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Viewing cable 06BELGRADE257, SERBIA'S DEMOCRATS UNDER THREAT?

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BELGRADE257 2006-02-21 09:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Belgrade
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000257 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR
SUBJECT: SERBIA'S DEMOCRATS UNDER THREAT? 
 
REF: A) 05 BELGRADE 2343 B) 05 BELGRADE 2341 C) 05 
 
     BELGRADE 2326 D) 05 BELGRADE 2224 
 
Classified By: Classified by POLOFF Michael Papp for reasons 1.4 (B&D) 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) Recent polls indicate that Serbia's anti-Western 
nationalists are within striking distance of capturing a 
parliamentary majority in new elections.  Potentially 
traumatic issues later this year, such as Kosovo final 
status, could strengthen their hand even further. Early 
elections, perhaps linked to a Serb rejection of a Kosovo 
final status settlement, are a distinct possibility. 
Although they are under threat, it is by no means a certainty 
that the democrats will be ousted -- especially if they 
(including Tadic and Kostunica) work jointly against the 
Radicals.  For our part, we will continue to work closely 
with reform forces in Serbia. Progress on issues related to 
Serb interests in Kosovo (e.g., decentralization, religious 
sites, etc.), combined with a Euro-Atlantic embrace of Serbia 
if it follows a constructive course, could also help mitigate 
the erosion of support for the democratic forces.  End 
Summary. 
 
New Elections: Kostunica Will Decide 
------------------------------------ 
 
2.  (SBU) Prime Minister Kostunica's fragile minority 
government continues its precarious existence amidst 
increasing talk of early elections sometime this year.  Polls 
show that only 18 percent of Serbs support the government 
while 70 percent lack trust in their government. A majority 
favors new elections (see reftel d).  All of the governing 
parties have weakened substantially since the last 
parliamentary elections were held; according to recent polls, 
Kostunica's DSS is the sole governing party that would today 
cross the minimum 5 percent threshold for re-election to 
parliament.  The government continues to rely on the support 
of Slobodan Milosevic's divided Socialist Party of Serbia 
(SPS) for its tenuous 3-seat majority. Polls showing rising 
abstention rates among democratically-inclinded voters also 
indicate strengthened support for the nationalist/Radical 
bloc.  Additionally, DS Vice President Dusan Petrovic told 
poloff that the Prime Minsiter had to postpone an 
extraordinary session of parliament, originally planned for 
February 16, because he had to re-secure a majority in 
parliament. 
 
3. (SBU)  There is considerable speculation here about the 
viability of the SPS and about Kostunica's relationship with 
the Radicals.  Milosevic in many ways has undermined the SPS 
by using his still considerable influence in sole pursuit of 
providing safety and security for his family, preventing any 
serious house-cleaning.  The assumption is that the SRS could 
easily induce SPS MPs to abandon Kostunica and bring down the 
government.  Our sources suggest, however, that the Radicals 
will wait until the Kosovo talks heat up before trying to 
force elections.  Many observers have noted that Prime 
Minister Kostunica has made a tacit agreement with the 
Radicals to keep the GOS in power until it deems the time is 
ripe for elections.  (Comment:  Other observers here discount 
the possibility that Kostunica could team up with the 
Radicals.  End Comment) 
 
4.  (SBU) Numbers are also shifting on the democratic side, 
with Tadic's DS currengly polling about 18% (compared to 36% 
for the SRS).  DS's willingness to allow Karic's PSS to bring 
down the government by "buying" M.P.s from the ruling 
coalition has been set back with the government's aggressive 
effort to crush Karic.  (Karic has fled the country with his 
three brothers - septel). Petrovic told poloff that the Karic 
card may still work.  He speculated that Karic, desperate to 
halt legal action against him, is offering large sums of 
money to any MP who will break with the GOS. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Despite his party's generally gloomy numbers, 
Kostunica and his DSS are making the best of the situation. 
While the DS continues to focus on its upcoming Party 
Congress and play hardball in its negotiations with smaller 
democratic parties on possible future coalition arrangments, 
the DSS has been working to consolidate its ties with its 
coalition partners through the use of government hand-outs 
and other means.  A good part of FM Draskovic's Serbian 
Renewal Movement (SPO), some of G-17 , and Capital Investment 
Minister Ilic's populist New Serbia Party (NS) are considered 
to be strongly in the DSS camp.  None of the DSS' coalition 
partners has a strong incentive to leave government, since 
their dismal poll numbers threaten them with extinction in 
new elections (absent some sort of pre-electoral coalition.) 
 
 
Polls Suggest Tight Race 
-------------------------- 
 
5.  (U) A January 2006 Medium-Gallup poll -- reflecting 
rising abstention rates and Karic's travails -- indicted that 
the Radicals and Socialists are in striking distance of a 
parliamentary majority in new elections.  While all parties, 
including the SRS, are losing supporters, the poll suggests 
that Radicals are losing them at a much slower rate, helping 
their overall relative numbers.  Together, the Radicals and 
Socialists would currently poll 43.7 percent while the 
Democratic bloc (DS, DSS, NS, G-17 , SPO, LDS), excluding 
Karic's PSS, comes in at 44.9%.  Minority parties come in 
around 4-6 percent and would likely join the democrats. 
However, most experts agree that the largest part of Karic 
voters would likely go to the SRS or the Socialists, with a 
smaller number dropping out or joining the DSS or the NS. 
 
