This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000193 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO- SERBS GO PUBLIC WITH PRIVATE MESSAGES 
 
REF: 05 BELGRADE 2215 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, (Reasons 1.4 B&D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.(C) A media uproar over an announcement by Kosovo Serbs 
that visiting British Political Director John Sawers told 
them the Contact Group supported Kosovo independence, 
prompted a sharp reaction from Belgrade officials, and 
overshadowed the constructive private messages delivered on 
February 4 by U.S. Status Envoy, Frank Wisner.  Though 
Sawers tried to downplay the independence question in 
public statements made in Belgrade on February 7, the 
Kostunica and Tadic cabinets, forced into a defense 
posture, portrayed the British position as being different 
from the international consensus (read: Russia's position). 
The freshness of the private message on independence and 
the public debate sparked by disclosure of the British 
position, make a focus on delivering tangible progress on 
decentralization from the upcoming Vienna meetings a way to 
keep Belgrade engaged.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WISNER MESSAGE BURIED, NOT LOST 
------------------------------- 
2.(U) In the immediate aftermath of Ambassador Wisner's 
Feb. 4 visit, by design, there was little substantive media 
coverage, other than Wisner's comment that the U.S. wants 
the negotiations to end on by the end of 2006.  The Feb. 7 
issue of the generally pro-government daily, Politika, 
offered the first view of the Serbian response to the visit 
with the headline: "Milosevic lost Kosovo-- Loss of the 
province is not a punishment for the current leaders of 
Serbia."  The accompanying article claimed that, in his Feb 
4 meeting with PM Kostunica, "Amb. Wisner did not 
explicitly say that the American plan envisages an 
independent Kosovo by the end of this year, but he clearly 
stated he believes that a concept of conditional 
independence is nonsense."  The story went on to say that 
PM Kostunica strongly agrees with Wisner's rejection of 
"conditional independence," since "you are either 
independent or you are not." 
 
3.(U) The article further suggests that the U.S. "is 
leaning towards full independence", since Wisner allegedly 
stressed with Kostunica that "Kosovo was lost by Milosevic 
and the Radicals."  The story challenges this assertion by 
quoting Tadic advisor Kojen as saying it would be 
"completely illogical" to hold a negotiation on Kosovo's 
future status, if Milosevic had lost Kosovo.  "If such a 
thing were the case," Kojen asserts, "KFOR and UNMIK should 
just withdraw and leave all the power to the Albanians who 
have 'earned it' for all their suffering." 
 
4.(C) A close advisor to President Tadic told the DCM on 
Feb. 8 that the President was "thankful" for Wisner's 
forthright message on status.  Knowing the USG view up 
front would make it easier for Serbia to approach the 
talks, he said. 
 
MEDIA UPROAR OVER U.K. MEETING WITH K-SERBS 
------------------------------------------- 
5.(C) Discussion of Wisner's message was eclipsed on 
February 7, after some Kosovo Serbs told Belgrade media 
following a meeting with British Foreign Office Political 
Director John Sawers, that Sawers had told them the Contact 
Group had decided to grant independence to Kosovo.  One of 
the Kosovo Serbs present at the February 6 meeting told us 
that they were all completely surprised when, within the 
first few minutes of the meeting, Sawers told them 
explicitly that the outcome of status discussions would be 
independence.  Goran Bogdanovic (DS), who is a member of 
the Belgrade negotiating team for Kosovo status, recounted 
the meeting for the press, saying Sawers had urged Kosovo 
Serbs to accept that "Kosovo is your state as well, which 
will be multi-ethnic, but will be eventually independent." 
Kosovo Serbs Rada Trajkovic and Momcilo Trajkovic gave 
similar statements to Belgrade media, sparking widespread 
public speculation about the CG position on the outcome of 
status talks.  Radical party deputy leader, Tomislav 
Nikolic, and Kosovo Coordination Center (CCK) president 
Sanda Raskovic-Ivic have called into question Serb 
participation in upcoming direct talks in Vienna. 
 
6.(C) The Kostunica and Tadic cabinets have continued to 
reassure us they will participate in the Vienna talks, and 
have relied on well known Belgrade talking points in their 
public response-- that the status outcome must come from 
the U.N. Security Council; that international law 
guarantees Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, and that the 
British position on Kosovo independence is not in line with 
Contact Group consensus.  Several of our interlocutors have 
pointed to Russia's vocal stance and the lack of a CG 
consensus. 
 
