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Viewing cable 06ANKARA386, AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH THE TURKISH GENERAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA386 2006-02-01 12:49 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Ankara
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

011249Z Feb 06
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000386 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER MASS TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH THE TURKISH GENERAL 
STAFF: IRAQ, PKK, IRAN AND DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 
 
REF: A. USDAO ANKARA 211 
 
     B. ANKARA 273 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (S) Summary:  During separate meetings with Turkish 
General Staff (TGS) Chief GEN Hilmi Ozkok, TGS Deputy Chief 
GEN Isik Kosaner, and  Turkish Land Forces (TLFC) Commander 
GEN Yasar Buyukanit January 26 and 27, the Ambassador 
asserted that Turkey should do nothing to disrupt the fragile 
situation in Iraq.  Buyukanit said his poor English resulted 
in his comments in Washington to CJCS Gen Pace about a 
"spring offensive" in Iraq being "misunderstood" (ref A); 
TLFC has no such plans.  The generals expressed understanding 
as to why the US cannot undertake operations against the PKK 
in northern Iraq, but pleaded for the arrest and rendition of 
one or more PKK leaders from northern Iraq to demonstrate to 
the Turkish public that the USG stands with Turkey against 
terrorism.  The generals also repeated the GOT policy of 
opposing Iran's acquiring a nuclear weapon while calling for 
a diplomatic solution to the issue.  The Ambassador noted US 
companies' problems in competing for defense contracts under 
Turkey's new procurement system.  The TGS leaders pushed 
back, noting that some of the responsibility lies with US law 
and companies, but accepted that US participation in tenders 
was good for Turkey. End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Iraq: Fragile Time/No Cross-Border Operations 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (S) After opening exchanges at TGS reaffirming the 
importance of strengthening the US-Turkey military 
relationship, the Ambassador noted that Iraq is currently the 
most important issue for the USG.  He expressed appreciation 
for Turkish cooperation on Iraq, which is recognized by the 
highest levels of the USG.  Iraq was currently at a sensitive 
stage, and Turkey and the US need to stay in close contact, 
he said.  Nothing should happen through or from Turkey to 
break the fragile situation there, he warned. 
 
3, (C) Ozkok responded that Turkey wants all factions to 
participate in the next Iraqi government.  It was especially 
important that the Kurds be included to keep the north from 
splitting away.  Ankara was prepared to help with all the 
factions.  He urged the US to listen to Turkey's advice, 
noting that while the US may have better intelligence, Turkey 
enjoyed a longer experience with the region that developed 
certain instincts.  He called for a deeper bilateral dialogue 
on Iraq.  He also said the Turkmen, one of two Iraqi peoples 
akin to Turkish citizens (the other are Kurds), needed 
protection by the US and Turkey because they were vulnerable 
on their own.  Kosaner worried that the lack of a single 
Iraqi military chain of command, with units following orders 
from anyone other than the CHOD, would pose a serious 
challenge to stabilizing the country.  Neither general made 
reference to a possible cross-border operation this year. 
 
4. (S) The meeting with Buyukanit was the day after the TGS 
meetings.  Buyukanit began by reviewing his recent 
counterpart visit to the US, which he characterized as "more 
than excellent."   He said he had heard that some were 
claiming that he talked in Washington about a spring 
offensive attack on PKK bases across the border in northern 
Iraq, which was not true.  TLFC has anti-PKK operations in SE 
Turkey year-round, so he never talks about seasonal 
offensives.  Buyukanit said he told CJCS Gen Pace about the 
problem posed by the 3,000 PKK fighters in Iraq moving into 
camps close to the Turkish border.  If more meaning was read 
into what he said than that, it was due to his broken 
English, he said.  The Ambassador expressed appreciation for 
Buyukanit's clarification and said he would relay it to 
Washington.  He had discussed the issue with Gen Pace and had 
wanted Buyukanit's views.  Ambassador said he shared the deep 
frustration at the continued presence of the PKK in northern 
Iraq, but was also concerned that no one do anything that 
might destabilize the sensitive situations there. 
 
5. (S) Comment: The Ambassador had raised in a private 
conversation several days earlier with MFA U/S Tuygan 
Buyukanit's comment to Gen Pace that he would like to conduct 
a cross-border operation in the spring.  At that time, Tuygan 
said he would talk to Buyukanit.  This and the Ambassador's 
conversations the previous day with Ozkok and Kosaner 
apparently prompted Buyukanit to preempt discussion of 
cross-border operation by declaring it a non-issue.  End 
comment. 
 
---------------------------------- 
PKK: Psychological Pressure Needed 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) The Ambassador underscored with each general the broad 
bilateral cooperation underway against the PKK -- sharing 
intelligence, working to cut PKK financial streams, improving 
Turkish extradition requests to European countries, and 
building Iraqi authorities' ability to deal with terrorists 
in Iraq.  The PKK is a multifaceted problem requiring a 
multifaceted solution. 
 
