VZCZCXRO4510
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0024/01 0530658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220658Z FEB 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0253
INFO RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0271
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000024 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV ECON EAID ETRD EINV IZ
SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, SECURITY ARE CASUALTIES AS BADR AND 
OMS FIGHT FOR PORTS, PROFIT 
 
REF: 05 BASRAH 125 
 
BASRAH 00000024  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: KEN GROSS, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (e) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  On February 20, the Basrah Regional 
Coordinator (RC) and Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) met with 
Captain Hussain M. Abdallah, the Director General of the Iraqi 
Port Authority (IPA).  Captain Hussain described Umm Qasr port 
operations as being at full capacity.  He acknowledged delivery 
of laboratory equipment at Umm Qasr for food testing and said 
there is a disagreement over whether to install the food-testing 
lab at Umm Qasr or in the city of Basrah.  A Japanese loan 
package for port rehabilitation is on track and funds should be 
available in April 2006.  The Iraqi ports still have not 
attained International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) standards, 
although Lloyd's of London visited Umm Qasr in January to review 
certification.  The politicization of the ports between Badr and 
OMS shows no signs of abating, as they battle over control of 
the lucrative and strategically important ports in southern 
Iraq.  End Summary. 
 
Port Operations at Maximum Capacity 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
-------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On February 20, the Basrah RC and DRC met with Captain 
Hussain M. Abdallah, the Director General of the IPA.  Captain 
Hussain said that Umm Qasr is currently operating at maximum 
capacity.  He said he had been contacted by the Project and 
Contracting Office (PCO) with a request to use Umm Qasr instead 
of Kuwait for shipments.  Captain Hussain would like to 
accommodate their request, but there are not enough cranes for 
unloading containers to meet current demand.  He said that some 
ships must wait up to 10 days to unload and some grain shipments 
are now coming in overland because of port congestion.  He said 
a project to relocate cranes from the north to the south port 
was delayed because the cranes do not fit through the gates. 
Port operations are further hampered because there are only four 
workable jetties and a shortage of grain evacuators.  He is in 
contact with the PCO regarding additional equipment for the 
ports. 
 
U.S.-Funded Food Testing Laboratory Still in Storage at Umm Qasr 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Captain Hussain said he had seen equipment for a food 
testing laboratory purchased by the PCO in May 2005 and that 
this equipment is currently in storage at Umm Qasr.  He said 
that he would like to install the lab at Umm Qasr and has made 
space available.  The Ministry of Health, according to Captain 
Hussain, prefers the lab be installed in Basrah instead so that 
it would be accessible to all four southern ports:  Umm Qasr, 
Khor az Zubair (KAZ), Abu Floos, and Al Basrah.  Captain Hussain 
said that nearly all grain is imported through Umm Qasr, so it 
would be better to install the lab there.  Installing the lab in 
the city of Basrah would involve delays while grain samples were 
transported back and forth from the port to Basrah.  He believed 
that the Ministry of Health (MoH) wanted the grain lab installed 
in Basrah to avoid having its officials make the 50-mile commute 
between Basrah and Umm Qasr and pass through the extensive port 
security.  (Comment:  This is the first time that REO Basrah has 
heard mention of the MoH in connection with the food-testing 
lab.  End Comment.) 
 
Japanese Loan Ready in April 2006 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Captain Hussain said that a Japanese assistance package 
to remove wrecks, dredge the ports to a 12.5-meter depth, and 
procure equipment and utilities for the ports is on track (see 
reftel).  He estimated the project would take three to four 
years to complete.  He said that the loan should be ready in 
April 2006, and he has been working with the Japanese to prepare 
tender statements so that the project can be tendered out 
immediately after the loan is received. 
 
