VZCZCXRO4947
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #0157/01 0340924
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030924Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9510
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1446
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0390

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MARR RU AR AJ
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTER IVANOV'S VISIT TO 
AZERBAIJAN: HEATING UP THE COURTSHIP? 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Reno L. Harnish III per 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  During a January 24-26 visit to Azerbaijan, 
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov made a highly 
publicized offer to sell arms to Azerbaijan, a move President 
Aliyev interpreted as indicative of a sea-change in Russia's 
relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia.  Recounting his 
discussions with Ivanov to an international official, Aliyev 
said he believes Russia no longer is a staunch supporter of 
Armenia and might not even support Armenia in the event of 
hostilities in the Caucasus. Presidential advisor Novruz 
Mammadov characterized Ivanov's visit as an attempt to regain 
Russia's former position in the Caucasus, noting that 
President Putin will follow Ivanov to Azerbaijan in just 
three weeks.  Russia is using high-level visits and carefully 
calculated rhetoric to woo Azerbaijan's leadership and could 
make inroads without commensurate attention from the west. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov paid a 
highly publicized visit to Azerbaijan January 24-26. 
According to press reports, Ivanov's talks with GOAJ 
officials (including President Aliyev and Defense Minister 
Abiyev) focused on military sales, a proposal to deploy 
Russian peacekeepers as part of a negotiated settlement of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, extension of Russia's lease 
for the Gabala radar station, military training and Russia's 
plans to create a multinational Caspian Sea security 
collective (CASFOR).  In press interviews, Ivanov later 
confirmed that Russia has "no reason to boycott arms supplies 
to Azerbaijan as the two countries had signed a military 
cooperation agreement years ago;" he also noted that Russia 
would continue to sell arms to Collective Security Treaty 
Organization countries (e.g., Armenia) at discounted prices. 
 
¶3.  (C) Azerbaijan's Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov 
on January 25 said Ivanov's visit focused largely on military 
cooperation, characterizing it as a "Ministry of Defense to 
Ministry of Defense" visit.  He added that Azerbaijan and 
Russia hoped to improve communication and cooperation between 
their two Ministries of Defense.  Noting that Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Karasin accompanied Ivanov to Azerbaijan, 
Khalafov said part of the discussions also focused on 
bilateral preparations for the "Year of Russia in 
Azerbaijan," which will begin with Russian President Putin's 
expected visit to Azerbaijan on February 21. 
 
¶4.  (C) According to an international official who has a 
long-standing relationship with President Aliyev (and who met 
with him the day after Ivanov's visit), Aliyev interpreted 
Ivanov's visit as evidence of a sea-change in Russia's 
attitude toward Azerbaijan and Armenia.  In Aliyev's view, 
Russia's willingness to sell arms to Azerbaijan indicates it 
no longer is a staunch supporter of Armenia and could in fact 
be using closer ties to Azerbaijan (including arms sales) to 
pressure Armenia.  Aliyev also told this official that Ivanov 
had threatened to withdraw Russian forces from Armenia should 
Armenia charge more for Russia's basing rights, boasting to 
Aliyev that Armenia needs Russia more than Russia needs 
Armenia.  Based on this exchange, Aliyev believes Russia is 
far less inclined to support Armenia than it had been in 
previous years; he speculated that Russia would not 
necessarily be ready to support Armenia in the event of 
hostilities in the southern Caucasus.  Aliyev also confirmed 
that Ivanov had raised the possible deployment of Russian 
peacekeepers in the event of a negotiated settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, a discussion Aliyev characterized 
as a general expression of Russian interest rather than a 
specific offer. 
 
¶5.  (C) Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov 
also viewed the visit as an effort by Russia to reestablish 
its position in the South Caucasus.  Scribbling a map as he 
spoke, Mammadov outlined Russia's efforts in recent years to 
create an alliance with Belarus, bolster Iran's efforts to 
develop nuclear weapons, reestablish ties to Central Asia and 
build an alliance with China.  All that remains, Mammadov 
said, is the South Caucasus, and Russia is using a charm 
offensive to try to lure Azerbaijan back into the fold. 
Russia aptly uses high-level visits -- including at least two 
or three meetings between Putin and Aliyev each year -- to 
try to sell itself as the true protector and friend of 
Azerbaijan.  The moral support that Russia offers, Mammadov 
said, is very attractive. 
 
 
BAKU 00000157  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (C) In spite of the high-level charm campaign, however, 
Mammadov said Azerbaijan continues to view Russia with 
caution.  Mammadov reported that President Aliyev had turned 
down an invitation to visit Russia in December 2005 to attend 
the closing ceremonies of the "Year of Azerbaijan in Russia." 
 Azerbaijan also tries to eliminate any possible leverage 
that Russia might be able to exercise over Azerbaijan. 
Mammadov cited as an example Russia's recent move to increase 
the prices charged for gas sales to the Caucasus.  "We 
immediately accepted their price," Mammadov said, "so Russia 
would not be able to open any other issues with us." 
Mammadov wryly added that President Aliyev had cautioned the 
Georgians to do the same, but they did not accept 
Azerbaijan's advice. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment: With a succession of high-level visits, 
carefully calculated rhetoric regarding Armenia, and a 
new-found, public willingness to sell arms to Azerbaijan, 
Russia has ramped up its efforts to woo Azerbaijan's 
leadership.  Azerbaijan clearly continues to view Russia with 
a wary eye, jealously guarding its relative independence from 
Moscow and orientation toward the West.  However, given 
Aliyev's post-election sense of frustration and isolation, 
Russia could make some inroads without a commensurate level 
of high-level attention from Western nations. 
HARNISH