6.  (SBU) Factoring in everything, the Gallup poll showed the 
Radical/Socialist block just two seats shy of a governing 
majority if elections had been held in January.  (An even 
more recent IRI-commissioned poll puts the SRS/SPS coalition 
at 3 seats short of a majority.)  Moreover, significant 
numbers of DSS and PSS voters claim in recent polls that the 
Radicals would be their first preference as a coalition 
partner. The Gallup polls also suggest that another 3-5 
percent of voters say they would change their vote to the 
Radicals in the event of the loss of Kosovo. 
 
7. (U) The numbers, do not however, factor in an aggressive 
get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaign, which could strengthen 
results on the democratic side.  In short, early elections 
would be very close and difficult to call. 
 
Divided and Directionless: The Democratic Parties 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8.  (SBU) The constant bickering between democratic parties 
in the GOS and opposition will certainly not help. 
Kostunica's decision to use the state apparatus to attack the 
supporters and financial network around Karic and his PSS has 
helped protect his government against attack in the short 
term, but possibly at the expense of strengthening the 
anti-democratic bloc.  The ferocity of the GOS campaign 
against Karic, notwithstanding the veracity of charges of 
corruption against him and his business empire, will make it 
difficult for Kostunica to attract significant numbers of PSS 
voters and could help drive them to the Radicals' camp (or 
into abstention). 
 
9. (SBU) President Tadic's DS also has not been able to 
generate new enthusiasm among disillusioned voters, and polls 
show that its support continues to erode (see ref c). 
Petrovic indicated to poloff that the party has made little 
progress on establishing a platform that would widen the DS' 
support base, is uncertain how to utilize Tadic's position 
and relative popularity, has not identified a publicly 
acceptable rationale for ending their parliamentary walkout, 
and lacks a strategy to balance its opposition to Kostunica's 
government and its plan to ally with the DSS and its partners 
to form a new government in the event of early elections.  A 
senior advisor to Tadic told us 2/17 that the DS is convinced 
nonetheless that the SPS/SRS bloc is incapable of winning a 
majority in future elections. 
 
Steps We Can Take 
----------------- 
 
9.  (U) Our efforts will focus on reducing the risk of 
political instability by developing more inclusive political 
structures and helping reformist elements attract back their 
old supporters.  In the short term, that means working 
closely with the DS, DSS and others to refine their messages 
and improve their party operations in order to better reach 
out to disaffected voters.  We will also seek to increase 
public engagements on democratically-oriented topics, such as 
corruption and economic reforms, key issues that Serbs 
actually care about, and use NDI and IRI to build stronger 
and more productive ties within the democratic bloc. 
Additionally, the democratic parties will have to carefully 
analyze a proposal to lower the parliamentary threshold to 
three percent, which could significantly reduce the SRS' 
chances of controlling the next government. 
 
10. (U) Approximately $1.4 million of our SEED funding has 
been allocated in FY06 for this program, with an estimated 
total four-year budget of approximately $6 million.  To 
support this program, USAID will work in the following three 
related areas: developing parliamentary coalitions on 
specific issues and strengthening local government coalitions 
that will help at the national level; strengthening party 
caucuses between the parliament and the government; and 
working with democratic opposition parties on enhancing their 
role in parliament.  Finally, we have prepared an aggressive 
and targeted GOTV campaign that draws on our successes in the 
last Presidential and local elections. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11.  (SBU) Polls repeatedly indicate profound public 
frustration with politicians, especially the democrats who 
have been running Serbia since Milosevic's ouster over 5 
years ago.  Nor is democracy as a concept deeply-rooted -- 
according to a poll that appeared earlier in February, at 
least 51 percent of the respondents believe that it is more 
important to have a capable leader than a parliamentary 
system, and only 23 percent are opposed to having a strong, 
single ruler.  Additionally, the five most popular (or in 
this case, least unpopular) figures in Serbia are indicted 
war criminals Mladic, Seselj, and Karadzic, followed by the 
leaders of the SRS, Nikolic and Vucic.  In a year that will 
see outcomes on highly emotional issues like Kosovo, we 
cannot exclude the possibility of a Radical/Socialist bloc 
taking power. 
 
12.  (C) This is not a foregone conclusion, however.  If the 
democratic parties could put aside their differences and work 
together, they could conceivably weather this tough year and 
beyond -- potentially even without early elections.  The DS 
would need to be brought into the tent for this to work. 
 
13.  (C) Post will work to coordinate and assist democratic 
parties and NGOs in order to shore up societal support for 
democratic parties, market-oriented reforms, and Western 
integration.  Kosovo-related developments could also have a 
measurable impact on domestic Serbian politics. Demonstrable 
progress on decentralization in Kosovo, protection of Serbian 
religious sites, and other "Serb issues" could give the 
savvier democrats advantages they could exploit.  In 
addition, a warm embrace of Serbia by the international 
community in response to a constructive Belgrade approach on 
Kosovo would also be helpful to the democrats. 
MOORE