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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000419 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E 
USUN NY FOR T.OHLSON 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: UNMEE SRSG ADVOCATES REDUCING UNMEE TO "TOKEN 
PRESENCE" 
 
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 00385 (NOTAL) 
 
     ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 03930 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON.  REASON: 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Eritrea continues to restrict freedom of 
movement by UNMEE MILOBs within the Temporary Security Zone, 
and to flaunt previously agreed upon protocols relating to 
UNMEE's right to challenge and inspect police and militia 
within the TSZ, according to UNMEE SRSG Legwaila.  Such 
restrictions on freedom of movement, coupled with the GSE's 
continued ban on UNMEE aerial operations within the TSZ, have 
severely restricted UNMEE's ability to monitor the border, 
with 95 per cent of the eastern sector going unmonitored. 
According to Legwaila, the status quo favors Ethiopia, which 
occupies contested areas legally, so long as demarcation does 
not occur.  Neither party seeks war, but neither appears to 
seek compromise either, as both parties have avoided 
participating in Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission 
meetings since November 2004.  Citing the futility of the 
status quo, Legwaila advocates downsizing UNMEE to either a 
"token presence" or "liaison office," which would cost 
one-half to one-fourth the current mission's cost.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U) On February 7, Charge and visiting Rear Admiral 
Douglas McAneny, Joint Staff,s Deputy Director for 
Politico-Military Affairs (Europe/NATO/Russia/Africa, J-5), 
met with United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(UNMEE) Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General 
(SRSG) Amb. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila and Deputy SRSG Amb. 
Azouz Ennifar.  DATT, deputy polecon counselor, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Dan Hampton of the Joint Staff also 
accompanied Charge. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
GSE CONTINUES TO RESTRICT UNMEE MILOBS IN TSZ 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) UNMEE SRSG Legwaila observed that while the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea border situation appeared calm, "things are 
not normal," as the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) 
continued to hamper the work of UNMEE military observers 
(MILOBs) monitoring the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). 
Eritrean police and militia, allowed within the TSZ in 
accordance with the 2000 cessation of hostilities agreement, 
failed to present required identification cards to UNMEE, and 
failed to allow UNMEE to inspect their weapons stores, he 
said, which constituted a violation of both the cessation of 
hostilities agreement and the protocol on police.  Legwaila 
underscored the importance of maintaining the special nature 
of the TSZ, calling it the "core" of the 2000 cessation of 
hostilities agreement.  Despite protesting these violations 
to the GSE commissioner the previous week, and asking him to 
direct local Eritrean officials to end them, "intolerably 
high" restrictions continued, Legwaila said.  In contrast to 
when UNMEE faced no restrictions in the TSZ, it now faced 
10-14 restrictions daily on its freedom of movement within 
the TSZ.  The TSZ was "being violated with impunity," 
Legwaila said, noting that he had already received reports 
that day of a restriction in the TSZ's central sector and 
nine in the western sector.  The GSE, which had previously 
given UNMEE officials multiple-entry visas, were now issuing 
only single-entry visas, in order to enforce its expulsion of 
Western nationalities, he said. 
 
¶4. (C) Such restrictions of movement, coupled with the GSE's 
continued ban on UNMEE aerial operations within the TSZ, 
severely hampered UNMEE's ability to monitor the border, 
Legwaila said.  UNMEE could now only monitor 5 (five) per 
cent of the TSZ's eastern sector, he said, as it had 
previously relied on aerial reconnaissance to monitor that 
sector.  Ground patrols also faced restrictions:  Eritrean 
authorities did not allow UNMEE patrols traveling between 
Assab and Bure to leave use the highway, so UNMEE could not 
inspect encampments visible from the road. 
 
