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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8993
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6814
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000385 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER AND UNMEE SRSG DISCUSS NEXT STEPS ON 
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BORDER 
 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000385  001.4 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON.  REASON: 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  Following her visit to the 
Ethiopian-Eritrean border, AF A/S Frazer told UNMEE SRSG 
Legwaila that current residents of the disputed town of Badme 
oppose the 2002 boundary commission decision awarding the 
town to Eritrea.  Badme was administered by Ethiopia, but the 
EEBC places it 1.7 kilometers within Eritrea, according to UN 
peacekeeping officials.  Amb. Frazer reported that Meles had 
made minor but significant concessions on the border: 
agreeing to "consider the possibility" of sending a 
representative to the next meeting of the Ethiopia-Eritrea 
Boundary Commission (EEBC), and showing some flexibility on 
whether Ethiopia accepted the EEBC decision only "in 
principle."  A/S Frazer underscored the need for flexibility 
among all parties, including the EEBC, whose president 
Ethiopia believes is biased.  Eritrea reiterates that 
Ethiopia must accept the EEBC decision "as is," and 
criticized the USG delegation's visit to "occupied 
territory."  UNMEE SRSG Legwaila asserts that a slightly 
downsized UN peacekeeping operation that was mandated to 
serve only as an observer force could still be used to 
support demarcation of the border.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
USG DELEGATION VISITS BORDER FROM ETHIOPIA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) On January 19-20, AF Assistant Secretary Jendayi 
Frazer, AF Special Assistant Kendra Gaither, and AF Military 
Advisor COL Kevin Kenny, accompanied by Charge, DATT, and 
deputy pol/econ counselor, visited the following sites on the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea border: 
-- Adigrat, Sector Center headquarters for the United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), manned by UNMEE's 
Indian battalion (INDBATT); 
-- Zelambessa, in UNMEE's Sector Center; and 
-- the disputed town of Badme, currently under Ethiopian 
control but awarded to Eritrea in the April 2002 decision of 
the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC). 
 
The USG delegation met only with UNMEE officials at Adigrat 
and Zelambessa.  On January 20, the Ethiopian National 
Defense Force (ENDF) airlifted the delegation to Badme.  A 
young NCO assisted with Amharic interpretation as the group 
moved throughout Badme, speaking at random with male and 
female residents of Badme, ranging from young schoolchildren 
to the elderly, in what was clearly an unexpected visit.  The 
local administrator of Badme said that Badme had 5,000 
residents.  The delegation also met with UNMEE military 
observers (MILOBs) at UNMEE's Badme team site. 
 
¶3. (C/NF) In Zelambessa, UNMEE military observers brought the 
USG delegation to UNMEE's team site for a brief visit, which 
lies approximately 200 yards in the Temporary Security Zone. 
No officials were present, other than UNMEE MILOBs and troops. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
BADME'S CURRENT RESIDENTS STRIDENTLY ETHIOPIAN 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4. (C) On January 21, A/S Frazer briefed UNMEE Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) Amb. 
Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Deputy SRSG Amb. Azouz Ennifar, and 
UNMEE poloff Dr. Abdel-Kader Haireche on her visit to the 
border and on her January 20 meeting with Ethiopian Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi (septel).  Amb. Frazer said she had 
informed PM Meles of the places she had visited, but had not 
shared her impressions of what she saw.  She said she had a 
better understanding of the challenges Meles faced in 
implementing the EEBC decision, citing the "strong impression 
of Ethiopian identity in Badme."  She said that residents of 
Badme were well-informed and opinionated, spoke with "the 
passion of a people invaded," and had criticized the EEBC 
decision as unjust, unfair, and unbalanced.  Badme villagers, 
including a one-legged man who said he was prepared to 
sacrifice his remaining leg, claimed that they would rather 
go to war than live under Eritrean administration.  Elders, 
who spoke Amharic rather than Tigrinya, asserted that 
Eritrean President Isaias had banned a traditional song whose 
lyrics identified a nearby river as the boundary. 
 
