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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 000417 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/PI, NEA/ARPI, NEA/FO, DRL/PHD, S/P 
PLEASE PASS USAID FOR ANE/NEA, DCHA/DG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 
TAGS: KMPI KDEM PHUM PGOV AE MEPI
SUBJECT: RESTRICTIVE LAWS HAMPER MEPI GOALS AND ACTIVITIES 
IN THE GULF 
 
 
Classified By: MEPI Regional Office Director Hans Wechsel, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This message from the MEPI Regional Office has been 
cleared by Embassies Abu Dhabi, Doha, Kuwait, Manama, and 
Muscat. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Summary: Restrictive laws that limit the 
establishment, funding, and activities of NGOs and other 
civil society groups have been and will continue to be a 
major impediment for MEPI efforts - and later those of the 
Foundation for the Future - to seek and support the growth of 
democracy in Gulf countries.  (An appendix summarizing each 
Gulf country's legal restrictions on civil society has been 
included.)  Legal restrictions and governmental control over 
civil society at times are used to hamper some civil society 
activities that are key to advancing MEPI projects and goals. 
 Furthermore, the current governmental stifling of civil 
society limits the number and strength of voices that would 
compete with the voices of extremism. 
 
¶3.  (C) Summary Cont: In order to effectively support the 
efforts of an independent civil society to fuel democratic 
reforms from within, a two-pronged approach is necessary: 
First, MEPI should seek programming specifically aimed at 
liberalizing the laws that govern civil society groups in the 
Gulf.  Second, until new legislation is enacted, the USG will 
have to press governments to use their discretionary 
authority under existing laws to accommodate some of the more 
sensitive MEPI projects currently planned for the Gulf.   End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
The shallow end of the MENA civil society pool 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In a recent effort to identify local groups that 
could conceivably undertake small to medium-scale MEPI-funded 
projects, posts and the Abu Dhabi RO identified twice as many 
groups in Yemen and Jordan than in the six Gulf countries 
combined.  While the developing status of both of those 
countries is a key factor in the existence of larger civil 
society communities there, so is the approach of those host 
governments' toward the establishment of civil society 
groups.  Yemen has the most liberal (though still flawed) 
legal requirements in the sub-region.  Jordan's law gives the 
government - like Gulf governments - broad discretion over 
the establishment of civil society groups.  Unlike Gulf 
governments, however, Jordan generally uses that discretion 
to let civil society groups proliferate. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In the Gulf, the financial and administrative 
requirements for licensing an NGO or professional association 
are more extensive than other sub-regions of the MENA, and 
are far more onerous than Western standards.  Even when those 
obstacles can be surmounted, the government often uses its 
broad discretion to prevent licensing.  In Qatar, for 
example, post officials and Qatari contacts estimate that 
less than 15 percent of applications to establish new civil 
society groups have been approved.  In the UAE, the first 
&NGO8 (other charitable and educational civil society 
organizations exist) has yet to be established, and at least 
two applications known to Embassy officials have been pending 
for more than a year.  Only a handful of "NGOs" exist in 
Saudi Arabia, and they can only be established by royal 
decree. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Can local groups accept USG funding? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Official NGOs are not the only possible recipients 
of MEPI funds.  Other types of civil society organizations, 
such as professional associations, community groups, and 
universities are also potential recipients.  Whether an 
official NGO or some other kind of civil society group; local 
groups in five Gulf countries cannot accept USG funds without 
the host government's written permission.  (Note:  The 
exception is Bahrain, where groups are required to inform the 
government of their intention to accept USG (and other 
foreign) funding.  The GOB can disallow the group accepting 
USG funds, but no government response signals consent.  Some 
groups choose to request and receive government permission to 
accept U.S. funds so they do not run into problems in the 
future.  End Note)  Several representatives of civil society 
groups in Gulf countries have cited the necessary 
governmental approval of MEPI funding as a reason for either 
limiting the activities proposed, or not submitting a 
proposal to MEPI at all. 
 