¶5. (C) Even before the GSE's October 2005 flight ban, Eritrea 
had imposed more restrictions on UNMEE than Ethiopia had, 
Legwaila said.  As the GSE had never recognized the concept 
of "adjacent areas" to the TSZ, UNMEE had never had full 
freedom of movement beyond the northern border of the TSZ, 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000419  002 OF 003 
 
 
and could only visit sites outside the TSZ when permitted to 
by the GSE.  In contrast, Ethiopia recognized "adjacent 
areas" and allowed UNMEE unhampered freedom of movement on 
its side of the border.  Ethiopian troop movements had been 
"very transparent," Legwaila said, noting that Prime Minister 
Meles had informed UNMEE in advance before deploying an 
additional seven divisions to the border in December 2004, 
and before deploying an additional two divisions in 2005. 
The UNMEE Force Commander had since been able to verify their 
redeployment away from the border, Legwaila added. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
BORDER DEMARCATION REMAINS UNMEE'S GOAL 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Despite these restrictions, UNMEE's continued presence 
was intended to support the demarcation of the border, 
Legwaila said.  "The reason why we are still here is because 
the (last) pillar has not been planted," he added.  The 
creation of the TSZ in April 2001, and the subsequent 
imposition of UN peace-keepers, had created "space" for the 
parties; however, there was now no indication that the border 
would be demarcated, he said, citing the closure of 
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) offices. 
Legwaila reviewed the parties' positions on demarcation: 
"dialogue" was anathema to Eritrea, who had avoided meetings 
with the UN special envoy and asserted that the EEBC decision 
could not be changed.  Eritrea had also opposed partial 
demarcation, even though the border's eastern sector had been 
ready for demarcation since 2004, and demarcation would 
confirm Eritrean sovereignty over the port of Assab. 
On the other hand, Ethiopia was "determined" that the 
boundary decision "never" be implemented without discussion, 
and avoided appeared at the EEBC for fear of being presented 
with a timetable for demarcation.  Both parties had last 
attended an EEBC meeting in November 2004 at the Hague, he 
said, when the EEBC confronted the GSE for blocking 
demarcation of the mutually agreed upon eastern sector as a 
confidence-building measure. 
 
¶7. (C) Legwaila noted that Ethiopia currently occupied 
contested areas "legally," as the exchange of territory was 
preconditioned on demarcation.  Eritrea, however, sought to 
transfer territory prior to demarcation.  He noted that 
Botswana and Namibia had peacefully demarcated their border, 
through compromise and the exchange of land.  Legwaila 
acknowledged that the line of delimitation had been 
determined "blindly" at The Hague, and therefore split 
villages and churches; some villages had moved from their 
locations on colonial era maps, he said.  Nevertheless, the 
EEBC could vary the line only if both parties expressly 
empowered the EEBC to do so; this was not likely, so long as 
the GSE considered the boundary "immutably final and 
binding."  While UNMEE called for dialogue, it was the 
parties' "prerogative" to determine the agenda; UNMEE had 
never called for a renegotiation of the EEBC decision, he 
said. 
 
¶8. (C) Asked whether demarcation could proceed without the 
cooperation of Eritrea, Legwaila explained that demarcation 
would have to involve work on both sides of the border, on 
the basis of demarcation directives involving both Ethiopia 
and Eritrea.  One could not demarcate unilaterally, he said; 
doing so might endanger the security of those conducting the 
pillar emplacement, he added.  Legwaila lamented the absence 
of any peaceful dialogue between the two parties (apart from 
the UNMEE-chaired Joint Military Coordination meetings), 
underscoring that such dialogue was essential to making 
peace, and that the border would not be demarcated through 
"brinksmanship."  Ethiopia and Eritrea "are condemned by 
geography" to co-exist with each other, but the anger between 
their two governments was now worse than in 2000, Legwaila 
said.  He hailed the "determination" of AF A/S Frazer to 
resolve the border tensions, and noted the irony of the 
United States now "being condemned" in Eritrean state-run 
media, even though both parties had previously appealed for 
U.S. intervention. 
 
