This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000232 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2031 
TAGS: PREL PINS PGOV PREF PHUM ASEC SU DARFUR
SUBJECT: HOPES FOR PEACE AND TALK OF WAR AT DARFUR TALKS 
 
 
Classified By: USDEL Member Erin Y. Tariot, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The pace of the Darfur Peace Talks has 
accelerated. The parties appear to have more of a negotiating 
mandate, and although red-lines remain, those committed to a 
settlement still outnumber the spoilers.  International 
observer corps, enthusiasm about the improved op tempo, 
however, has been tempered by events in N,djamena, and 
continued allegations of military excursions along the 
Sudan/Chad border.  The fragility of the rebel movements, 
alliance has grown, increasing with it fears of 
intra-Movement military conflict between JEM and SLM. Mixed 
signals from Khartoum to Abdelwahid,s SLM faction remain a 
significant impediment to the development of alternative 
avenues toward peace.  Issues at play on the Talk,s margins 
could either scuttle or save a political settlement. The 
latter is achievable only through rapid, coordinated, and 
clear international action aimed at keeping the parties 
focused at the table, and maintaining cooler heads in the 
field.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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PACE, PROGRESS ARE PROMISING, BUT( 
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¶2. (C) The hopes of the international observer corps were 
buoyed by the post-Eid spike in activity at the Darfur Peace 
Talks. Technical experts, save for previously promised and 
still required USG military advisors,  are in train. Skilled 
AU mediation has established an important store of 
cross-table goodwill critical for continued progress as 
working groups approach thornier political/military issues at 
week,s end. The inter-parties distance on security 
arrangements remains significant, but progress is occurring, 
albeit slowly. (NOTE: Pertinent security arrangement issues 
septel. END NOTE.) Positive movement has been seen on 
decisions regarding representation within the Council of 
Ministers and National Assembly; proactive AU mediation has 
been promised should the parties fall short.  Reparations and 
quantifying shares of natural resources remain the sole 
obstacles to the conclusion of a wealth-sharing agreement. 
The parties remain firmly anchored in negotiating mode. 
 
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TALK OF SLM/JEM VIOLENCE ABOUNDS 
-------------------------------- 
¶3. (C) In contrast, the attention of observers is 
increasingly focused elsewhere, seized by an urgent sense to 
shelter the fledgling progress from external events -- 
alleged and actual -- that are at best unclear and at worst 
disturbing.  Although the Abdelwahid Nur SLM faction (SLM/AW) 
has been able to compartmentalize NMRD,s potential political 
implications at the Talks, the same cannot be said for the 
perceived threat of SLM/AW-JEM violence. &We remain 
committed to a political settlement beneficial to all of 
Darfur, and to the negotiating agreement that places us at 
the same table with the other Movements, but should JEM 
attack, for us, the talks are over.& Abdelwahid emphasized. 
The SLM co-chair told PolOff January 28 that recent JEM 
militia increases in and around Malit, and the &troubling8 
arrival of Khalil in Darfur, have increased SLM concerns that 
a JEM attack may be imminent. He posited with reference to 
Ghelil &why is he here now, when he has been absent from 
Darfur since the early 1990s?& His representatives alleged 
to PolOff in the same meeting a substantial arms and militia 
buildup by JEM throughout West and North Darfur, and have 
promised the USDEL, although not yet delivered, a list of 
purported locations. 
 
¶4. (C) Abdelwahid,s concerns on field violence may be 
premature, if only because they have been usurped by flaring 
intra-Movement tempers at the talks themselves. On January 
26, JEM ordered the removal of three dissenters from its 
negotiating team after they internally criticized the NMRD 
decision. The erstwhile JEM delegates were given 30 minutes 
to vacate the hotel on the heels of their argument, made 
during a sidebar on power-sharing, that the NMRD decision was 
taken without proper Movement-wide vetting. Abdelwahid,s SLM 
faction prevented the involuntary expulsion by offering up 
rooms within the SLM delegation -- and a seat at on their 
section of the negotiating table. 
 
¶5. (C) On January 27/28, a physical altercation between four 
JEM representatives and one of the dissenters -- at 3:30AM -- 
resulted in the man and his wife seeking medical treatment at 
a local hospital. In an AU briefing January 28, the Deputy 
Secretary,s Special Representative to the Sudan (D/SpecRep) 
 
SIPDIS 
pushed the African Union to take the assault seriously, and 
not &smooth it out,8 as the AU was intending. (COMMENT: The 
AU response to this request has improved. At its insistence, 
JEM expelled the three attackers from the delegation and the 
hotel. END COMMENT.) 
 
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IS KHT OFFERING A DEAL, AND WOULD IT MATTER? 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶6. (C) A cadre of AU mediators profess confidence that 
Khartoum could be persuaded to deal on power sharing 
arrangements.  More forward-leaning AU resource people 
believe a deal between Khartoum and Abdelwahid,s faction 
could bring the talks to a final signing ceremony.  Both 
argue that it would be centered on two tenets: the creation 
of an assistant president and the acceptance of Darfur as one 
region, vice its current construct of three states. Sidebar 
discussions between select AU resource people and the GNU 
have elicited the following negotiating posture, should 
Khartoum following through with its efforts to court 
Abdewahid Nur: Assistant President would be removed from his 
position, and replaced with a Darfur repetitive agreed upon 
by the Movements.  The portfolio for the position would be 
modified, awarding the incumbent specific, and sole, 
responsibility for Darfur. GNU would also concede to SLM/AM 
regional status for Darfur, but through a gradual process 
that would enhance the administrative and political 
capacities of the Movements before ceding them complete 
oversight of the new region. 
 
