This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 
TAGS: PREL EAID CY GR TU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU OFFICIALS AGREE ON NEED TO BUILD MOMENTUM ON 
CYPRUS 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Vincent Carver for reason 1.5 (b/d). 
 
SUMMARY 
- - - - - 
 
¶1.  (C) European Commission and Parliament officials agreed 
with visiting DAS Bryza February 6-7 on the need to build on 
the momentum created by Turkish FM Gul's recent proposal on 
opening Turkish and Northern Cypriot ports.  The EU officials 
noted that Turkey could not open its ports to Cypriot vessels 
without the political cover of movement toward ending 
Northern Cypriot isolation.  All agreed that a halt to 
Turkey's EU accession negotiations could have serious 
geostrategic consequences and negative effect on Turkey's 
2007 national elections.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C) EUR DAS Matthew Bryza met with European Commission 
Director General for Enlargement Michael Leigh, Commission 
Unit Head for Turkey Christian Danielsson and advisor on 
Turkey to Enlargement Commission Rehn, Jean-Christophe 
Filori, February 6 and with Member of the European Parliament 
(MEP) and EP Rapporteur on Turkey, Camiel Eurlings (Dutch, 
Center-Right) February 7 to discuss Turkey and Cyprus. 
Leigh, stressing that EU accession negotiations with Turkey 
would proceed on their merits and not on political 
considerations, emphasized the positive effects of the 
negotiations.  Once "taboo" subjects were now open for 
discussion, with the EU and Turkey enjoying a more 
sophisticated and higher level dialogue.  Given pressure from 
member states, the EU and Turkey are holding a series of 
monthly seminars, including on issues such as human rights 
and religious freedom.  For their part, the Turks are taking 
a practical approach.  Leigh stressed that the process is 
valuable and maintaining its momentum will be key to further 
promoting reform in Turkey.  In this light, the EU will 
attempt to avoid the risk of Cyprus, possibly with other 
member states, halting accession negotiations absent Turkish 
implementation of the additional protocol. 
 
¶3.  (C) One way to avoid such blockage, Leigh explained, is 
to convince Nicosia that direct trade with the north does not 
imply recognition of the TRNC.  Having the UN or another body 
manage trade out of Famagusta is one option worth exploring 
to allow a form of direct trade, while affording Greek 
Cypriots a sense that they had not surrendered their claim of 
sovereignty over the North.  The Greek Cypriots, however, 
continue to link Famagusta with their demand for a moratorium 
on construction in the north and with a hand over of Varosha, 
which the Turkish Cypriots reject.  Still, by potentially 
opening a debate on the Famagusta-Varosha issue, Ankara's 
recent Cyprus proposal seems to reflect a new political 
willingness by Ankara to fulfill its obligation to extend the 
Additional Protocol (by opening Turkish ports to Greek 
Cypriot ships).  By so doing, Leigh continued, Turkey may 
convey within the EU a sense of momentum on the difficult 
port issue sufficient to allow the Commission to avoid 
criticizing Ankara on this matter in its October progress 
report. 
 
¶4.  (C) In any case, the EU recognizes the primacy of the 
UN's role in forging an overall settlement.  Commission Unit 
Head for Turkey Danielsson emphasized the positive role 
Athens has played on Cyprus, noting the U.S. might want to 
continue to encourage Greece to play a helpful role in trying 
to persuade Nicosia to be more reasonable.  Danielsson 
observed that there may be a window of opportunity for 
progress after the Cypriot elections in May and before the 
European Commission issues its annual monitoring report on 
Turkey in October or early November.  DAS Bryza agreed that 
Greek FM Molyviatis has indeed been helpful, including with 
the Greek aide memoire regarding the Gul initiative, which 
points toward the Famagusta-Varosha proposal.  DAS Bryza 
added that the U.S. would continue to engage Athens on the 
issue. 
 
¶5.  (C) Leigh noted that Turkish accession negotiations were 
taking place within a wider context:  public opinion in many 
member states opposed Turkish accession, more parties are 
calling for a closer examination of the EU's absorption 
capacity (Leigh observed that this was generally perceived as 
"code" for opposition to Turkish EU membership), and debate 
was beginning over where Europe's borders are situated.  The 
Commission's tactic, Leigh added, is to try to keep 
enlargement, particularly regarding Turkey, as part of a 
larger debate on the future of Europe.  Otherwise, many 
people will focus on Turkey's differences with the EU rather 
than on the EU's success in promoting reform and exporting 
stability throughout southeastern Europe. 
 