7. (C) All three generals signaled appreciation for US 
efforts, but also thought visible action by the US against 
the PKK would improve the Turkish public's perception of the 
United States.  Ozkok agreed that without external support 
the PKK would wither away.  They allowed that it was not 
practical to expect the US to capture or kill all the PKK; 
Kosaner and Buyukanit thought that handing over a few PKK 
leaders would be a good gesture for Turkish public opinion. 
The generals all well understood the difficulties of fighting 
the PKK in northern Iraq, and acknowledged the difficulty in 
controlling the border without any help on the Iraqi side. 
 
8. (C) According to Ozkok, more than military, political or 
economic pressure, psychological pressure was needed to 
defeat the PKK.  What he wanted from the US, therefore, were 
strong statements by senior officials condemning the 
organization as well as pressure on the Iraqi Kurds to deny 
the PKK freedom of movement and logistic support in the KRG 
area.  Kosaner in particular dwelt on this latter point (the 
PKK's freedom of movement in Iraq).  He appreciated the 
Ambassador's public comments that the PKK in Iraq was not 
only a problem for Turkey, but for the USG and GOI as well. 
Buyukanit revealed frustration with European attitudes toward 
the PKK, pointing particularly at the Danes and Roj TV.  The 
Ambassador noted that one objective of our collaboration with 
Turkey on the PKK in Europe was to change European attitudes. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Iran: Diplomatic Solution Desired 
--------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) Given that EUCOM DCDR Gen Wald addressed Iran at 
length during his January 17 visit to TGS (ref B), the 
Ambassador wanted to reinforce the point that the US sought a 
diplomatic solution to the issue and to seek Turkish views on 
this high priority issue.  He emphasized that the 
international community needed to speak with one voice in 
support of Iran's meeting its obligations to the IAEA and the 
EU-3.  The generals affirmed that Iran's nuclear weapons 
program was a threat to Turkey.  Ozkok, echoing Gen Wald's 
points, noted that while Turkish-Iranian relations were good 
now, Iran's intentions could change suddenly; thus, Iran must 
be kept from acquiring nuclear weapons.  At the same time, he 
worried that isolating Iraq might increase its incentive to 
acquire WMD.  Both he and Buyukanit expressed concern about 
Iranian influence in the Caucasus as well. 
 
---------------------------- 
Defense Procurement Problems 
---------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) The Ambassador noted American defense contractors' 
difficulties over the past two years with Turkey's new 
procurement system (i.e., non-negotiable terms and conditions 
that must be accepted unconditionally when submitting bids). 
Once the bedrock of our bilateral relationship, defense 
industry cooperation had now become a problem.  The three 
generals declared the Turkish military's preference for 
American equipment.  They also noted how the military sets 
the requirements, but other agencies -- Defense Industries 
Undersecretariat (SSM) and the Ministry of National Defense 
(MND) -- actually procure defense articles. 
 
11. (SBU) Ozkok noted how Turkish industry had developed in 
recent years and needed to participate more in defense 
procurement projects.  Also, changes in the security 
environment had changed the military's requirements.  He 
thought American companies did not well understand how Turkey 
was changing and they should try harder, he advised.  He 
asserted that the USG had the responsibility to address US 
legal and regulatory prohibitions that might inhibit American 
companies' competitiveness; he did not see the need for 
Turkey to change in order to make opportunities just for US 
companies.  Kosaner, who previously served as undersecretary 
of MND, said Minister Gonul and he were aware of the problems 
in general terms, but did not know what specifically was 
keeping American companies from bidding on Turkey's defense 
tenders.  (Note: We understand the American Turkish Council 
is working on a letter to Gonul laying out the specifics. End 
note.)  Nonetheless, SSM's mission was to develop Turkish 
industry and maximize local content. 
 
12. (SBU) The Ambassador responded that American companies 
generally understand Turkey's desire for technology and to 
build its defense industry.  He was not arguing for a US 
monopoly of the Turkish defense market.  Instead, he proposed 
to work with all stakeholders in the GOT to find a way so 
that American contractors can compete and so that Turkey can 
benefit from competitive US bids.  He feared that SSM's 
current terms and conditions may be thwarting, rather than 
accomplishing, Turkish policy goals. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Other Issues: Buyukanit's woes; 
Syria; Border Surveillance FMS Case Coming 
------------------------------------------ 
 
13. (C) Other comments of interest during these meetings 
included: 
 
 
-- Media Pressure on Buyukanit: Buyukanit, who is Ozkok's 
assumptive heir to the CHOD position, complained about how 
the Turkish press spun his visit into more than what it was 
(one story had him receiving instructions from Washington) 
and criticized him for speaking at AEI, an institution that 
the Prime Minister and others had addressed in the past. 
 
-- Syria: Stating that Damascus' support for terrorism was 
"indisputable," Ozkok cautioned against trying to replace 
Asad, saying he was better than anyone who might succeed him. 
 Turkey has cultural and social ties with Syria and could 
work on changing Damascus's policies, he said. 
 
-- Border Surveillance Systems: Buyukanit said TLFC had sent 
a request to TGS for balloon-mounted cameras for border 
monitoring to help stop illegal trafficking and smuggling 
along Turkey's border with primarily Iran but also Iraq.  If 
TGS approves, TLFC would initially request 2 or 3 units via 
FMS to test. 
WILSON