¶7. (C) Although popular within some AU mediation circles, 
SLM/AW has yet to be persuaded of the plan, and it remains 
uncertain if they have even been approached by the GNU. In a 
January 28 meeting with D/SpecRep, Abdelwahid initially 
dodged the question of whether his faction was being courted 
by Khartoum, instead lamenting his lack of access. &I have 
been here throughout,8 he complained, &Mini is gone, Khalil 
has never come, so why not approach me?8 Midway through the 
meeting, however, he returned to the point unprompted, 
actively soliciting D/SpecRep,s views on how such a move 
would play in Washington. D/SpecRep demurred on the direct 
question, instead emphasizing USG desire for a speedy and 
sustainable peace in Darfur. 
 
¶8. (C) Mixed signals from Khartoum, not at the table but in 
Sudan itself, further strain the initial credibility of the 
proposal. In follow-on talks with PolOff largely centered on 
violence in Golo and Kaure, Abdelwahid and two advisors, 
while seemingly receptive to the idea of dealing one-on-one 
with the Government of National Unity, remained perplexed by 
the alleged uptick in SAF activity against this faction of 
the SLM. They stressed repeatedly their belief that Khartoum 
is attempting to leverage recent SAF/SLM skirmishes in Darfur 
to drive SLM-AW to a political settlement in Abuja. They 
scoffed, however, at the SAF,s &misguided belief8 that 
this would force SLM/AW to capitulate at the talks. 
 
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WHAT IS JEM THINKING, AND IS MINI ONBOARD? 
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¶9. (C) JEM,s post-NMRD objectives at the Talks, when 
contrasted against Abdelwahid,s characterization of their 
field activities, remain murky.  AU Security Arrangement 
Mediator Laurie Nathan (STRICTLY PROTECT) noted to D/SpecRep 
and PolOff January 28 that JEM Chief Negotiator Tadjedine had 
requested expediting the working group schedule so the sides 
could immediately tackle disarmament modalities, ostensibly 
an unusual request for a militia purportedly in the process 
of weapons, stockpiling. Nathan further remarked to PolOff 
January 26 that JEM,s position had &visibly sweetened8 
during the plenary sessions on security arrangements normally 
reserved for grandstanding. Nathan opined JEM,s transition 
to listening mode appeared legitimate, albeit hobbled a 
superficial understanding of disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration mechanisms as they related to the CPA. 
 
¶10. (C) AU advisor Alex de Waal (STRICTLY PROTECT) argued to 
D/SpecRep and PolOff on January 27 that JEM s 
Chadian/Libyan-influenced negotiating style made JEM a key 
aspect in finalizing any possible political settlement 
between SLM/AW and Khartoum &on behalf of the Movements,8 
but maintained that JEM was not to be mistaken for a swing 
vote to peace. De Waal claims JEM is psychologically 
positioned the &jump and follow the strong man,8 and would 
quickly align itself with a &winning8 SLM/AW faction -- 
regardless of the current pro-JEM power set-up within NMRD -- 
should an agreement be reached with Khartoum. (COMMENT: If de 
Waal,s read of JEM,s motivating factors is correct, and 
Abdelwahid,s assertion about JEM militia activity true, one 
has to question what signals JEM is getting as to who 
currently holds military supremacy in Darfur. END COMMENT). 
 
¶11. (C) Mini Minnawi, absent from the Talks (and claiming to 
us to be on the Sudan/Chad border, exploring ways to fortify 
vulnerable allied populations there) remains somewhat of an 
enigma in Abuja. His SLM negotiating team (SLM/Minnawi) is 
led by three hard-line political advisors who remain 
insufficiently schooled in military demobilization to move 
the talks forward, and visibly nervous about the level 
criticism (and in limited cases, outright dissent) from field 
commanders about perceived capitulations by the Movements 
at the negotiating table. De Waal has speculated Mini would 
accept an agreement, even if led by SLM-AW, to avoid being 
left out in the cold. (COMMENT: Whether Chad or Libya could 
persuade Minnawi to remain a holdout to a SLM/AW-driven 
political agreement in a fashion that would undermine peace 
in Darfur remains the subject of considerable speculation at 
the Talks, margins.  We are arguably too close to the issues 
here to accurately forecast the degree to which any such 
theories are correct. END COMMENT.) 
 
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SAF/DARFUR VIOLENCE: LITTLE IMPACT, SO FAR 
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¶12. (C) Unlike previous rounds, recent skirmishes between the 
Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM/AW and SLM/Minnawi) and the 
Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur have had a negligible impact 
on the Talks. Although neither faction has relinquished their 
status as the aggrieved party, both GNU and SLM-AW 
interlocutors at the talks are satisfied that AMIS has the 
situation in hand, and mechanisms exist for minimizing 
fallout following the events in Golo. Abdelwahid,s SLM 
faction -- to include the chairman himself -- maintains that 
the SLM attack in Golo was in retaliation for the burnings of 
21 villages in the immediate area that served as SLM supply 
garrisons. Abdelwahid claimed to PolOff that a heightened SLM 
alert posture triggered ground units to misread the SAF 
arrival near Kaure as an approaching attack, and noted field 
commanders have since been disciplined for the pre-emptive 
strike. (NOTE: It is doubtful that said &discipline8 was 
significant.  Abdelwahid held a lengthy discourse on the 
&burden of responsibility8 field commanders shoulder to 
defend allied civilians from &SAF and Janjaweed 
aggression,8 allowing for little difference between the two. 
END NOTE.) 
 
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COMMENT: 
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¶13. (C) The situation in Abuja remains fluid, but the rapport 
between the parties -- when at the table -- indicates an 
improved environment. External events warrant a close look. 
Equally important, the speedy delivery of resources: be it 
political pressure in Khartoum or the arrival of USG military 
advisors, is important for international community traction 
once the parties truly commit themselves to crafting a final 
settlement. 
CAMPBELL