¶7.  (C) Kuwaiti officials made clear to post that its recent 
effort to broadly publicize MEPI funding opportunities was 
not welcome.  GOK contacts explained that they share the 
objectives of MEPI programs, but anticipated two negative 
consequences to publicizing outside funding for NGOs:  (1) a 
conservative backlash within the National Assembly, and (s) 
pressure from Iran to be allowed to follow the U.S. precedent 
and provide funding to purported religious NGOs with less 
benign intentions within Kuwait. (Note: Kuwait's law does 
permit foreign funding, though the Government's approval is 
required.  In practice, the many sources of both public and 
private funding available to most Kuwaitis limits interest in 
seeking outside funding.  End Note.)  The Omani Government, 
meanwhile, would not approve an Embassy press release on MEPI 
funding opportunities for dissemination to local papers. 
Even in Bahrain, where the Government has a more liberal 
attitude toward reform and MEPI than other Gulf countries, 
the Bahrain Transparency Society would not conclude a grant 
agreement with MEPI until it had written permission from the 
GOB (per the notation above), which delayed the project for 3 
months. 
---------------------------------------- 
U.S.-based groups are also stymied by law 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) With limited options for supporting democratic 
change through direct funding of local groups, MEPI often 
funds U.S.-based organizations instead.  These organizations 
can then hire local representatives, partner with local 
groups, or provide services directly to individual program 
participants.  Many of these U.S.-based organizations still 
need some kind of presence on the ground, however, to 
implement their projects effectively.  Like the establishment 
of local NGOs, the ability of foreign or international NGOs 
to establish a branch office or resident representative in 
Gulf countries is also hampered by restrictive laws and/or 
broad governmental discretion. 
 
¶9.  (C) In Bahrain, the lack of legislation allowing the 
registration of foreign and international NGOs has forced NDI 
to seek the umbrella of an GoB institute to make its 
continued presence there legal.  NDI and the GoB institute 
have not yet been able to reach a mutually acceptable MoU, 
however, and the MFA recently asked NDI to suspend its 
activities.  Per Manama 0092, the Foreign Minister offered to 
assist NDI in resolving its status, and direct contacts 
between NDI and the Bahrain Institute for Political 
Development appear to be yielding positive measures that 
should lead to a final resolution of NDI's status soon. 
 
¶10.  (C) In Qatar, the IRI program director has for more than 
15 months unsuccessfully sought legal status for IRI in 
Qatar.  Without legal recognition of IRI, she has been forced 
to depart the country at frequent intervals to abide by the 
terms of her visitor visa.  More importantly, IRI's ability 
to work with groups and institutions interested in its 
services has been hampered by concerns over its lack of legal 
status and/or their inability to obtain explicit permission 
from the MFA to conduct an activity with IRI.  As a result of 
the Government's lack of official recognition of IRI and/or 
explicit permission to carry out activities, IRI has been 
largely idle in Qatar for several months. 
 
¶11.  (C) New MEPI projects in the pipeline for several Gulf 
countries through AIESEC, Freedom House, and IREX, as well as 
new phases of bilateral programming through NDI or IRI in 
Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, may all face these types of 
problems as they try to roll out their programs in 2006.  No 
U.S. implementer can effectively move programming forward in 
the Gulf unless the host government accommodates the project. 
 
 
--------------------- 
Don't get "political" 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) Whether directly funded or just partnered with an 
U.S. implementer, civil society groups in every Gulf country 
are legally prohibited from engaging in "political" 
activities.  Other vague prohibitions for civil society 
groups include undermining "national unity", "social peace", 
and even "harmony".  Sanctions if the government deems that a 
group has violated these provisions range from shutting down 
the organization to jailing its leadership. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Such actions are rare, but occur enough - 
including in the past year - that the possibility creates 
some degree of "self-censorship" among most civil society 
groups.  With the exception of Bahrain, where there has been 
more political space for civil society than elsewhere in the 
Gulf, most groups in the Gulf are cautious about advocating 
reform positions on highly political issues that are critical 
of government policy.  Combined with the above-mentioned 
requirement for governmental approval of foreign funding, 
MEPI is unlikely to get many proposals from local groups that 
are significantly more forward-leaning on political reform 
issues than their host governments. 
¶14.  (C) Partnering - or even participating - in a 
forward-leaning political reform project with a U.S.-based 
implementer also gives local groups pause.  Many Gulf 
countries require civil society groups to report any official 
contacts with foreign groups or governments.  The UAE 
Journalist Association (JA), for example, was eager for a 
MEPI project that would provide it the services of an 
U.S.-based media law expert, but was concerned that some UAEG 
officials might try to thwart the project if informed.  To 
avoid broadly informing the Government, the JA moved forward 
with the project on the condition that its verbal assurances 
would suffice, as any written communications to the USG would 
have to be forwarded to two UAEG ministries as well. 
----------------------------- 
 Mosque-based "civil society" 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The ability to organize and get messages out is 
central to any group's ability to influence issue debates and 
affect public opinion.  Without a free and vibrant civil 
society, however, it is difficult to for groups in the Gulf 
to form and affect public opinion.  Islamic extremists, 
meanwhile, are able to spread their ideas through existing 
networks. 
 
