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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000391 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2015 
TAGS: PREL TU CY
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S JANUARY 24 CYPRUS PROPOSAL UNLIKELY TO 
SOLVE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Ross Wilson, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Ankara's EU diplomats view positively FM 
Gul's January 24 proposal for mutual opening of Turkish and 
northern Cypriot ports and airports but see little likelihood 
the proposal will solve the issue of Turkey's Customs Union 
obligations.  The GOT is indicating it will not open its 
ports and airports without some EU gesture for Turkish 
Cypriots.  We need to ensure that the discussion of these 
EU-related issues continues -- preferably for a long time -- 
so that other items on the accession agenda and the UN's 
mediation efforts can make progress.  End Summary. 
 
Domestic Reaction Positive 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Turkish domestic reaction to FM Gul's January 24 
proposal calling for mutual opening of Turkish, Turkish 
Cypriot and Greek Cypriot ports and airports was 
overwhelmingly positive.  Press commentary, reinforced by PM 
Erdogan's remarks January 31, has emphasized Turkey's 
positive approach on Cyprus, as contrasted with Greek Cypriot 
intransigence.  EU nay-sayer and main opposition Republican 
People's Party (CHP) leader Baykal's criticism of the 
proposal as a declaration of intent to make concessions got 
little resonance. 
 
¶3.  (C) Reaction in Ankara to the Department Spokesman's 
statement on the proposal was positive.  Journalists from 
mainstream Vatan and pro-government Islamist-oriented Yeni 
Safak newspapers expressed surprise and pleasure to Embassy 
IO at what they saw as a forward-leaning U.S. position. 
Turkey's leading all-news TV channel NTV ran a headline 
touting "Full U.S. Support for Turkey's Proposal."  According 
to MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG Bilman, FM Gul 
"appreciated" the statement. 
 
Proposal Reflects Turkish Domestic Politics 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Mutual opening of ports and airports, the heart of 
the proposal, reflects several things.  One is the GOT 
position that equates the EU's outstanding pledge to ease 
Turkish Cypriot isolation with Turkey's obligation to 
implement the Customs Union by opening ports and airports. 
Domestic political factors buttress this position: Turkey 
sees opening ports and airports as a "concession" that, 
without some EU gesture toward Turkish Cypriots, would result 
in a firestorm of criticism of PM Erdogan's government, 
including from within his own Justice and Development Party 
(AKP).  Obtaining a quid pro quo for the Turkish Cypriots, 
the government believes, is essential to creating a situation 
in which Turkey can meet its Customs Union obligations and, 
more importantly, keep on track the barely initiated EU 
accession negotiations started last October. 
 
EU Diplomats See No Break in Impasse 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) While EU diplomats in Ankara see the proposal as a 
positive step, none expect it to resolve the issue of 
Turkey's implementation of its Customs Union obligations.  At 
most, they think it may buy the GOT time, delaying a showdown 
over implementation until late 2006 or early 2007. 
 
¶6.  (C) EU diplomats here, even the UK and others sympathetic 
to Turkey, describe the crux of the matter: the EU views 
Turkey's obligation as contractual and binding, while it 
views the EU's commitment toward Turkish Cypriots as 
political and subject to consensus.  UK FS Straw nudged 
closer to the Turkish position when, in January 25 remarks in 
Istanbul, he said "These are separate tracks but they must 
both work." 
 
¶7.  (C) None of our EU contacts predicts the proposal will 
affect the impasse over trade and aid for Turkish Cypriots or 
result in any other EU move toward Turkish Cypriots.  They 
emphasize the EU's natural tendency to side with affected 
member states.  One EU contact referred to a Cyprus impasse 
 
ANKARA 00000391  002 OF 003 
 
 
as still "the perfect pretext" for the EU's Turkey-skeptics 
to block accession. 
 
¶8.  (C) The one hope EU diplomats here see is that flexible 
and persistent Turkish diplomacy, coupled with heavy-handed 
ROC intransigence, may eventually lead member states to 
increase pressure on the ROC.  The German Ambassador 
suggested that FM Gul's initiative may change the psychology 
in Europe; FS Straw's comments had reminded nations that 
Turkey does not bear all the onus for the Cyprus stalemate. 
Turkey's initiative may also lead governments to view Greek 
Cypriot obstreperousness more critically.  And some may 
recognize, the German Ambassador indicated, that the EU 
should resist Greek Cypriot efforts to enmesh the EU too 
deeply in issues that should be dealt with by the UN in the 
context of overall settlement negotiations. 
 
