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INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000517 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016 
TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: MGLE01:  SPEAKER BERRI SAYS HE'S READY TO REMOVE 
LAHOUD, BUT NEEDS A NAME 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
 ------- 
¶1.  (C)  Nabih Berri stated that his "national dialogue 
conference," scheduled to run March 2-9, could seal the fate 
of President Lahoud, if the participating political blocs can 
agree on a consensus replacement.  As he has throughout his 
career, Berri has assiduously counted the votes and has 
concluded that if either Amal (15 deputies) or Aoun (21 
deputies) join forces with the March 14 coalition (71 
deputies), it would create the two-thirds majority in 
parliament needed to replace Lahoud.  Although Michel Aoun 
remains opposed to any candidate except himself, Berri 
indicated he is ready to commit his Amal delegates (which 
would create a two-thirds majority) if an acceptable 
replacement can be found.  Berri is annoyed with the "stupid" 
behavior of Saad Hariri in calling for street demonstrations 
on March 14 to oust Lahoud, but believes such a 
confrontational strategy can be avoided if agreement on a 
replacement can be achieved -- an agreement he feels is 
within reach because it requires neither Aoun nor Nasrallah. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U)  Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri met the Ambassador 
and poloff on February 21 at his office in Ayn Tine in West 
Beirut.  Amal political affairs advisor Ali Hamdan also 
attended the meeting.  Berri indicated he would soon be 
leaving for Amman for a meeting of the Arab League, but would 
be back in Beirut well before next week's scheduled opening 
of his "national dialogue conference." 
 
"I WILL COOPERATE ON ONE CONDITION" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Following a remark on how rapidly things were 
changing on the political scene, Nabih Berri referred to a 
statement made on February 20 by the religious leader of 
Lebanon's Maronite community, Patriarch Boutros Sfeir. 
Unlike his previous stated position that street 
demonstrations designed to remove Lahoud would be unwise and 
damaging to the institution of the presidency, Sfeir had now 
declared that demonstrations were permissible, but "not in 
front of Baabda Palace" -- to avoid potentially dangerous 
counter-demonstrations.  According to Berri, by making such a 
statement, the Maronite leader moved one step closer to 
joining a growing consensus to replace the Syrian-imposed 
president.  When asked if the patriarch will name a 
candidate, Berri commented that the cleric was "too clever" 
to publicly declare an acceptable replacement, because if he 
did he would antagonize the numerous Maronite candidates not 
chosen.  All the candidate need be, Berri continued, is 
"moderate" and acceptable to the country's diverse 
communities. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Berri expressed frustration and annoyance that Saad 
Hariri, in emphasizing a March 14 deadline, had needlessly 
compressed the time available for a consensus solution, but 
even so, indicated there was a way to achieve Lahoud's 
removal peacefully, "if Saad is smart enough" to seize it. 
Berri indicated that preparations for the planned dialogue 
conference were moving ahead and it appeared the necessary 
parties would attend.  As a result, the pieces were in place 
for consensus reQlution of the situation. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The speaker, who has previously beaten political 
odds by astute management of leverage, indicated there were 
presently two blocs that, if aligned with the 71 deputies of 
the March 14 coalition, could create the two-thirds majority 
needed to remove Lahoud and select his replacement. 
Acknowledging the obvious, Berri said that unless the 
replacement candidate was Michel Aoun, it was doubtful that 
the general would ally himself with the Hariri-led coalition. 
 
 
AVOIDING A POLITICAL VACUUM 
--------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  But unexpectedly, Berri then said he would consider 
taking his deputies into such an alliance on one condition: 
"I have to know who it (candidate) is."  Berri indicated he 
really didn't have a preference, but wanted at all costs to 
avoid the dangerous political "vacuum" that would result if 
the president were removed without a consensus replacement. 
In essence, Berri's deputies would prevent a dangerous 
political impasse.  More importantly, Hizballah, with its 14 
deputies, would not be able to block a Amal/March 14 
 
BEIRUT 00000517  002 OF 002 
 
 
parliamentary alliance. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Similarly, Berri explained it was important to have 
a two-thirds parliamentary majority even if Lahoud decided 
(unexpectedly) to simply resign, because under Lebanon's 
constitution, matters such as the selection of a new 
president still required the presence of two-thirds of the 
deputies for a legal quorum.  Thus, Hizballah would be unable 
to subvert the process simply by refusing to attend the 
pertinent parliament session. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Even though Berri insisted "it would not be 
difficult," he conceded that if his "national dialogue" 
strategy failed and Lahoud survived past March 14 -- Saad 
Hariri's deadline -- there would be a crisis for the March 14 
coalition, and the country, if competing street 
demonstrations broke out in the already tense capital.  In an 
aside, Berri said the still-to-be-released ISF investigation 
of the violent Sunni demonstration on February 5 would 
indicate Syrian and Palestinian involvement was much less 
than originally stated, and that Sunni extremism was the real 
culprit. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Berri concluded, "I accept that Lahoud must go, but 
in the street you can do nothing."  He said that even though 
the timeframe was short, the scheduled March 2-9 dialogue was 
the only real solution to the increasing sectarian pressure. 
He expressed hope that once the presidential issue was 
resolved, Lebanon could begin to address the many pressing 
issues it confronted: the truth behind Hariri's 
assassination, implementation of UNSCR 1559, and normalizing 
relations with its most important neighbor, Syria. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  The confidence of Berri is interesting when viewed 
in connection with Saad Hariri's similar frame of mind (see 
septel).  There is the possibility that Berri and Hariri have 
already decided to join forces (to create the theoretically 
safe two-thirds parliamentary majority) that would explain 
their public statements and comments to this Embassy.  If 
that is the case, it would appear they are playing with an 
awfully thin margin for error.  But the slight, nuanced shift 
in the patriarch's position and the new-found independence of 
Berri to consider new alliances could be construed as key 
developments that may lead to the constitutional removal of 
Lahoud.  In addition, it would be good news for Lebanon if 
Berri's suggestion that he might split from Hizballah is 
sincere.  An Amal-Hizballah split would allow other Shia 
politicians to emerge, if the current Shia monolith 
splinters.  But we are not holding our breath at this point. 
End comment. 
FELTMAN