This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000234 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS AF/RSA AND AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2031 
TAGS: PARM PGOV PINS ASEC SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: SUDAN: GETTING PAST "NO" ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Classified By: USDEL Member E. Tariot. Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Skilled AU mediation has wrested 
control out of the hands of the incapable chairman of the 
Security Arrangements Committee and established some 
promising common ground between the parties at the Darfur 
Peace Talks.  The Movements, superficial grasp of the 
modalities of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
continues to stifle meaningful progress in cross-table 
plenary discussions between the parties.  Tactical maneuvers 
by the Sudanese Armed Forces along the outskirts of 
Movement-held areas have reportedly heightened acute food 
shortages within the Movements, field ranks, giving credence 
to SLM/Minnawi and JEM field commanders, concern that their 
political brethren may be negotiating their defeat at table. 
Field command dissent (and the difficulties of obtaining 
militia-level buy-in at the Talks) remains another barrier to 
progress, exacerbating the Movements, lack of negotiating 
confidence opposite a skilled, professional, national 
military delegation. Shifting and extremely close-hold 
security arrangements, red-lines within the Government of 
National Unity,s (GNU) negotiating posture, all combine to 
create drag on the pace -- and ultimate closure -- of the 
Peace Talks as a whole. AU technical advisors argue that 
resultant delays could be overcome with an increase of 
skilled, technical military advisors with DDR implementation 
experience. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
¶2. (C) Progress on the security arrangements front remains 
promising, though the tough issues relating to disarmament 
have not yet been discussed.  The skilled mediation efforts 
of AU technical advisor Laurie Nathan have resulted in the 
parties opting out of AU mediation in lieu of cross-party 
discussions between the GNU and the Movements -- a first for 
the Security Arrangements Commission. Intensive, 
collaborative problem-solving negotiations between the 
parties at the working group-level resulted in a preliminary 
enhanced ceasefire document on track for an agreement late 
this week. Oriented toward strengthening the monitoring, 
enforcement, and verification abilities of AMIS, the Joint 
Ceasefire Commission, the Joint Commission, and the Joint 
Humanitarian Facilitation and Monitoring Unit, the document 
also exacts precise concessions out of the parties to ensure 
compliance. 
 
¶3. (C) Although Nathan,s diligence has shown positive 
results thus far, discussions between USDEL and a variety of 
interlocutors at the Darfur Peace Talks indicate that without 
improving the comprehensive technical capacity of the 
Movements, progress in the Security Arrangements Commission 
as a whole will continue to be inadequate. In one-on-one 
discussions between the Movements and AU technical advisors, 
all three factions (JEM, SLM/AW, and SLM/Minnawi) continue to 
be hobbled by their lack of understanding about disarmament 
and demobilization process.  SLM/Minnawi negotiators 
confessed to AU security arrangements team member Jeremy 
Brickhill and Laurie Nathan (STRICTLY PROTECT) that field 
commanders continued to be concerned that &assembly points8 
meant anything ranging from specific geo-coordinates 
vulnerable to SAF attack to concentration camps.  SLM/AW 
negotiators, in similar discussions, repeatedly asked at what 
point disarmament was most appropriate during the transition 
period. When queried by the AU advisors as to what SLM/AW 
meant by &transition,8 advisors were met with &what does 
it routinely mean?8 as the response. 
 
¶4. (C) Movements, skittishness during security arrangements 
discussions is exacerbated not only by the political 
fragility of the Movements, negotiating position, but 
reported SAF strategic victories (as the Movements have 
categorized them to us) in the field.  The December/January 
period remains one Darfur,s worst with regard to cease-fire 
violations, and allegations of under-reporting to the Joint 
Ceasefire Commission (CFC) by both sides only bolsters 
Movements, private claims to AU technical advisors that 
their current field deficits are significant.  Large-scale 
military attacks have dropped off as Movements, leaders 
attempt to bolster credibility at the table through selective 
enforcement of the N,djamena Protocol.  This downturn in 
what previously served as a re-supply activity, coupled with 
(apparently successful) tactical maneuvers by the Sudanese 
Armed Forces along the outskirts of Movement-held areas, has 
reportedly heightened acute food shortages within the 
Movements field ranks. Internal schisms between 
per-diem-supplemented SLM/JEM political advisors and 
inconsistently paid and supplied SLM/JEM militia remain an 
undercurrent of the Talks.  Mini Minnawi,s lead negotiator, 
Ali Tray, alleged to PolOff that the main reason behind 
Mini,s absence from the Talks is to keep the commanders 
&from throwing over the table in anger8 as they hear, third 
and fourth hand, of Minnawi,s claims to &Western Sudan,8 
and media reports alleging progress in disarmament talks. 
 