¶6.  (C) Filori, in a separate meeting, acknowledged that no 
Turkish government could be expected to open its ports absent 
moves to diminish Northern Cypriot isolation.  The key is to 
avoid "the big clash that everyone foresees" by providing 
Ankara the necessary political cover to implement the 
Additional Protocol.  According to Filori, the Commission 
wants the Council to bless its financial aid package to the 
north and provide additional tangible benefits to the Turkish 
Cypriot population.  Confidence-building measures could help 
ease the sense of isolation as well, he added, stressing that 
the EU recognizes the indispensable role of the UN in this 
regard.  That said, Filori added that Nicosia must acquiesce 
to such measures and this "will be difficult, to say the 
least." 
 
¶7.  (C) Filori reiterated Leigh's observations regarding 
Greek Cypriot calls for the return of Varosha and a 
moratorium on construction in the north.  Bryza noted concern 
over the possibility that Nicosia, sometime this year, would 
send a ship as a provocation toward the Turkish coast with 
Turkey preventing it from entering a Turkish port.  Filori 
predicted that, in this scenario, several member states would 
support Nicosia and agree to suspend accession negotiations 
with Turkey.  Filori and Bryza agreed the U.S. and European 
Commission should think through options for responding to 
such a move by the Greek Cypriots. 
 
¶8.  (C) Dutch MEP and EP Rapporteur on Turkey Eurlings agreed 
with DAS Bryza on the need to try to build on the momentum 
created by the Gul proposal to avoid a possible stalemate on 
accession negotiations.  Eurlings also stressed that the U.S. 
can continue to play a helpful role by quietly but firmly 
persuading the Turkish leadership, "as a friend," to promote 
further political and societal reforms.  Erdogan and others, 
Eurlings stressed, should drop their "fighting their way into 
the EU" attitude and concentrate more on promoting reforms 
such as opening the Halki Seminary and returning some 
Christian churches to their religious communities.  This, he 
emphasized, would go a long way in helping shape a more 
positive European public opinion about Turkey. 
 
¶9.  (C) Likewise, Eurlings underscored, Ankara must alter its 
penal code, particularly articles 301 and 305, to allow fro 
greater freedom of expression.  Eurlings noted that even 
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn (a usually calm Finn), became 
very emotional when discussing Turkish "obstructionism" on 
religious freedom and property rights with a Turkish 
parliamentary delegation and GOT chief accession negotiator 
Babacan in December.  Eurlings cautioned that the end of 2006 
could result in a crisis if Turkey does not implement the 
Additional Protocol.  He added that the end of 2007 could 
bring an additional crisis if the EU determines that Turkey 
has not demonstrated sufficient progress in meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria on democracy and human rights under the 
Association Framework Agreement. 
 
¶10.  (C) Focusing on religious tolerance, Eurlings stressed 
the emerging consensus in the Netherlands on the need to 
train imams in the Netherlands rather than allowing them 
entry from abroad.  He agreed with Bryza that a key challenge 
would be to ensure that the trainers were themselves 
moderate.  Eurlings further agreed that Turkey's Directorate 
of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) could be a helpful partner in 
imam training, provided that the Diyanet agreed to reduce its 
efforts to exert political control over Turkish emigre 
communities in Europe. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶11.  (C) DAS Bryza's EU interlocutors appeared genuinely to 
want to avoid the "train wreck" predicted by some in Brussels 
regarding Turkish accession negotiations by discussing ways 
to help promote Ankara sufficient political cover to begin to 
implement the Additional Protocol.  They recognized that 
Gul's proposal indicates an increased willingness by Ankara 
to try to generate some more positive thinking on how to 
proceed toward a compromise.  They also agreed that one way 
to help provide Turkey with some political cover was to ease 
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, through EU aid for the 
region and via confidence-building measures.  While Eurlings 
observed that Papadopolous "always says no" to any proposal 
aimed at promoting a settlement, the EU officials agreed with 
DAS Bryza on the need to continue talking on how best to 
convince Nicosia to engage in a practical discussion aimed at 
ending the deadlock.  All also agreed on the need to engage 
the UN and maintain it as the primary conduit for settlement 
talks. 
 
¶12. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.  DAS Bryza's 
energy-related meetings reported septel. 
MCKINLEY