This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 
TAGS: PREL PREF DPKO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU ON AMIS REHATTING: BRUSSELS DONOR CONFERENCE? 
 
REF: (A) USUN NEW YORK 0192 
 
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR.  REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary.  The EU agrees that AMIS rehatting to a UN 
peacekeeping operation should happen as soon as possible. 
Because of funding constraints, both the AU and the UN need 
to make important decisions this month.  The UN has urged the 
Commission to host a donor conference in Brussels.  While a 
February 20 timeframe would be ideal for expediting the 
transition, the EU believes a full-fledged donor conference 
cannot happen until the AU has formally requested the UN to 
take over its peacekeeping mission in Darfur and the UN has 
taken concrete steps to fulfill such a request. 
Specifically, the UN needs to formulate a precise transition 
plan with timetables and logistical details before donors can 
decide on funding options.  The Commission might reprogram 50 
million euros in development funds to support AMIS during the 
transition.  However, African countries must agree to this, 
and some may favor other priorities.  Additional Commission 
funds could not come online before June, meaning other donors 
would have to fill the AMIS funding gap from April through 
June.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
EU Position on Rehatting 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) At the January 10 meeting of the PSC, the EU agreed to 
engage the AU and urge it to request rehatting as soon as 
possible.  The PSC stressed that rehatting should: 1) portray 
AMIS as a success; and 2) incorporate AMIS troops into the 
new UN operation.  According to Council Secretariat Sudan 
policy officer Christian Manahl, neither the AU nor the UN 
has a big surplus of peacekeeping troops, making the second 
point important practically as well as politically. 
 
------------------------ 
Donor Conference 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Both Manahl and DG Development Head of Unit for East 
Africa Roger Moore characterized the report of a February 20 
donor conference in Brussels as a "rumor" (without completely 
discounting the possibility that Commissioner Michel may have 
supported such a meeting during discussions with UN 
officials).  They said that before a full-fledged donor 
conference could take place, two things should happen:  1) 
the AU should make a formal request to the UN for rehatting; 
and, 2) UN DPKO should present a strategy for transition, 
along with specific details about its peacekeeping plans for 
Darfur. 
 
¶4. (C) Both EU interlocutors insisted that key decisions must 
be made this month by both the AU and UN to ensure a smooth 
transition.  Manahl said the AU cannot wait until the 
ministerial meeting in the second half of March to make a 
formal request to the UN for rehatting because this would 
leave insufficient time for donors to consider the financial 
needs and identify funds. 
 
¶5. (C) This rationale is probably behind the February 20 
date.  Moore reported that the UN has "bombarded" Commission 
officials with calls urging them to host a donor conference 
in Brussels, but that no final decision had been made by the 
Commission.  He said a Brussels conference remains "a 
possibility" although the issue of a date is tricky. 
Ideally, a full-fledged donor conference would take place 
soon after the AU makes its request to the UN and well before 
the AMIS funding and mandate runs out at the end of March. 
 
¶6. (C) According to High Representative Javier Solana's ESDP 
Counselor, Matthew Reece, his office prefers the first week 
of March as this will ensure at least four weeks interval 
prior to the end of existing funding arrangements.  Given 
travel schedules, March 7 in Paris or March 8 in Brussels 
were mentioned as possible dates.  He said that for this 
conference to be successful, high-level contacts with Annan 
and Konare will be necessary to get an AU decision prior to 
the conference to hand the mission to the UN. 
 
------------------------ 
EU Thinking on Darfur peacekeeping 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Manahl said that the EU was hopeful that the arrival 
of a new Nigerian force commander would improve the current 
AMIS mission.  EU Special Representative Pekka Haavisto was 
scheduled to meet the new force commander in Darfur on 
February 4.  However, he said the AMIS force continues to 
suffer from the lack of an Addis-based strategic director. 
Undoubtedly, this would change for the better after 
rehatting. 
 
¶8. (C) Manahl said that UN DPKO has not been in a rush to 
move into Darfur or to present a timeline for transition.  In 
a meeting with Haavisto in Khartoum last week, Jan Pronk 
discussed his own "elaborate" plans for the new UN force 
(which Pronk thought should number from 12,000 - 20,000). 
 
¶9. (C) According to Reece, a key question for all players on 
planning the transition is what can the UN begin to provide 
in the run-up to taking control in October?  In other words, 
can the UN gradually take overall control of aspects of the 
mission?  For example, the UN has agreements with Sudan for 
the mission in the South.  Some of those could be extended 
early to cover Darfur thereby taking some pressure off the 
donor community.  Manahl made similar points about using 
extending the UN operation from the South to Darfur. 
 
------------------------ 
Funding 
------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Both Moore and Manahl expressed concern about AMIS 
funding when the operation runs out of cash in early April. 
For months, the Commission has been considering reprogramming 
50 million euros from development accounts to the Africa 
Peace Facility in order to support AMIS.  Moore said for this 
to happen African countries would need to agree to give up 
development projects in order to support AMIS.  Although some 
money would come from expiring development funds that have 
not been used, other money would need to come from projects 
that the Commission and African countries have already agreed 
to.  Moore said he was personally skeptical about putting 
more development money into AMIS since there was no clear 
picture at this point regarding the future of the operation. 
"We keeping adding segments to this bridge that leads 
nowhere," he told PRMOff. 
 
¶11. (C) If decisions are made in favor of reprogramming 
additional development money to AMIS, the earliest it can 
become available is June.  Both interlocutors wondered 
whether the U.S. was prepared to plug the April-June funding 
gap. 
 
------------------------ 
Next steps 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) According to Reece, the following sequential steps 
would enable the EU to support a donors conference and 
increase the likelihood of further transitional funding: 
 
-- AU decision to hand the mission to the UN; 
 
-- UNSC decision (UNSCR or Presidency statement) to take on 
the mission, which along with allocation of UN resources to 
its staff to commence planning provides confidence to donors 
that the final stretch of the AMIS mission has begun.  Reece 
stressed that this action "punches the clock" for a 6-9 month 
countdown to UN control; 
 
-- EU Council goes to Commission and to Member States with 
clarity on how much money is needed and for how long with 
assurances that this is the last tranche of EU funding for 
AMIS; 
 
-- The Africa Peace Facility could then predict the end of 
this aspect of its funding increasing the likelihood that the 
issued discussed above could be managed. 
 
¶13. (C) Reece summarized further steps urging that the 
political process needs "kick started" in the face of a 
deteriorating situation on the ground.  He concluded that 
"cutting up the cake" among the participants by forcing 
concessions from the Sudanese government and the rebel groups 
is seen within Solana,s office as the most likely solution. 
This will require both carrots and sticks in the hands of 
senior people according to Reece. 
 
------------------------ 
Comment 
------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) EU concerns about timing and funding with regard to 
rehatting closely match those of the U.S. (ref A). 
Coordinated messages from the international community, 
particularly from the U.S. and EU, may help both the AU and 
UN make necessary decisions sooner rather than later. 
 
McKINLEY 
.