¶5. (C) SRSG Legwaila observed that in the Temporary Security 
Zone, the "opinions of the people are invariably those of the 
government," as residents were "indoctrinated" by political 
cadres.    Amb. Frazer and Charge pointed out that a number 
of elderly residents made their case by stating that Badme 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000385  002.4 OF 004 
 
 
had never been subject to Italian colonization, which stopped 
at the Mereb River.  UNMEE observers also had the same view, 
namely that the residents of Badme consider themselves 
Ethiopian. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
MELES: ISAIAS MUST MAKE "STRATEGIC DECISION" ABOUT DIALOGUE 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Although PM Meles reported that he had not talked with 
President Isaias in seven years, he considers Isaias a "fully 
rational" adversary who makes calculated decisions, Amb. 
Frazer said.  Meles had indicated that neither he nor Isaias 
want to go to war.  Meles believes that because Isaias cannot 
topple Ethiopia militarily, Isaias is using Ethiopian 
opposition groups to foment dissent and to seek "vengeance," 
Amb. Frazer said.  According to Meles, the "key test" for 
Isaias is whether he is willing to make a "strategic 
decision" to engage in dialogue about an EEBC decision in 
which Ethiopia is losing towns that are clearly Ethiopian, 
and Eritrea is losing towns that are clearly Eritrean.  Meles 
had not extensively discussed normalization of relations 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Amb. Frazer said.  SRSG 
Legwaila responded that there could be no normalization 
without demarcation; indeed, Eritrea had said that landlocked 
Ethiopia may gain access to the port of Assab, as part of 
normalization.  Demarcation would lead to progress in other 
areas, Legwaila said. 
 
¶7. (C) SRSG Legwaila noted that residents of border areas 
"disadvantaged" by demarcation had the choice of going to 
either Ethiopia or Eritrea, but said that Isaias had 
manipulated groups of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to 
get international aid and to blame UNMEE falsely for giving 
border villages to Ethiopia.  Legwaila explained that the 
Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) had told IDPs not to 
return to villages along the southern edge of the TSZ, even 
though conditions permitted them to do so; the GSE had even 
mined some villages.  Legwaila also said that Isaias knows 
that land must be ceded or transferred (as a result of the 
EEBC decision), but "does not care" to address the issue. 
Isaias falsely claimed to have instructed Eritreans living 
near the border with Ethiopia to move four kilometers north, 
Legwaila said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
MELES TO "CONSIDER" SENDING REPRESENTATIVE TO EEBC 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶8. (C) Amb. Frazer said that Meles repeatedly referred to his 
five-point plan, saying it accepted the EEBC decision but 
required dialogue.  Meles said initially he was willing to 
work with Isaias, not the EEBC, but ultimately agreed to 
"consider the possibility" of sending a representative to a 
future meeting of the EEBC, "if prepared carefully," Frazer 
said.  SRSG Legwaila highlighted the need to thoroughly 
prepare the agenda of any EEBC meeting contemplated, as the 
GOE did not want to be told by the EEBC that it was simply 
reaffirming the 2002 boundary decision.  He said that in 
accordance with the EEBC's own decision (not the Algiers 
accords), the EEBC could vary or "refine" the boundary line, 
if both parties (i.e., Ethiopia and Eritrea) requested it. 
Legwaila noted that the EEBC's "dispositif" in the 2002 
decision stated that the decision was final, but also 
recognized the principle of "manifest impracticability": 
that it may be impractical to place a pillar (demarcating the 
border) in a given location, such as on a mountain. 
Observing the principle of "manifest impracticability," both 
parties had already agreed to minor variations of the 
boundary along the 375 kilometers of the border's eastern 
sector, he said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
"MANIFEST IMPRACTICABILITY" WILL NOT ALLOW EXCHANGE OF BADME 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶9. (C) However, this principle did not mean that entire towns 
could be exchanged, Legwaila said, noting that by UNMEE's 
calculation, Badme lay 1.7 kilometers within Eritrea. 
Legwaila said that the GOE had not emphasized the issue of 
Badme before the EEBC, as, according to Ethiopia's 
calculation, Badme was 60 kilometers within Ethiopia.  In 
2001, UNMEE sent a cartographer and poloff to Badme to draw 
the boundary of the TSZ, Legwaila said.  The UNMEE team found 
that Badme then had 2,700 residents (2,500 Ethiopian and 200 
Eritrean), and that "even the Eritrean elders" acknowledged 
that the land belonged to Ethiopia.  According to archives, 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000385  003.4 OF 004 
 
 
Ethiopian authorities had conducted municipal elections, 
Legwaila said; an OAU mission had confirmed that Ethiopia had 
long administered the village, but could not determine for 
how long. 
 