¶5. (C) The GNU,s limited negotiating mandate continues to 
keep the security arrangements commission off balance. Lead 
security arrangements negotiator General Ismat Abdelrahman 
noted to AU mediator that, although he could agree to 
decisions on integration and assembly independent from 
Khartoum, everything else required the approval, at a 
minimum, of the Minister of Defense.  Stove-piping issues 
aside, the GNU delegation faces significant capacity issues 
of its own.  Abdelrahman admitted to Nathan in a private 
mediation discussion that Khartoum remains highly concerned 
about its ability to disarm the Janjaweed. In a frank 
exchange that outlined the intense disagreement in government 
circles on how to best handle ultimate Movement integration, 
Nathan brought conversation to a standstill with his query on 
the status of GNU planning for Janjaweed disarmament.  After 
a long pause, Abdelrahman admitted that the SAF remained 
uncertain that it was capable of being even marginally 
successful in executing the initiative, before recovering 
with a less-than-convincing acknowledgement that  &it will 
be difficult.8 
 
¶6. (C) Nathan offered the Deputy Secretary,s Special 
Representative to the Sudan (D/SpecRep) well-considered 
thoughts on how the USG (or other international partners 
could hold the GNU accountable to its international mandate 
to disarm Janjaweed and other Arab militias. The AU mediator 
offered a two-track approach focused on the negotiating table 
and targeted international pressure on the SAF.  The latter 
calls for dedicating U.S. intelligence and other capabilities 
to ascertaining the scope and breadth of both known 
arms-trafficking routes into and out of Darfur and 
known/suspected munitions stockpiles.  Such collection 
efforts, shared and coordinated with like-minded diplomatic 
partners, could be used to pressure the GNU to come to the 
table significantly reduced red-lines.  Given the fact the 
GNU will offer up &the cheapest bottom-line possible,8 
Nathan opined that only compelling evidence of GNU 
intransigence  )  beyond that of the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in Darfur  ) could force GNU to 
commit itself seriously to the security negotiations in the 
face of otherwise shaky (and therefore easily stalled) 
Movement position. 
 
¶7. (C) D/SpecRep was enthusiastic about the idea, noting the 
USG,s enormous success in using satellite images of razed 
villages to pressure Sudan in the past.  Once tied seriously 
to the Talks, Nathan continued, the international community 
could capitalize on the GNU,s Janjaweed disarmament concerns 
by focusing the debate (and subsequent agreement) on 
&neutralizing8 the Janjaweed threat.  Nathan argued this 
was not meant to absolve the GNU of its responsibility to 
reign in its Janjaweed proxy, but rather establish a set of 
benchmarks to which the international community could 
reasonably hold the Government to account. (NOTE: In 
follow-on conversations, Nathan has offered USDEL a white 
paper on neutralization versus disarmament.  USDEL will fax a 
copy to AF/SPG once available. END NOTE.) 
 
¶8. (C) Capacity weaknesses and limited mandates aside, the 
chief obstacle to progress within the Security Arrangements 
Commission so far: the sizeable shortcomings its chief AU 
mediator, Nigerian General Geruba.  He is unskilled at 
mediation, and is repeatedly bowled over by both parties 
during plenary discussions. Salim Mohammed Salim is familiar 
with Geruba,s inadequacies, but his unhappiness with the 
General,s approach has only forced Geruba to make defensive 
decisions unhelpful to the process.  The entire AU security 
arrangements committee has approached USDEL and other select 
partners with their concerns, and noted that Salim is 
soliciting names to replace Geruba,s equally inadequate 
deputy. (NOTE: USDEL and AF have discussed a specific list of 
names that should be quickly submitted to Salim for his 
immediate consideration and action. Current ad-hoc mediator 
Laurie Nathan is scheduled to depart Abuja o/a February 9, 
making Washington,s swift signal to Salim all the more 
imperative. END NOTE.) 
CAMPBELL