This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001139 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016 
TAGS: PREF PREL TH KS KN DPRK
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY ON NORTH KOREAN 
 
REFUGEES 
 
REF: A. SEOUL 471 
     ¶B. STATE 4712 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN SUTTON, REASON 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In a February 23 meeting, a South Korean 
Embassy official said he had received no new instructions or 
information from Seoul regarding U.S.-ROK discussions about 
North Korean refugees, including on providing assistance to 
the Embassy if any suitable refugee cases arose or sharing 
information on North Korean refugees who wanted U.S. 
resettlement.  The official raised familiar concerns that 
U.S. resettlement processing of North Korean refugees in 
Thailand would lead to a surge in North Koreans coming to 
Thailand and endanger the existing pipeline to the ROK.  He 
also speculated that if the United States resettled North 
Koreans from Thailand, the DPRK might charge that the United 
States was abducting its citizens and cite that as an excuse 
not to participate in the Six-Party talks.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Political Counselor and Refcoord met informally on 
February 23 with Counsellor Hong-Kyn Kim of the South Korean 
Embassy to discuss the North Korean refugee issue.  Kim will 
shortly be leaving Thailand to work in Seoul as one of the 
special assistants to the ROK Foreign Minister. 
 
¶3. (C) Political Counselor noted that the USG had recently 
told the ROK government that it would continue to push ahead 
on resettling a small number of North Korean refugees in the 
United States.  To that end, the USG would be trying to 
overcome the resistance of asylum countries, including 
Thailand, to permitting U.S. resettlement processing of North 
Koreas.  If suitable cases were found, we would also be 
looking for some assistance from the ROK.  Political 
Counselor asked Kim for an updated assessment of the North 
Korean refugee situation in Thailand and whether Seoul had 
passed on any new instructions or information. 
 
¶4. (C) Somewhat surprisingly, Kim responded that he had 
received no new instructions or information from Seoul 
regarding U.S.-ROK discussions on North Korean refugees, 
including on the provision of assistance for suitable cases 
or sharing information on North Korean refugees who wanted to 
resettle in the United States.  He added, however, that the 
ROK Embassy would naturally follow any instructions that 
Seoul might provide. 
 
¶5. (C) Kim then raised the familiar concern that USG 
processing of North Korean refugees in Thailand could 
endanger the pipeline to the ROK and said that the USG should 
not do anything that might disturb the existing system.  He 
asked whether the USG had considered Mongolia as an 
alternative location, noting that the Mongolian government 
seemed more forthcoming generally on this issue than 
Thailand.  (Comment:  In ref a, MOFAT DG Kim took a different 
tact, stating that a USG refugee resettlement initiative in 
Mongolia could lead the Mongolians to shut down the pipeline 
to South Korea and thereby end that country's status as a 
particularly important transit point for North Korean 
refugees.  End comment.)  Counsellor Kim stated that word 
spreads rapidly among the NGOs and brokers involved with 
North Korean refugees and it would quickly become known that 
the USG was processing North Korean refugees in Thailand.  He 
predicted that the number of North Korean refugees would 
surge since it was already relatively easy for them to travel 
here.  They would test the USG to see how many refugees it 
would take. 
 
¶6. (C) Kim continued that the Thai government was already 
concerned about the increasing number of North Korean 
refugees coming to Thailand.  He noted a recent press report 
in which a northern Thai police official had said that the 
Thai government was worried about the trend and would bolster 
its police presence in the areas where the North Koreans 
crossed the border.  He expressed confidence, however, that 
the Thai government would not take steps to stop the existing 
pipeline to South Korea.  Apart from the higher numbers that 
were moving through the pipeline this year, Kim said there 
were no changes in how the system was working.  It was now 
taking about 2 months on average for North Korean refugees to 
be processed in Bangkok before they were moved on to the ROK. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Kim raised another concern about U.S. refugee 
processing of North Koreans in Thailand.  He said he believed 
the DPRK had never approached the Thai goverment regarding 
the existing pipeline.  However, if the United States were to 
start taking North Korean refugees from Thailand, Kim said 
this would likely change.  The DPRK would raise the issue 
with the Thai.  In addition, the DPRK might charge that the 
U.S. was abducting North Koreans and use that as an excuse 
not to participate in the Six-Party talks. 
BOYCE