¶10. (C) Meles may be personally willing to surrender Badme, 
Legwaila said, noting that Meles had publicly referred to 
Badme as "a God-forsaken mud village" in a possible attempt 
to minimize its importance.  Legwaila said there had been 
much recent investment in Badme, which had previously 
consisted only of "shacks and mud huts."  Legwaila 
acknowledged that the EEBC decision split villages and 
churches.  "The only way out of this is for both countries to 
sit down and to discuss exchanging villages," Legwaila said. 
The boundary "circles" around Zelambessa, placing it in 
Ethiopia, while circling around Tserona and placing it in 
Eritrea, he noted. 
 
¶11. (C) "The EEBC is prepared to change the line," if both 
parties want it to, Legwaila said, but the GOE fears 
"entrapment" by the EEBC.  Charge noted that the GOE 
considered EEBC President Sir Elihu Lauterpacht "biased," due 
to his previous statement that the boundary was "practically 
demarcated," which suggested little or no discretion would be 
allowed.  At the same time, SRSG Legwaila pointed out that in 
March 2004, even the EEBC commissioners appointed by Ethiopia 
had defended the 2002 EEBC decision.  Legwaila noted, 
however, the potential conflict of interest posed by 
Professor James Crawford's affiliation (one of several legal 
counsels for Eritrea, as noted in the 2002 EEBC decision) 
with the "Lauterpacht Research Center for International Law" 
at Cambridge University. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
ERITREA: ETHIOPIA MUST ACCEPT DECISION "AS IS" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶12. (C) Meles had told A/S Frazer that he accepted the EEBC 
decision, and that the GOE's caveat that it accepted the 
decision (only) "in principle" came as a suggestion offered 
by the UK.  For Meles, the problem was the implementation of 
the EEBC's decision, for which he seeks dialogue with 
Eritrea, she added.  SRSG Legwaila said that Meles dropping 
the caveat would be a positive development, which would then 
allow the international community to push Eritrea.  Legwaila 
noted that "in principle" did not appear in the GOE's January 
16 memorandum on the border situation submitted to the UN 
Security Council.  Legwaila agreed not to publicize Meles' 
flexibility on "in principle," however. 
 
¶13. (C) Amb. Frazer said that even if Meles were to drop the 
caveat, the GSE may not necessarily welcome it.  She 
explained that she had informed EPFDJ head of political 
affairs Yemane Ghebreab, who was visiting Washington and then 
Paris, of her trip to the border, and had told him that the 
next steps needed were:  a meeting of the Witnesses 
(including the U.S., AU, and EU) to the Algiers Accord, a 
meeting of the EEBC, and then the beginning of demarcation. 
Yemane responded that only the EEBC, not the Witnesses, had 
the mandate and legal authority to demarcate the border; that 
Ethiopia must accept the decision "as is"; and that the USG 
delegation had visited "occupied territory."  Amb. Frazer 
said she had reminded Yemane that Badme was sovereign 
Ethiopian territory until demarcation.  Legwaila hailed USG 
engagement with Yemane, noting that the GSE had spurned 
former UN envoy Lloyd Axworthy, believing that Eritrea was 
not the problem.  Yemane Ghebreab was a better interlocutor 
than GSE presidential advisor Yemane Gebremeskel, who was 
"too angry for my liking," Legwaila said. 
 
¶14. (C) Noting that Meles had said that Yemane Ghebreab spoke 
for Isaias, Amb. Frazer said that she was not pushing for a 
meeting with Isaias; the international community needed 
actions, not talk, she added.  Asked who exerted influence on 
Isaias and the GSE, Legwaila suggested Israel as a 
possibility, alleging that Isaias had an aversion to Arabs. 
The relationship between Isaias and Qaddafi was a "marriage 
of convenience," Legwaila said, noting that Qaddafi would not 
be an effective intermediary since he questions why Ethiopia 
simply does not accept the EEBC decision.  One could also 
engage the GSE's international lawyers, Legwaila said, 
although some were "strident."  (NOTE: Italy and Egypt have 
had recent access to Isaias, if not influence.  In subsequent 
meetings with poloff, Italian DCM and Egyptian poloff 
separately noted that Isaias hosted an Italian ministerial 
delegation (led by deputy foreign minister Alfredo Manteca) 
in January 2005; Isaias also visited Cairo in December.  END 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000385  004 OF 004 
 