Iraqi Ports Still Do Not Meet ISPS Standards 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  None of the four ports in Iraq (Umm Qasr, KAZ, Abu 
Floos, Al Basrah) have attained ISPS standards.  Captain Hussain 
mentioned that Lloyd's of London had toured the ports in January 
and described the delegation as "surprised at the quality" of 
the ports.  He hoped a positive report from Lloyd's would result 
 
BASRAH 00000024  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
in a lowering of sky-high insurance rates for docking at Iraqi 
ports, described as being located in an active war zone.  Even 
if the ports do not have ISPS certification, he said, they had 
attained "certain standards," and he hoped this would be 
recognized.  (Comment: Captain Hussain appeared more interested 
in obtaining a favorable report from Lloyd's that would result 
in lower insurance fees rather than in actually attaining ISPS 
standards.  End Comment.) 
 
Port Security Questionable and Political 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Captain Hussain said that there were currently 500 
Iraqi police (IPS) at Umm Qasr port, 280 at Khor az Zubair, and 
about 200 at Abu Floos and Al Basrah.  If true, these numbers 
represent a sizeable increase in police presence at the ports 
from October 2005, when former KAZ port manager Basil Abdul 
Majeed reported that there were 160 IPS appointed to KAZ (see 
reftel).  IPS, under the Ministry of Interior, function in the 
capacity of customs officers at the ports.  Captain Hussain said 
that all police at the ports take their instructions from him, 
even if their salaries come from the MoI.  "Many people tried to 
get involved in security," he said, "but we are in control." 
Nevertheless, he said that security would be even better if he 
had his own "police force," under the authority of the Minister 
of Transportation.  (Comment:  Facility Protection Services, 
provided by the Ministry of Transportation, are also present at 
the ports. The OMS-controlled Ministry of Transportation has 
been consolidating its control over port operations over the 
past six months, while the MoI has been increasing police 
presence at the ports.  End comment.) 
 
¶7.  (C)  When specifically asked about security at the ports, 
Captain Hussain described security as "good." He was quick to 
add, however, that he bears no responsibility for security 
outside the gates of Umm Qasr port, which he said is provided by 
"private companies."  He made no mention of the two British 
soldiers who were killed in an IED attack on January 31 near the 
main gate of the port. 
 
Vague on Boycott, Iranian Interest 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
---------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  When asked if the February 13 suspension of 
communication between the Basrah government and the British were 
affecting work at the ports, Captain Hussain answered in vague 
terms, saying only that he had to "postpone" one meeting with 
the British regarding project work.  Captain Hussain was also 
vague when asked if other countries, and Iran in particular, 
were interested in investing in Iraq's ports.  He avoided giving 
a definitive answer and only said that many dhows came in to 
Iraq daily transporting fruits, vegetables, and dairy products, 
which were cheaper in Iran than in Iraq.  Most of these dhows, 
he said, came in to Abu Floos port, which is smaller, located 
directly across the Shatt al Arab River from Iran, and is a 
twenty-minute drive from the markets of Basrah. 
 
Badr and OMS Fight for Iraqi Ports, Profits 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
--------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Comment:  Captain Hussain does not appear to be overly 
concerned about obtaining ISPS standards, and instead hopes that 
a favorable report from Lloyd's will result in lower insurance 
rates.  This attitude is worrisome, as it will be difficult for 
Iraqi ports to become economically competitive with those of 
Iran and Kuwait without ISPS certification.  His dismissal of 
security concerns at Umm Qasr port is also disturbing.  It is 
difficult to see how Umm Qasr will attain international security 
standards and a lower insurance rating when Coalition forces 
were killed recently outside Umm Qasr's main gates. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Comment Continued:  The battle between Badr and OMS to 
win control over Umm Qasr, Iraq's largest, most profitable, and 
most strategically located port, shows no sign of abating.  This 
battle for control over one of Basrah province's major cash cows 
(the others being the Basrah International Airport and oil) is 
being mirrored in local politics, as OMS, Badr and SCIRI are 
engaged in political maneuverings to win influence on the Basrah 
Provincial Council and position themselves for success during 
the upcoming provincial elections.  End comment. 
GROSS