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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0313
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0712
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1150
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8425
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1664
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RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6018
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000340 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CAIRO FOR REFUGEE COORDINATOR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PBTS PREF PHUM AG WI UN
SUBJECT: NEA/MAG DIRECTOR'S DISCUSSION OF SAHRAWI REFUGEES 
WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS BOUGUERRA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) During visiting NEA/MAG Director Jordan's February 26 
courtesy call on MFA Multilateral Relations Director General 
Bouguerra, the latter engaged in spirited discussion of 
UNHCR's unilateral decision to cut food assistance to Sahrawi 
refugees and argued that a new census could not be carried 
out because it touched directly the political issues at the 
heart of the Western Sahara dispute. (Discussions on Iran's 
nuclear program, a Security Council seat for Venezuela, and 
Algeria's candidacy for the Peace Building Commission 
reported septels). 
 
DISAGREEMENT ON A CENSUS OF SAHRAWI REFUGEES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Noting that Jordan had just returned from a visit to 
the refugee camps near Tindouf, Bouguerra said that the 
quantity of food aid for the refugees was insufficient and 
that UNHCR's unilateral decision to reduce the provision of 
assistance from 165,000 to 90,000 refugees was unfair and 
unacceptable.  In this regard, Bouguerra said Algeria had 
received a UNHCR delegation a few days earlier and had used 
this meeting to press Algerian concerns. 
 
¶3.  (C) Jordan and Ambassador said there needed to be a 
census of Sahrawi refugees in order to establish the correct 
level of food assistance. Ambassador said that in making the 
case for assistance, governments had to have accurate and 
credible figures they could provide to their legislative 
bodies responsible for funding such programs. With refreshing 
frankness, Bouguerra argued the issue was not simply 
technical in nature. It was political and went to the heart 
of the Western Sahara issue since it bore directly on the 
question of self-determination and who could participate in a 
self-determination vote. In this regard, the Western Sahara 
refugee situation was unique and could not be compared to 
other refugee situations. He argued that in conjunction with 
the Baker Plan, the UN had estimated the number of Sahrawi 
voters at 128,000. Why couldn't the UNHCR use "its own 
figure" which, when combined with non-voting age Sahrawis, 
brought it up to the 165,000 level that has been the figure 
used up until recently? As for legislative bodies asking for 
more precise numbers, the GOA's contacts with other 
governments suggested somewhat lamely that no country has 
been required to produce exact figures. 
 
¶4.  (C) Reflecting discussions he had during his visit to the 
camps, Jordan said there was concern about the lack of 
accountability for food donations and other resources at the 
camps.  Allegations of pilfering were common, and the stocks 
at the warehouses were not well managed by the Red Crescent. 
The lack of food stocks was precipitating a crisis since more 
food was withdrawn each month than deposited.  Stocks are 
maintained for 90,000 refugees, according to Jordan, but the 
withdrawals were based on the 165,000 refugee figure. The 
solution, stressed Jordan, was a true census to resolve all 
doubts about the number of refugees present.  This was the 
only refugee population in the world that refused a census. 
 
SAHRAWI CASE UNIQUE IN GOA EYES 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Returning to his earlier argument, Bouguerra said the 
Sahrawis were a unique case of decolonization in the world. 
The refugee population, he explained, was also the core of 
the electorate for any referendum on the future status of the 
Western Sahara.  Any registration of the population was thus 
by definition political.  UNHCR could not mix the politics of 
a referendum, such as envisioned by the Baker Plan, with the 
distribution of food.  Refugee issues should not complicate a 
political solution, even if such a solution was at an 
impasse, declared Bouguerra. 
 
¶6.  (C) Jordan said the U.S. understood that the fate of the 
Western Sahara was a sensitive political problem.  For the 
U.S., food distribution in the camps was a technical matter 
that required resolution.  The U.S. wanted to mobilize the 
international community to meet the needs of the refugees, 
especially after the recent flooding in the area.  However, a 
 
clear, precise figure of need was necessary for donating 
partners.  It was too important to the refugees to let these 
issues remain unresolved.  The question of a census would 
continue to surface, stated Jordan.  Even though for the U.S. 
it was a technical issue, it called into question fundamental 
political issues for the Sahrawis. 
 
CENSUS REQUIRES A POLITICAL SOLUTION 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Bouguerra noted that holding a census was a political 
question for the Algerians as well.  A census required a 
political solution.  The question of identifying the 
electoral care had to come ahead of extant refugee matters. 
As the host country, Algeria gave more aid to the Sahrawis 
than anyone, added Bouguerra.  The unilateral cutback in 
assistance, based on a population of only 90,000, would 
increase the burden on Algeria.  The World Food Program, 
emphasized Bouguerra, had never told Algeria there was a food 
distribution problem in the camps.  "If these problems exist, 
we should know," he added.  It was important to separate 
propaganda from the serious. 
 
¶8.  (C) Ambassador said the U.S. was very cognizant of the 
humanitarian needs of the Sahrawis.  The U.S. has been one of 
the largest donors for a period of many years and would 
continue to provide such humanitarian assistance. Ambassador 
noted that the Department of State had approved his 
recommendation to provide $ 50,000 in supplemental emergency 
food assistance. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had also just 
approved an additional request for $1.3 million to fund the 
transportation of UN emergency relief items to the Sahrawi 
refugees. Bouguerra thanked the Ambassador, noting the 
dimensions of the catastrophe were large.  Algeria 
appreciated the assistance. 
 
¶9.  (U) William Jordan did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message. 
 
ERDMAN