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DE RUEHKB #0240/01 0470742
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R 160742Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9623
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0397
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0410

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2016 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KISL RU AJ
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CONVENES G-8 MEETING ON COUNTER-TERRORISM 
 
REF: BISHKEK 151 
 
Classified By: DCM Jason P. Hyland, reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  While participants at a Russian-chaired 
G-8 meeting on counter-terrorism issues agreed that 
Azerbaijan was a strong partner in the global war on 
terrorism, the meeting rapidly devolved into a discussion on 
Azerbaijan's reform record.  Western countries argued that 
greater reform was needed to stave off potential domestic 
terrorism threats, while Russia argued that Azerbaijan's 
"success" on reform had eliminated these threats.  Citing its 
"close" cooperation with GOAJ security services, Russia also 
said that Chechens posed the only real threat to Azerbaijan's 
security, while Iranian influences pose a potential threat to 
the Aliyev regime.  The Russian FSB representative insisted 
that Azerbaijan does not face any internal terrorist threats 
but acknowledged that weak borders and corruption could make 
it easier for terrorists to enter Azerbaijan.  This meeting 
provided a fascinating insight into Russia's relationship 
with Azerbaijan, but we do not support Russia's suggestion to 
share information on Azerbaijan's terrorism issues within the 
G-8 framework.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) Russia, in its capacity as G-8 chair, held a 
February 9 "counter-terrorism working group" to explore 
current terrorism issues in Azerbaijan and possible venues 
for G-8 cooperation.  France, Italy, Japan, Germany, the UK 
and the U.S. (represented by pol/econ chief and SIMO chief) 
attended the meeting.  France also sent SIMO counterpart. 
Russia was represented by Charge Pyotr Burdikin and four 
embassy officials, most of whom were not presented to the 
group. 
 
¶3.  (C) Burdikin opened the meeting with Russia's very 
positive assessment of Azerbaijan's performance on 
counter-terrorism issues.  Azerbaijan has ratified key UN 
conventions on terrorism, has taken action on terrorist 
financing under UNSCR 1373, has contributed peacekeeping 
troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and, in general, has 
demonstrated a strong desire to cooperate on 
counter-terrorism issues.  Burdikin also noted that 
Azerbaijan's political and religious leaders have played a 
positive role in promoting dialogue among religious groups 
and the GOAJ works closely with the media to make sure that a 
message of tolerance is broadly disseminated.  Nevertheless, 
Azerbaijan is both a transit point and a potential target for 
transnational terrorist groups and, according to Burdikin, 
Russia had evidence that some terrorist acts had been 
planned. 
 
¶4.  (C) While the western members of the G-8 agreed that the 
GOAJ was a strong partner on counter-terrorism issues, the 
UK, US, France and Germany argued that greater political and 
economic reform was needed to stave off any future domestic 
terrorism threats in Azerbaijan.  Only with greater openness 
and transparency would the GOAJ be able to achieve true 
internal stability and ensure that Azerbaijani youth do not 
turn to extremism.  The UK suggested that the slow growth of 
radical Islam in Azerbaijan was a trend that merited further 
attention. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Russian FSB representative bristled at this 
discussion, dismissing the possibility that the GOAJ could 
face an internal terrorism threat.  In Russia's view, 
Azerbaijanis are peace-loving people who refrain from 
conflict.  Moreover, GOAJ "success" on political and economic 
reform in recent years has eliminated any popular discontent 
within Azerbaijan.  The GOAJ, according to the Russian FSB 
representative, does not believe it faces any internal 
threats from terrorism, and Russia also does not believe that 
there any domestic radical groups working in Azerbaijan. 
Only the Chechens pose a terrorism threat to Azerbaijan and 
Russia is taking measures to help Azerbaijan "push" the 
Chechens out of its territory.  Iranian influence could also 
pose a "serious" threat to the Aliyev regime.  Weaknesses in 
Azerbaijan's border controls, including corruption, could 
allow some terrorists to penetrate Azerbaijani territory; to 
that end, Russian Charge Burdikin suggested, perhaps G-8 
members could begin sharing terrorism information in 
Azerbaijan.  Burdikin's suggestion was met with noncommital 
shrugs by most and a comment from the UK that this sort of 
meeting was not the appropriate venue.  (Burdikin also made a 
point of telling the group that not all Chechens are bad 
 
BAKU 00000240  002 OF 002 
 
 
people.) 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Comment:  This awkward meeting, presumably called 
on instructions from Moscow (ref), provided a fascinating 
insight into the Russia-Azerbaijan bilateral relationship. 
The FSB representative made repeated reference to Russia's 
close relationship with the Ministry of National Security and 
clearly felt compelled to defend Azerbaijan's performance on 
democracy and human rights issues.  Russia's insistence on 
the lack of domestic terrorist threats within Azerbaijan does 
not square with our information and suggests either 
deliberate disinformation on the part of the Russians or 
their "close" partners within Azerbaijan's security services. 
 We do not support Russia's suggestion to share information 
on Azerbaijan's terrorism issues within the framework of the 
G-8. 
HARNISH