 
NOTE.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
EEBC MEETING IN FEBRUARY OR MARCH 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) To ensure progress, all sides needed to be flexible, 
Amb. Frazer said, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the EEBC, 
which could hold its next meeting either at the beginning of 
February or in March.  Legwaila highlighted the need to 
consult with Lauterpacht to explain what was needed from the 
EEBC; Amb. Frazer responded that General Carlton Fulford had 
already done so and would continue to do so in the future. 
Amb. Frazer added that one could not rule out sanctions. 
Both Amb. Frazer and SRSG Legwaila agreed that if both 
parties sought war, then there was little the international 
community could do. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
UNMEE OBSERVER MISSION COULD STILL SUPPORT DEMARCATION 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶16. (C) Amb. Frazer said that Meles supported the removal of 
UNMEE, or its downsizing to an observer force, if UNMEE 
continued to be "held hostage" by Isaias; Meles believed 
UNMEE would not be able to stop Isaias if Isaias wanted to go 
to war with Ethiopia.  SRSG Legwaila agreed that so long as 
UNMEE was being "brutalized" by Eritrean restrictions on its 
freedom of movement, there was nothing to push the GSE to be 
serious about solving the current crisis.  Legwaila noted 
that the GSE had long considered UNMEE's presence 
unnecessary:  twelve days after the EEBC's decision in April 
2002, Isaias had expressed surprise that UNMEE was still in 
Eritrea, since both sides (at that time) had accepted the 
EEBC's decision.  Legwaila said he had told Isaias that UNMEE 
would withdraw "when the last pillar is driven" (i.e., only 
after the completion of demarcation).  Legwaila underscored 
that the GSE's recent expulsion of UNMEE staff who were 
Western nationals was "absolutely unacceptable," and 
continued to hamper recruitment for the mission, as any 
Europeans hired had to remain in Ethiopia and could not enter 
Eritrea. 
 
¶17. (C) SRSG Legwaila affirmed that if changed to a pure 
observer mission, UNMEE could still support demarcation.  A 
tailored mission with field offices, helicopters, and fewer 
than 3,700 troops could be used for demarcation, he said. 
(NOTE:  UNMEE's current troop strength is approximately 
3,200; its authorized strength is 4,000.  END NOTE.)  UNMEE's 
role would include demining pillar sites and adjacent access 
roads.  Originally, the EEBC had directed UNMEE to provide 
security for pillar sites, so that pillars demarcating the 
border would not be removed overnight; the demarcation 
directives had later been amended so that the parties 
themselves were to provide security, he said. 
 
¶18. (C) COMMENT: Meles's decision to "consider the 
possibility" of sending a representative to attend the next 
meeting of the Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission, 
coupled with the lack of any reference to accepting the EEBC 
decision only "in principle" in the GOE's January 16 
memorandum to the UNSC, represent small but significant 
concessions.  UNMEE officials, including SRSG Legwaila and 
UNMEE military observers in the field (septel), highlight 
Ethiopia's compliance with the provisions of UNSCR 1640 
calling for the withdrawal of troops to December 2004 
positions, saying that Ethiopia has withdrawn eight divisions 
from the border.  Progress on demarcation, however, is 
another matter.  It is clear from our visit to Badme that 
local Ethiopian authorities are making no preparations to 
transfer Badme to Eritrea, and that local sentiment strongly 
opposes the EEBC decision.  While it is important for the 
United States to build on the momentum generated by A/S 
Frazer's visit, the parties may have their own strategic 
interests for maintaining the status quo.  As SRSG Legwaila 
observed in a January 19 briefing to the USG delegation 
(septel), prior to its visit to the border, if the border is 
not demarcated, then "advantage Ethiopia," as Ethiopia 
currently occupies all the contested areas.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶19. (U) A/S Frazer cleared on this message. 
HUDDLESTON