GOT in No Mood For Further Cyprus Concessions 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Additional flexibility will, it appears, be difficult 
for the GOT.  PM Erdogan and his AKP government reject the 
idea of further unilateral concessions on Cyprus.  In a 
January 26 meeting with Erdogan, UK FS Straw urged the PM to 
consider more gestures, including troop withdrawals, to win 
Turkey credit in the EU. 
 
¶10.  (C) According to UK PolChief Miller, Erdogan was 
"unbending."  Erdogan replied that Turkey is already "ten 
steps ahead" of the Greek Cypriots and further concessions 
would be perceived as weakness.  Claiming the EU has not kept 
promises to Turkey about Cyprus, Erdogan asked Straw 
rhetorically if the EU would put in writing the benefits 
Turkey would get in exchange for further concessions. 
Erdogan pointedly noted that he had to contend with domestic 
politics.  When Straw urged Erdogan to bring the protocol 
extending the Customs Union to new member states, including 
the ROC, to Turkey's parliament for ratification, Erdogan 
replied that the European Parliament had not yet ratified it. 
 Erdogan's public comments January 31 echoed these points. 
 
¶11.  (C) According to MFA Northeastern Mediterranean DDG 
Bilman, FM Gul also rejected Straw's pitch for further 
Turkish gestures in their January 26 meeting. According to 
Bilman, Gul handed Straw a list of previous Turkish 
initiatives on Cyprus and said Turkey was suffering from 
concessions "fatigue."  Erdogan advisor Omer Celik likewise 
ruled out unilateral moves on Cyprus, including opening port 
and airports, in our January 26 meeting with him. 
 
Turkish Diplomatic Efforts Continue 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Immediately after Gul's January 24 rollout of the 
proposal, Turkish diplomats demarched a number of foreign 
capitals and urged support.  Gul personally called at least a 
couple of his EU colleagues.  According to DDG Bilman, the 
MFA focused on EU, P-5 and OIC countries. 
 
¶13.  (C) The MFA is preparing a demarche in response to the 
Greek Cypriot January 25 aide memoire detailing the ROC's 
"utter rejection" of the Turkish proposal.  The MFA's current 
goal is to prevent the EU from adopting a common position 
rejecting the Turkish proposal. 
 
¶14.  (C) An EU statement of outright rejection is unlikely. 
UK PolChief Miller and FirstSec Barnes predict that the UK, 
having expressed support for the proposal, will not allow a 
negative statement by the EU Presidency.  They expect either 
a bland statement noting the proposal or no statement at all. 
 Although Austria is a notorious Turkey-skeptic, Austrian DCM 
Steiner rules out any Presidency statement absent consensus. 
A German diplomat predicts the EU will be influenced by the 
UN's reaction to the proposal. 
 
¶15.  (C) Bilman says Turkey will continue to push the 
proposal "for some time" despite the ROC rejection.  He 
emphasizes the proposal is not "take it or leave it," noting 
that part of the proposal envisions a high-level conference 
to "finalize" it. 
 
ANKARA 00000391  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Comment:  Turkey has rolled out Gul's initiative 
well and gotten more positive commentary than seemed likely 
six weeks ago in the wake of Orhan Pamuk's trial.  It needs 
to continue to be active and to promote its flexibility, 
including on Cyprus and non-Cyprus issues.  Our diplomacy 
should aim to support Turkey's efforts, encourage the EU to 
find ways to be responsive, and urge the EU to avoid imposing 
a premature Cyprus litmus test that would usurp the UN's 
proper role in mediating a settlement of the dispute.  If the 
discussion about fulfillment of Turkey's Cyprus-related 
Customs Union obligations can be dragged out while the UN 
re-starts its efforts and Turkey's broader accession process 
has a chance to gain steam, it can only be helpful.  For now, 
the USG objective should be to help persuade the EU and the 
UN to take the initiative as a basis for further discussion. 
End Comment. 
WILSON