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DE RUEHRL #0455/01 0481035
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R 171035Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1585
INFO RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
RUEHVV/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 
TAGS: PREL KISL PHUM PTER GM
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S MEETINGS IN GERMANY 
 
 
Classified By: DCM JOHN CLOUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Senior German officials responded positively 
to USG efforts to show solidarity with Denmark and agreed 
with the basic principle of using the incident to stress the 
importance of building democracy in the BMENA region.  The 
Germans agreed with the USG assessment that the caricatures, 
although clearly offensive to Muslims, were being exploited 
by Iran and Syria for their own internal purposes.  They 
expressed interest in our policy of using American Muslims to 
reach out to other Muslims.  German officials also briefed us 
on Fonmin Steinmeier's just completed visit to Israel and 
expressed concern that Israel might be trying to degrade 
living conditions in the Occupied Territories under a 
Hamas-led government to create conditions for new Palestinian 
elections.  On Kosovo, Political Director Schaefer briefed us 
on intensive German contacts with both the Serbians and the 
Kosovars.  Schaefer reported indications the Kosovars were at 
least considering accepting limited sovereignty and a special 
status for Mitrovica.  A/S Fried briefed the Germans on USG 
energy security concerns in Eurasia.  NSA-equivalent Heusgen 
reported that the Germans were also sending tough messages to 
the Russians on the need to build trust as a credible energy 
supplier.  Both sides considered next steps in Georgia.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) EUR A/S Daniel Fried and NSC Director for Middle 
Initiatives Farah Pandith met with German NSA-equivalent 
Christoph Heusgen (accompanied by Chancellery North America 
director Dirk Brengelmann) and MFA Political Director Michael 
Schaefer (accompanied by North America Desk Director 
Christoph Eichhorn, Middle East Director Andreas Reinicke, 
and note taker) during their February 14-15 visit to Berlin. 
DCM and A/Polcouns (note taker) accompanied A/S Fried and 
Director Pandith. 
 
Laying out the USG Strategy 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In both meetings, A/S Fried and Director Pandith laid 
out the USG response to the controversy created by the 
publication (and subsequent republication) of caricatures of 
the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper: the USG viewed 
the drawings as offensive, but opposed compromise on the 
issue of freedom of speech and condemned the manipulations of 
Muslim public sentiment in particular by the Governments of 
Iran and Syria.  Democracy, they argued, was the system of 
government best able to reconcile in practice the values of 
freedom, respect, and sensitivity at the center of the 
current controversy.  The U.S. was considering ways to shape 
a response to the cartoon issue, including especially using 
the Forum for the Future and the Democracy Assistance 
Dialogue, to bring together editors and journalists with 
experience in dealing with politically sensitive issues with 
counterparts and democracy advocates from the Middle East. 
These counterparts were to be selected on the basis of their 
independence from government control.  Efforts to promote 
dialogue would be conducted in parallel with our efforts to 
build democracy in the region.  Pandith told Heusgen and 
Schaefer that the USG sought to use the voices of American 
(and ultimately European) Muslims to engage with the Muslim 
world both to isolate extremists and to emphasize that the 
current controversy was not one of "Islam vs. Democracy." 
She noted that a Belgian Muslim had told her that Muslims had 
come to Belgium and the West because they wanted to enjoy 
these freedoms.  Fried stressed the USG interest in 
supporting an evolving Islam that was modern and enlightened. 
 He expressed concern that in many instances Muslims continue 
to appear to Europeans like an "alien" force. 
 
¶4.  (C) Heusgen told A/S Fried and Pandith that Chancellor 
Merkel had called Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen to express 
German solidarity with Denmark.  She told him that Denmark 
had nothing to apologize for and urged Denmark to stick to 
its principles.  Germany saw clearly that Iran and Syria (and 
to some extent Egypt as well) were trying to manipulate 
public reaction to the caricatures.  Heusgen said he found it 
outrageous that Syria was trying to fuel public outrage over 
religious sensitivities, given its massacre of members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in February 1982.  Merkel 
understood it was important not to offend religious feelings 
and wanted to engage in a "dialogue of cultures." 
 