SAWERS: OPTIONS ARE LIMITED 
--------------------------- 
7.(U) Sawers tried to quell the uproar over the K-Serb 
announcement with a high profile, in-depth interview on B- 
92 TV after his Feb. 7 meeting with PM Kostunica and Tadic 
advisors.  Sawers said he had not told the Kosovo Serb 
leaders the CG had decided on independence.  Instead, he 
clarified that the CG had agreed the solution for Kosovo's 
status should be acceptable to the majority of the 
province's citizens.  "It is clear that independence is an 
option, for some the only one," he told B-92 television, 
"but it is not the only topic of the talks.  The talks will 
discuss many issues and the details will be essential as to 
how common Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and member of 
other minorities in Kosovo can live freely on that 
territory."  He added, "there is a large consensus in the 
Contact Group on what is important, what the options are, 
and which path should be taken," and that the options being 
considered as possible outcomes were "very limited." 
 
BELGRADE: BRITS PLAYING GAME, UNSC WILL DECIDE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
8.(U) After meeting with Sawers, PM Kostunica issued a 
written statement which emphasized, "the UN Security 
Council alone has the mandate to change principles adopted 
for talks on the future status of Kosovo."  The statement 
added that a "one-sided and exclusive" approach to the 
status talks, before they have begun, is "totally 
unacceptable," and is a direct contradiction to the CG 
public statement issued on January 31.  According to the 
GOS statement, the PM told Sawers, "Any attempt to impose a 
solution on a democratic state represents not only 
inappropriate pressure, but a violation of the founding 
principles of international law and the international 
system." 
 
9.(U) Advisors to the PM and President made themselves 
available to the media after the meeting with Sawers, 
characterizing the British position as at odds with the 
consensus CG view.  Slobodan Samardzic told RTS television 
that the U.K. "is playing a pressure game" for Kosovo 
independence, and that this is "not the first time" the 
British have delivered such a message.  Though Sawers had 
toned down the message he had delivered in Pristina, 
according to Samardzic, the British diplomat had "de facto" 
called for an independent Kosovo in his meeting with 
Kostunica.  Tadic advisor, Leon Kojen, appearing on B-92 
television, said there is disagreement in the Contact Group 
about what should be the final outcome of status talks. 
Kojen said the positions range between the British position 
of independence and the Russian position that the outcome 
must be acceptable to both sides.  Kojen added that the 
U.S. position offered by Ambassador Wisner was closer to 
the U.K. position. 
 
10.(U) Russian Ambassador to SaM, Aleksandr Alekseyev, also 
gave an interview to B-92 television, saying, "If the 
decision on Kosovo's future status were already known, 
there would be no point in launching status talks." 
Alekseyev stressed that Russia supported a solution that is 
acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina.  At the same 
time, Alekseyev rejected the idea that Russia disagreed 
with its Contact Group partners and cautioned that "Serbia 
should not believe Russia views Kosovo as an internal 
problem," but only that the resolution of the problem 
"should take into account, "universal, international 
principles." 
 
EU'S LEHNE SOFTENS MESSAGE 
-------------------------- 
11.(C) The EU envoy to the Ahtisaari team, Stefan Lehne, in 
Belgrade on February 8-9, told the Ambassador that he had 
had a "positive meeting" with Kostunica, where he delivered 
the private messages from an EU point of view.  Lehne said 
he sought to deliver the "tough message" to Kostunica more 
softly, in terms of the EU's legitimate interest in shaping 
a realistic post-settlement transition and Serbia's 
European prospects. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
12.(C) The reaction to Sawers' visit was predictable. 
There has been for some time a deep-seated suspicion in the 
Prime Minister's office that London has actively lobbied 
inside the Contact Group for an early decision on 
independence (Reftel).  Belgrade expected the worst out of 
Sawers' visit and may have sought to exploit it: the K-Serb 
public outcry after their meetings with Sawers embarrassed 
the British and presented the "tough" message not as an 
emerging Contact Group consensus but as another example of 
British eagerness to advance their own national position in 
support of an independent Kosovo. 
 
13.(C) It will take time for Belgrade to accommodate their 
public position to the reality outlined by Ambassador 
Wisner (and Sawers).  They are still assessing how to 
proceed and what changes, if any, they should make in their 
public posture and negotiating strategy.  We should 
consider the whole cycle of images and reactions of the 
last few days as trial balloons-- both the spin on Sawers 
visit as well as the more encouraging argument in Politika 
that Milosevic lost Kosovo some time ago.  Belgrade will be 
watching carefully to see if the IC is committed to 
something real on decentralization or whether the "tough 
message" is an announcement that the negotiations are over. 
14.(C) As they make that determination and get accustomed 
to a dose of reality, we should strive to make the first 
round in Vienna a substantive step forward on 
decentralization, in order to provide Belgrade a strong 
rationale for staying at the table.  Early progress will 
demonstrate to Belgrade that there is something in this for 
them.  It will also help the more constructive leaders-- 
Tadic and Draskovic-- sell whatever package comes out of 
the status settlement.  END COMMENT. 
 
15.(U) Embassy Belgrade clears this cable in its entirety 
for release to U.N. envoy Marti Ahtisaari. 
POLT