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FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9567
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN; EUR/SNEC 
PARIS PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR MANN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL KDEM AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S OPPOSITION SKEPTICAL OF N-K PEACE AS 
RHETORIC ON ALL SIDES HARDENS 
 
REF: BAKU 170 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Reno L. Harnish for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: From separate conversations with 
working-level contacts among Azerbaijan's opposition 
political leaders, it is evident that not only do many 
political activists discount the sincerity of GOAJ efforts to 
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but few have any 
concrete ideas of their own.  Most trot out rote statements 
on the need to protect Azerbaijan's territorial integrity 
(i.e. return to GOAJ control of all seven occupied 
territories and the former autonomous region of Nagorno 
Karabakh), a message that resonates with the general public. 
While one group of civil society activists has focused on the 
need to reduce radicalism on both sides, even this group of 
political intellectuals has been unable to agree on concrete 
steps they can take to move the peace process forward. 
Without any government officials publicly advocating a 
"realistic" peace plan, the GOAJ could find itself vulnerable 
if and when it makes concessions to resolve the conflict. 
Opposition parties could play a spoiler role on N-K, seizing 
upon the GOAJ's "betrayal" as the platform they need to 
regain support following November parliamentary elections. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Discussions the first week of February with various 
opposition party deputy chairmen revealed that the parties 
have little to offer on a resolution to N-K beyond the 
campaign rhetoric of last year.  Asked for their thoughts on 
the process and the prospect for peace, most responded with 
doubt that the current regime could pull off a resolution. 
According to opposition hard-liners, the current regime is 
not democratic, does not represent the people and is seen as 
illegitimate.  According to the opposition's thinking, any 
peace deal negotiated by the Aliyev government therefore 
would not have the best interest of the people at heart.  For 
this reason, according to Fuad Mustafayev (Popular Front 
Party), the people will reject any peace deal the GOAJ 
negotiates.  However, if the GOAJ were democratic, Mustafayev 
surmised that the people would give the GOAJ a carte blanche 
to negotiate in its interest. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In this vein the opposition also criticized the GOAJ 
for its lack of openness with the people and stated that 
while it was understood the negotiating strategies of a 
government cannot be public, the current regime has shared 
nothing.  This leaves the opposition little with which to 
work, therefore contributing to the rampant (and probably 
often unfounded) speculation in opposition newspapers.  The 
lack of information is also used by most with whom we spoke 
to justify their lack of ideas on how to solve the conflict. 
Chairman of the Umid Party and current MP Igbal Aghazade said 
the opposition should be seen as an informal partner and 
could provide feedback to the current government if allowed 
to cooperate on some aspects of negotiation points. 
Harder-line opposition contacts Mustafayev and Sulhaddin 
Akhbar (Musavat) simply accused the GOAJ of manipulating the 
conflict for political gain. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Our contacts also had little to offer in terms of 
what a resolution acceptable to Azerbaijanis would look like. 
 All unequivocally stated that Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity must be upheld, a point that seems to have almost 
universal resonance in Azerbaijan.  The idea of peacekeeping 
troops once a resolution is reached was not outright 
rejected, as long as the Russian Federation would not supply 
those troops.  (NATO was referenced as an acceptable 
alternative).  The issue of a referendum was also generally 
not outright rejected, but most with whom we spoke were less 
certain what ultimately would be "workable," i.e. a plan that 
would serve the Azerbaijani interest of maintaining control 
ovr N-K.  The return of Azerbaijani IDPs to their hoelands 
(Shusha and the occupied territories) is een as part and 
parcel with preserving Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. 
Mustafayev, Aghazade, and YES Bloc leader Eldar Namazov all 
underscored additionally that Azerbaijanis are tolerant 
people; therefore, Armenians would not need to fear for their 
security at Azerbaijani hands.  Beyond these ideas, however, 
our contacts had little conception (or would not share) what 
a realistic, workable peace deal would look like. 
 