¶5.  (C) Turning to Germany's own Muslim population, Heusgen 
commented that many of the Turks now in Germany tended to 
live in their own sections of large cities, were generally 
from poor families and often had a limited education.  Merkel 
discussed this issue with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who 
argued that Turks in Germany first had to become comfortable 
in their "own" culture and language before they could seek to 
integrate into a new culture, Germany.  Heusgen questioned 
this approach and argued that this approach would mean that 
Turkish immigrants would never get beyond the first stage of 
learning their own culture.  Heusgen then argued that 
Europeans, including Muslim immigrants, had to better 
understand their adopted civilization.  Without such 
understanding, they could not effectively promote democratic 
values in the Middle East. 
 
¶6.  (C) Heusgen said Germany was disappointed at the results 
of the November Barcelona Process meeting.  The Europeans had 
stressed the importance of the rule of law, but no or few 
heads of state from the region came, and many others from the 
region appeared to reject these arguments.  This left the 
West in an uncomfortable situation of needing Middle East 
governments to help in the War against Terrorism, even if 
those governments had poor human rights records.  Fried 
stressed the need to keep advancing with our shared reform 
agenda in the region. 
 
¶7.  (C) Political Director Schaefer noted a broad consensus 
on where the problems with the caricatures lay.  Limits to 
account for religious sensitivities should exist, but these 
limits should be tested in the courts and not by throwing 
stones and burning buildings.  We, in the West, needed to be 
aware of how words are being perceived in a different 
cultural context.  Schaefer saw the genesis of the current 
crisis as the translation of a set of caricatures that were 
innocuous by Western standards to a cultural context where 
they were clearly explosive.  Although the West had succeeded 
in gaining broad acceptance for certain universal principles, 
such as the right to life and human dignity, there are 
important cultural values which genuinely differ from one 
culture to the next and have to be respected.  He gave as an 
example his own experiences in dealing with "Asian" values. 
In that instance, it was clear that Asian cultures give a 
priority to the well-being of the group that is difficult for 
Westerners to understand.  We faced one additional problem: 
we tended to preach to the converted.  Who are our 
counterparts in the Muslim world?  He urged the West to 
undertake speaking with "more difficult" people who might 
disagree with us but still exhibited a sense of 
responsibility. 
 
¶8.  (C) Taking A/S Fried's point, Schaefer agreed that fora 
like Forum for the Future might offer a good opportunity for 
such dialogue.  He argued that Turkey also had an important 
role to play, but could not be "overburdened" given its own 
struggle to build democratic institutions.  A/S Fried agreed 
with Schaefer on the need to reach out further, but argued 
that we still had to be clear that what we were talking about 
is democracy.  Schaefer noted he agreed largely with the U.S. 
approach of using Muslims within American and European 
societies to help reach out.  Reinicke said the West had to 
take into consideration Muslim sensitivities.  Schaefer 
continued the argument saying that the West had to approach 
the Muslim world on democracy with a clear sense of respect. 
A/S Fried argued that it was important that the West not cast 
the debate in terms of freedom of speech vs. respect for 
religious sensitivities.  Rather we wanted to promote the 
idea of democracy being best able to deal with issues where 
there were competing claims like those of freedom of speech 
and religious sensitivities. 
 
