots deep in a 
problematic history between the two countries, is shared too 
by our Ukrainian interlocutors here.  In the run-up to the 
Basescu visit to Kiev, the Ukrainian charge told DCM that 
while Russia was Ukraine's number one problem, Bucharest was 
"challenge number two" in the minds of his Ukrainian MFA 
colleagues back home.  With Romania already a stand-out NATO 
partner, poised to join the EU, it could indeed represent an 
ally and a model for Ukraine, at least under the right 
circumstances.  But it is also true that the level of 
distrust between Romania and Ukraine is considerable, and 
will not be overcome so readily.  It is very much in our 
interest to promote closer ties and cooperation between these 
two key regional states -- and to be prepared to counsel 
restraint should old habits of thought and zero-sum thinking 
take hold anew.  End Comment. 
TAUBMAN