¶5. (C) Unique among opposition contacts was Musavat's 
 
BAKU 00000195  002 OF 003 
 
 
representative, Sulhaddin Akhbar. Although a regular embassy 
contact, he refused to engage on the issue.  Instead, he 
chose to highlight how US security concerns, Iranian and 
Russian pressure, and the intensifying debate over Iran's 
possible nuclear weapons as reasons why the international 
community and the GOAJ are unlikely to reach a resolution to 
the conflict.  The only constructive points he gave were that 
if the following five points played any role in the 
resolution, the deal would be rejected by Azerbaijanis: N-K 
keeping any of its state symbols, N-K keeping military 
forces, Lachin and Kelbajar being used as "hostages," (we 
assume he was referring to a 5 1 1 resolution), any ban on 
the entry of Azerbaijani military forces to the region, and 
negotiating access for Armenia through the Lachin corridor. 
He stated from a position of "authority" that the N-K talks 
currently focused on Russia's demand for monetary 
compensation prior to agreeing to any sort of resolution. 
While Akhbar likely does not speak for the Musavat party 
itself, he is a close advisor to party chairman Isa Gambar. 
His conspiracy theories and lack of constructive feedback are 
worrisome if this is the manner in which the leadership of 
Musavat (one of the two largest opposition parties) is 
discussing the N-K conflict with its supporters. 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY: WALKING THROUGH A MINEFIELD 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) While opposition leaders focus purely on rhetoric, 
civil society figures tend to have more constructive 
approaches to the N-K issue.  Various groups have been 
holding almost weekly roundtables and press conferences in 
Baku to discuss the conflict.  One group toiling outside the 
public's eye is composed of influential civil society and 
opposition figures such as Arzu Abdullayeva, Eldar Namazov, 
Zardusht Alizade, Rasim Musabayov and Ilgar Mammedov (former 
Embassy employee and former country director of the 
International Crisis Group).  At the group's February 6 
Meeting, discussion dissolved into a disagreement over the 
most effective means for civil society to participate in the 
peace process.  While no one expected civil society to 
participate in the talks, the group debated to what extent 
civil society initiatives, such as people-to-people diplomacy 
and draft agreements, could affect the outcome of the 
process.  Expressing concern about the increasing 
radicalization of both sides, the one point the group agreed 
on was the need to counter official GOAJ propaganda vilifying 
Armenia.  The group finally agreed to begin work on a draft 
constitution for Nagorno Karabakh with input from all parties 
to the conflict, in hopes that it would stem growing 
radicalism on both sides. 
 
¶7. (SBU) However, work such as this comes with its own 
dangers; several members of the group have been criticized 
and publicly branded as "Armenian spies" for past work 
involving bridge building with Armenians.  These types of 
accusations crop up in the press periodically.  The most 
recent incident involved the independent scholar Arif Yunus 
(husband of NGO activist Leyla Yunus).  Yunus has been 
branded as a traitor and an "Armenian" for an interview he 
gave criticizing corruption within the Ministry of Defense. 
The independent TV channel ANS picked up the issue and has 
been calling his statements treasonous, highlighting that an 
Armenian press agency republished the interview.  On January 
30 the Minister of Defense reportedly said that only 
Azerbaijanis of "pure" Azeri origin can criticize the 
country's armed forces.  The next day a group of veterans of 
the Karabakh conflict stated that any criticism of the armed 
forces is treasonous. 
 
¶8. (SBU) ANS's February 8 coverage (two days before the 
Rambouillet talks) continued its negative propaganda, 
featuring a story on an Azerbaijani musician who traveled to 
Yerevan with the support of several NGOs to perform an Azeri 
song at a concert.  GOAJ officials lambasted the musician on 
air, including Deputy Foreign Minister Khalafov and 
Ombudswoman Elmira Suleymanova saying that they did not agree 
with his actions, but the people should judge the morality of 
it.  Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev went further, 
saying that Azerbaijan should change its laws to prevent 
these kinds of incidents from happening in the future. 
During the story ANS also caried very disturbing footage of 
alleged Armenianatrocities, including dead bodies and naked 
wome and children.  This type of propaganda, disseminated by 
both independent and GOAJ sources, severely undermines 
attempts at mutual understanding, reconciliation, and an 
eventual resolution to the conflict. 
 
BAKU 00000195  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Given the close-hold nature of the N-K talks, the 
complete lack of serious public debate on the issue, and the 
Azerbaijani public's passionate insistence on the concept of 
territorial integrity, the GOAJ will face a hard sell in the 
event it reaches a negotiated settlement with Armenia.  The 
GOAJ's position could be further complicated by the 
opposition parties, which are bruised and in search of a 
platform following the difficult November parliamentary 
elections.  Without any prominent political voices speaking 
out in favor of compromise and mutual understanding, N-K 
could emerge as exactly the platform the opposition parties 
need to rally support and regain a political following. 
HARNISH