¶16.  (C) The absence of a robust civil society free to 
advocate issue positions that are critical of government 
policy contributes to a disproportionate influence for 
extremists as detractors.  A robust civil society would 
expand the number and strength of voices that are critical of 
government policy without advocating extremism. Along with a 
free press and political parties, a robust civil society is 
part of an equation for creating a marketplace for ideas in 
the Gulf that does not disadvantage moderates. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Aim programming at liberalizing civil society laws 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) All of the Gulf posts' democracy strategies 
rightly call for strengthening civil society, and MEPI has 
some programs available to the Gulf that can contribute to 
that.  The key to broadly strengthening civil society in the 
Gulf, however, is liberalization of the laws that govern its 
establishment, funding, and activities.  With or without MEPI 
support, civil society will not be a significant force for 
democratic reform in the Gulf unless the legislative ties 
that bind it are loosened. 
 
¶18.  (C) MEPI should seek programming that would work with 
existing Gulf civil society groups to promote better civil 
society laws from elsewhere in the Arab world, and/or help 
them draft new model legislation.  Such a project could, 
however, quickly run into many of the obstacles described 
above.  Existing civil society laws could easily thwart a 
project aimed at liberalizing those laws.  In the current 
situation, a civil society law project - like any sensitive 
project in the Gulf - will only go forward if host 
governments are persuaded to accommodate it. 
 
¶19.   (C) In addition to bilateral efforts to liberalize 
civil society laws, it may also be worth raising the issue 
through the GCC structure.  The GCC Secretariat in Riyadh, 
regular GCC ministerials, possible sidebars with GCC 
colleagues at FFF events, and the Secretary's annual meeting 
with GCC FMs at UNGA, are all potential opportunities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Advancing MEPI democratic reform projects this year 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶20.  (C) Civil society laws in the Gulf are hindering some 
existing MEPI projects.  Nevertheless, most of these laws 
also give broad discretionary authority to the government. 
Until laws are liberalized, "pushing the envelope" of 
democratic reform in partnership with civil society groups in 
the Gulf will rely on the USG convincing governments on a 
case-by-case basis to accommodate some of the more sensitive 
MEPI projects.  We should expect that in 2006 bilateral 
dialogue might be necessary with Gulf governments to advance 
several key MEPI regional programs already in the pipeline 
through Freedom House, AIESEC, Arab Civitas, and IREX; as 
well as bilateral programs through IRI and NDI.  Otherwise, 
some of these programs - as well as the key aspects of posts' 
democracy strategies they are meant to support - simply may 
not move forward. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Appendix: Summary of Civil Society Restrictions 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶21.  (U) Bahrain: 
 
Licensing: 
--The Ministry of Social Development licenses civil society 
associations and organizations. 
--Applications can be rejected by the Ministry for broad, 
ill-defined reasons. 
 
Funding: 
--Local societies planning to receive funding from foreign 
groups or governments must inform the Ministry of Social 
Development. 
--Bahraini associations must also apply for a fundraising 
permit to the Ministry of Social Development.  The 
application is a lengthy process, and must be tied to a 
specific project or activity after which a new permit must be 
sought for a new activity/project. 
 
Activities: 
--Bahraini associations registered with the Ministry of 
Social Development cannot participate in &political 
activities8, must adhere to "public order and morals" and 
must ensure its activities do not affect the "the safety of 
the state, the form of government or its social order." 
--Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include 
dissolution. The Minister also has the right to halt the 
implementation of any decision made on the part of the NGO if 
it was deemed to contravene the law, NGO regulations, public 
order or morals. 
--Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs must be 
approved by the Ministry of Social Development. 
--The Ministry must be notified of any "General Assembly" 
meeting 15 days in advance.  The NGO must provide the 
Ministry with a copy of the invitation letter, the meeting,s 
agenda, and all other documents the members receive.  The 
Ministry can designate a representative to attend the meeting 
on its behalf.  The minutes of meeting must be provided to 
the Ministry within 15 days of its occurrence. 
 
