This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001092 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH TRT
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PLANS FOR THAKSIN'S OUSTER, TRANSITION 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 1034 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 0538 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton, reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: The NGO alliance organizing Sunday's massive 
protest against Prime Minister Thaksin predicts a peaceful 
and successful rally which will unseat the PM.  They expect 
the PM's ruling Thai Rak Thai party to crumble within several 
months, leading to new elections before the end of the year. 
This is a "best-case" scenario for the opposition, but it is 
not an unrealistic prediction.  Thaksin is in real trouble. 
END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C)  Polcouns met February 22 with Pittaya Wongkul, head 
of one of the NGOs in the "Alliance to Defend the Country," 
which is organizing Sunday's big protest rally against Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinnawatra.  Pittaya reviewed the reason 
why growing numbers of the public are opposed to Thaksin. 
Like other observers, he recognized that the issues that had 
animated NGO opposition to the PM, like press freedom, were 
not so important to the general public. The Shin Corp sale 
was the issue that was mobilizing the masses.  They were 
concerned about selling off a key asset to foreigners, and 
they were angry about that Thaksin did not have to pay any 
taxes on his enormous gains.  Pittaya pointed out that the 
authorities count the shirts for sale on the street vendor's 
table, and the number of bowls of soup the noodle shop sells 
in order to assess their taxes, but Thaksin will pay nothing 
on his 1.8 billion dollar deal. 
 
¶3. (C) Pittaya outlined the opposition plans for the 
demonstration on Sunday.  The Alliance members planned to 
meet on February 23 to elect a steering committee for the 
rally.  Media firebrand Sondhi Limthongkul, whose weekly 
protests started the ball rolling, and "Dharma Army" General 
Chamlong had pledged to work as part of a coalition with the 
lesser-known NGOs in the Alliance.  The steering committee 
will make all the decisions on the rally, including a 
determination on who would speak on Sunday.   This rally 
would not repeat the format of the previous protests, in 
which Sondhi essentially did a version of his talk show, 
dishing dirt on the PM and his family.  Who turns up and who 
speaks will be an important indicator of the scope of 
opposition to Thaksin.  We do not expect a final decision to 
be made until the last minute. 
 
¶4.  (C) Pittaya confirmed that the opposition would not be 
satisfied with the dissolution of Parliament; they would 
insist on Thaksin's resignation.  Pittaya expected Sunday's 
demonstration to be very effective.  A small part of the 
demonstrators would camp out at the site (presumably led by 
Chamlong, whose "Dharma Army" organization has experience in 
staging days-long protests).  Other participants would go to 
their jobs during the day and return to the protest rally in 
the evenings.  He said that "if they could get 200,000 to 
300,000 people to turn out on Sunday" then  "Thaksin would 
resign within a couple of days."  He predicted that other 
members of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party would not 
support the dissolution of Parliament for their own selfish 
reasons -- they don't want to be out of a job and have to 
campaign again in an uncertain environment.  They will be 
prepared to sacrifice Thaksin. 
 
¶5. (C) Pittaya aid that the opposition was not terribly 
concerned about who would step in as Prime Minister after 
that.  They presumed that one of the prominent TRT members 
would take on the job.  In any case, he predicted,  TRT would 
fall apart once Thaksin was gone.  The Parliament would 
remain for a couple of months, focusing on making some 
changes to the Constitution as called for by many academics 
and political figures, and would head into new elections 
within six months.  (Note:  It is not yet clear exactly what 
changes to the Constitution have broad support.  However, 
Pittaya probably has in mind measures to strengthen the 
independence of institutions like the National 
Counter-Corruption Commission, and changes to provisions that 
make it virtually impossible for MPs to change parties.  end 
note.) 
 
¶6. (C) Pittaya emphasized that the organizers do not expect 
violence.  They think that Thaksin supporters are 
contributing to rumors of possible trouble in order to scare 
people away from the protest.  He said that the group was 
working with local officials and would stay in touch with 
police to avoid misunderstandings.  The government 
understand, Pittaya said, that the use of violence by 
security forces would only galvanize opposition to Thaksin. 
 
¶7. (C)  Comment:  Septel provides our analysis of the serious 
challenge Thaksin faces.  Pittaya's scenario reflects a 
"best-case" outcome for the opposition, but it is not 
completely unrealistic.  It is notable that the plan does not 
require any intervention by the King -- it would simply allow 
the legal and constitutional mechanisms to play out.  End 
Comment 
BOYCE