¶9. (C) Asked whether the status quo gave rise to the threat 
of renewed hostilities, Legwaila said the border could be a 
source of future conflict if it remained undemarcated, but 
that neither party sought war now.  Both parties had 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000419  003 OF 003 
 
 
condemned the 1998-2000 war as "senseless," he said. 
Nevertheless, Ethiopia, having learned a historical lesson 
from 1998, would not allow itself to be caught by surprise 
again, he said.  While Eritrea believed it had the right 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter to take back what it 
considered to be "occupied territory," doing so would lead to 
international condemnation of the GSE, Legwaila said, citing 
the Ethiopian-Eritrean Claims Commission's recent decision 
that identified Eritrea as an aggressor.  (NOTE: Article 51 
in Chapter VII addresses a member state's "right to 
self-defense".  END NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
CUTTING UNMEE TO A "TOKEN PRESENCE" WOULD HALVE ITS COST 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶10. (C) Legwaila said that all six options for the future of 
UNMEE presented by the UN SYG (in S-2006-1) were "offensive" 
to the GSE, but he questioned whether one could sustain the 
status quo, citing UNMEE's annual cost and the continued 
"harassment" it faced from the GSE.  "Why should UNMEE remain 
in place, if it is not allowed to do its work?" he said.  By 
continuing its restrictions on UNMEE, Eritrea was withdrawing 
its "consent" for the mission under Chapter VI of the UN 
Charter.  He said the current stalemate was caused by the 
parties, not by the mission, which had been successful.  The 
total withdrawal of UNMEE would not necessarily lead to war, 
but would make the border "extremely volatile".  However, a 
downsized UNMEE "may end up as the best solution," he said. 
 
¶11. (C) Legwaila advocated reducing UNMEE to "a token 
presence," arguing that the approximately $180 million annual 
cost of UNMEE could be used for other peace-keeping 
operations where opportunity for political dialogue existed, 
such as Sudan.  It was "nonsense" to "keep UNMEE as it is 
now," Legwaila said, explaining that a "token presence" would 
cost $87 million (or half UNMEE's current cost), while a 
smaller "liaison office" concept would only cost about $45 
million.  Legwaila rejected the proposal to move UNMEE's 
entire operations from Eritrea to Ethiopia, saying that 
removing Indian and Jordanian contingents from the TSZ would 
anger Ethiopia and prompt Ethiopia to reoccupy the TSZ. 
 
¶12. (C) Asked whether downsizing UNMEE would compel Eritrea 
to return to the peace process, Legwaila said Eritrea needed 
to realize the danger that the international community could 
simply abandon the Ethiopia-Eritrea border issue, leaving 
Eritrea "to its own devices."  "Eritrea is holding a losing 
hand; their intransigence will cost them in the end," he 
said.  Legwaila warned that of the possibility that the 
border, like many others, would simply never be demarcated, 
thus preserving Ethiopian occupation of all the disputed 
areas (e.g., Badme and Irob).  Legwaila added that 
demarcation of the border would reinforce the status of 
Eritrea as an independent state, as some Ethiopian 
ultra-nationalists sought to reincorporate Eritrea into 
Ethiopia.  Legwaila observed that Norwegian deputy foreign 
minister Vidar Helgesen, who had close relations with 
Eritrea's President Isaias, had warned Isaias of the need to 
engage the international community.  Charge noted that PM 
Meles had told A/S Frazer that Eritrea's President Isaias was 
subject to about-faces and quick changes in policy. 
 
¶13. (C) COMMENT: UNMEE SRSG Legwaila's recommendation that 
UNMEE be reduced to "a token presence" is consistent with 
earlier statements to visiting AF A/S Frazer that UNMEE could 
still support demarcation if changed to a pure observer 
mission (ref A).  Legwaila's lament that UNMEE can now only 
monitor 5 per cent of the eastern sector should be a concern: 
 the temporary occupation of "Point 885" in November 2005 by 
an Ethiopian infantry platoon (ref B), in violation of the 
June 2000 cessation of hostilities agreement, occurred in the 
eastern sector.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶14. (U) RADM McAneny cleared the text of this cable. 
HUDDLESTON