¶22.  (U) Kuwait: 
 
Licensing: 
--The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs licenses civil 
society associations and organizations. 
--Applications can be rejected by the Ministry at its 
discretion without citing any provision of law.  More common 
than outright rejection is a non-response, with applications 
left to languish within the bureaucracy. 
--Rejections can only be appealed to the Minister.  There is 
no judicial review. 
 
Funding: 
--Associations are prohibited from accepting funds or 
benefits from any source outside of Kuwait without the 
approval of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. 
--The Board of Directors must annually submit to the Ministry 
complete financial accounts for the previous year's 
activities, and its draft budget for the next year. 
 
Activities: 
--Associations are prohibited from &engaging in politics, 
religious conflicts, or other activities that may incite 
sectarianism or discrimination.8 
--Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include 
dissolution, fines, and imprisonment. 
--The Ministry can designate a representative to attend the 
meetings of any General Assembly meeting. 
--Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs is 
prohibited without the permission of the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs. 
 
¶23.  (U) Oman: 
 
Licensing: 
--Ministry of Social Development licenses civil society 
associations and organizations, except some licensed under 
special laws.  State security services must screen 
applications and membership rolls as an obligatory step in 
this process. 
--Applications can be rejected by the Ministry for broad, 
ill-defined reasons. 
--Rejections can only be appealed to the Minister.  There is 
no judicial review. 
 
Funding: 
--The Minister,s approval, after proper vetting with state 
security services, is required before funds can be accepted 
from any source outside Oman. 
 
Activities: 
--Allowable fields in which associations may work include 
care of orphans, care of children and women, women,s 
services, care of the old, care of the disabled and special 
groups, care for the environment, and any other sphere or 
activity that the Minister of Social Development approves 
along with the Council of Ministers. 
--Associations &may not engage in politics or interfere in 
religious matters, and must avoid tribal or sectarian 
groupings.8 
--Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include 
dissolution, fines, and imprisonment. 
--The Minister of Social Development may rescind any decision 
or action taken by an NGO's Board of Directors. 
--Associations may not send delegations outside Oman or host 
delegations from outside the country before obtaining the 
approval of the Ministry. 
--Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs must be 
approved by the Minister. 
--Associations are subject to the Ministry,s "supervision"; 
including the right to attend activities, and the right to 
enter an association's office(s) and examine its records and 
documents. 
 
¶24.  (U) Qatar: 
 
Licensing: 
--The Ministry of Civil Service Affairs licenses civil 
society associations and organizations. 
--Applications can be rejected by the Ministry without 
justification or comment. 
--Rejections may be appealed only to the Cabinet of 
Ministers.  There is no judicial review. 
--Membership of all civil society groups must be at least 80% 
Qatari. 
--NGO licenses cost $14,000. 
 
Funding: 
--Ministry approval is required before funds can be accepted 
from any source outside Qatar. 
The association,s board of directors must annually present 
to the Ministry complete financial accounts for its previous 
year's activities and its draft budget for the next year. 
 
Activities: 
--"Involvement in political matters" is prohibited. 
--Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include 
dissolution, fines, and imprisonment. 
--Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs must be 
approved by the Ministry. 
--The association,s activities are subject to the 
"supervision and control" of the Ministry. 
 
¶25.  (U) Saudi Arabia: 
 
There are no specific provisions in Saudi law that deal with 
the establishment, funding, or activities of civil society 
organizations.  The few "NGOs" in country were established by 
decree.  Some professional associations have been allowed to 
form.  All "civil society" organizations exist and operate 
under governmental control. 
 
¶26.  (U) UAE: 
 
Licensing: 
--The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs licenses civil 
society associations and organizations 
-- Applications can be rejected by the Ministry at its 
discretion without citing any provision of law. 
--Rejections can only be appealed to the Minister.  There is 
no judicial review. 
 
Funding: 
--Groups must obtain a special permit from the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs before funds can be accepted from 
any source outside the UAE. 
 
Activities: 
--Groups may undertake social, religious, cultural, 
educational, and technical activities, and/or provide 
humanitarian or charitable services. 
-- Groups are &prohibited from engaging in politics, or in 
activities that may raise religious, ethnic, or sectarian 
conflicts.8 
--Possible sanctions for activities deemed illegal include 
dissolution, fines, and imprisonment. 
--Groups are not allowed to participate in any conferences or 
meetings abroad without a permit from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. 
--Affiliation with international or foreign NGOs must be 
approved by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the 
Ministry of Interior. 
-- The Ministry of Social Affairs has the right of 
&direction and technical supervision8 over any 
association's projects and programs. 
 
SISON 
SISON