Steinmeier, Israel, and Hamas 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Schaefer asked Reinicke to comment on German Fonmin 
Steinmeier's just completed visit to the Middle East 
(Reinicke accompanied him), including a visit to Israel. 
Reinicke said the Israelis appeared undecided how to respond 
to the Hamas victory in January, but at least some are 
arguing Israel should make life so difficult for the 
Palestinians that a Hamas-led government would fail, 
necessitating new elections.  The Palestinian response was to 
argue that if conditions grow even more difficult in the 
Occupied Territories, the Palestinians will blame the West 
and not Hamas.  Schaefer added that Steinmeier was clear on 
the conditions for talking with Hamas, but argued that we 
needed to have a "Plan B."  A/S Fried argued that we should 
avoid a situation where the West was debating what to do 
about Hamas.  Instead, we should try to force Hamas to debate 
what it should do to meet the Quartet,s conditions. 
Schaefer agreed with the point. 
 
¶10.  (C) Heusgen told A/S Fried that Merkel spoke with Putin 
on February 14 regarding Russia's invitation to Hamas. 
Putin, according to Heusgen, agreed to stick to Quartet 
decisions on handling Hamas.  In a private part of the 
meeting, A/S Fried told Heusgen that expressed USG 
appreciated Chancellor Merkel clear statements during the 
Munich Security Conference. 
 
Kosovo 
-------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Schaefer said that the Germans had held and would be 
holding a number of further meetings with both the Serbs and 
the Kosovars.  Yesterday, the Germans met with Kostunica to 
discuss the issue of Kosovar independence.  The Germans 
delivered what Schaefer called a difficult message.  There 
would be another meeting with Marti Ahtisaari on February 15. 
 In Schaefer's view, the Serbs needed to be perceived as 
getting something for Kosovo's independence.  Although the 
Serbs would not accept independence de jure, they would 
accept it de facto if they obtained compromises on roughly 8 
of the 10 issues of concern to them (such as property rights, 
churches, decentralization, etc.).  To the Kosovars, te 
Germans had been equally tough, saying they ha to earn 
independence.  Schaefer said the Kosovas had to be prepared 
for "gracious compromises" ith the Serbs.  Schaefer said he 
spoke with Albaian Kosovar leader Thaci, who told him the 
Kosovars were prepared to consider limited sovereignty an to 
accept a special status for Mitrovica.  Schafer used the 
argument that Germany had limited svereignty in the early 
post-war period and was nt a full member of the United 
Nations for 25 years.  A/S Fried said the USG understood 
there had to be a transitional period for Kosovo and 
guarantees for the Serbian minority. 
 
Energy Security 
------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) A/S Fried told Heusgen the U.S. was aware of the 
development of a "Green Paper" within the EU outlining their 
thinking on energy security and was pleased that our thinking 
largely overlapped.  The U.S. emphasized diversification of 
energy sources, including from Caspian sources, and multiple 
pipeline routes, all on a commercial basis.  The USG was 
beginning to discuss this with BP and other energy companies. 
 We were not trying to determine routes, but seeing if these 
policies were also supported by the market.  Heusgen said 
Merkel had told Putin the Russian game in the Ukraine during 
the January crisis was not helpful.  She said Russia needed 
to develop trust and confidence that it was a reliable 
producer of energy.  Heusgen said it remained to be seen 
whether Putin had drawn the necessary lessons from the 
experience.  A/S Fried noted that the Poles were particularly 
upset by the Baltic pipeline, but the Poles believed Merkel 
was a vast improvement, and appreciated Germany's decision to 
invest 100 million euros in Poland.  He argued that the Poles 
would show more flexibility once they were certain they were 
not isolated in dealing with Russia. 
 
Georgia 
--------- 
 
¶13.  (C) A/S Fried said the Russians were continuing to 
maintain security links with separatists in South Ossetia and 
sending Russian citizens to work in key, senior positions 
there.  Heusgen said he had spoken with Russian Fonmin 
Ivanov, who asked the Germans to urge the Georgians to deal 
directly with the Russians.  Saakashvili was being 
heavy-handed in the German view.  A/S Fried said the U.S. 
would keep pushing Saakashvili to do the "right thing."  In 
the meantime, we had to prevent Russia from continuing its 
efforts to dismember Georgia. 
 
¶14.  (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Fried. 
TIMKEN JR