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DE RUEHAD #0409/01 0390802
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY CLASS BY AD8DF19B MSI8746 503)
P 080802Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3429
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ADDED CLASSIFIED BY 
LINE) 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB (A/S WAYNE), EB/ESC/TFS (JSALOOM), NEA/ARPI 
(RSMYTH) 
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, PHEFFERNAN, RLEBENSON 
FBI FOR FWAIKART, MMOREHART, JHERRING 
CIA FOR CTC/FINO 
DHS FOR DHS/ICE, FINANCIAL AND TRADE INVESTIGATIONS, 
KDELLACOLI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2015 
TAGS: PTER KTFN AE
SUBJECT: U/S LEVEY LAUNCHES U.S./UAE JTFCC 
 
REF: A. STATE 1287 
     ¶B. 05 ABU DHABI 720 
     ¶C. 05 ABU DHABI 4982 
 
Classified by Ambassador Michelle J Sison for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  The U.S. and UAE held the inaugural meeting 
of the Joint Terrorist Financing Coordinating Committee 
(JTFCC) in Abu Dhabi on January 24, 2006.  The Central Bank 
Governor began the meeting by questioning the value in having 
a JTFCC, but by the end acknowledged that there could be 
benefit in having a "brainstorming committee." He proposed 
that the two sides should "formalize" the role of the 
committee and put in some "transparency", so that the U.S. 
does not "take unilateral action without first consulting on 
issues that concern us."  Although the pre-set agenda items 
(charities, cash couriers, UN 1267 designations, Iraq 
insurgency) were nominally covered, the UAE team focused 
primarily on explaining their laws and provided few, if any. 
examples of CFT enforcement action.  Although the UAE fielded 
a robust interagency team at the Federal level, only Central 
Bank officials spoke, and there were no representatives from 
Dubai. Notably, during a lunch sidebar discussion of 
proliferation related entities, al-Suweidi indicated that it 
is considerably easier for the Central Bank to close accounts 
than to freeze them. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued.  On January 25, U/S Levey met 
with Dubai State Security Organization Chief Mohammed 
al-Qemzi to discuss the Shamsi case, Saleh al-Suweidi, Human 
Appeal International, and the Iraqi Insurgency.  Al-Qemzi 
recognized Human Appeal International as a charity "run by 
the Muslim Brotherhood," and he promised to provide further 
information to SIMO. He was not receptive to the idea of 
designating Shamsi, explaining that he believes Shamsi has 
been &rehabilitated,8 that he is no longer a threat under 
current restrictions imposed by Dubai State Security, and 
that designating him would not be to the benefit of the UAE. 
U/S Levey's meetings with the Dubai Department of Islamic 
Affairs and Charitable Activities and the Dubai Financial 
Services Authority will be reported septel.  End summary. 
 
------------- 
JTFCC MEETING 
------------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) The U.S Delegation, led by U/S Stuart Levey, 
included Adam Szubin, Senior Advisor to the U/S; Policy 
Advisor Rachel Lebenson; Treasury Analyst Matthew Epstein; 
Ahmed El Bashari, Treasury Middle East and North Africa 
Specialist; Jason Beal, OFAC Attache in Manama; Michael 
Morehart, Chief FBI Terrorist Finance Operations Section 
(TFOS); and Frank Waikart, FBI Special Advisor to the NSC. 
Embassy participants included Ambassador Sison, Econoff 
Amanda Curtis, Pol/Mil Chief Michael Epperson, ALAT Athena 
Lien, and DHS/ICE Attache Bill Wallrapp.  The UAE Delegation, 
led by Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser al-Suweidi, 
included Deputy Governor Mohammed al Falazi, three officials 
from the Banking Supervisions and Examination Department, two 
officials from the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases 
Unit (AMLSCU); four officials from the Ministry of Interior; 
Dr. Mohammed al-Kamali from the Ministry of Justice; Yacoub 
al-Hosani, Director International Organizations Department at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Khaled al-Bustani, Assistant 
Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance; State Security officer 
Saif al-Muhairi; and Counselor Obaid Trais, Attorney 
General's Office.  Hassan al-Sheikh from the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs (the UAE body that regulates 
charities) was unable to attend. 
 
¶4. (S) U/S Levey opened the JTFCC by thanking the UAEG for 
its participation and engagement on the issue of terrorism 
finance.  Levey underlined the critical role combating 
terrorist finance plays in the global war on terror and 
offered that it was because of close US-UAE cooperation to 
date that he was there to help lead a bilateral interagency 
forum.  The Central Bank Governor agreed about the importance 
of stopping terror financing, but stated that he did not see 
value added in forming the JTFCC, telling the U/S to 
"convince us."  The Governor continued by saying, "Look how 
much the terror finance network has shrunk since we first 
started (after the September 11th attacks).  I think we will 
not be able to stop it 100 .  If you are aiming for that, 
then you should review your goals."  Levey replied that 
though it is tempting to celebrate what we have done 
so far 
and tick off accomplishments, we can not be satisfied and 
must continue to work to shut these flows down. Al Suweidi 
said that the UAE has already enacted a strong regulatory 
framework, and it conducts trainings and conferences to 
educate people in the UAE and regionally.  He said he thinks 
the main efforts now should be targeted at cultural changes, 
i.e. addressing why people become extremists.  "Your way is 
not always the right way.  We may have different opinions on 
how to approach these issues, but we have the same end 
goals."  Ambassador and Levey both assured the Governor that 
one of the purposes of the JTFCC is to provide a forum for 
the UAE to discuss their approach.  The Governor responded 
positively to this, noting that there could be benefit in 
having a "brainstorming committee."  Governor al Suweidi 
stated that the UAE would need a formal framework for the 
JTFCC.  "I also think we need to plug in some transparency in 
how we do things.  We do not want you to take unilateral 
action without first consulting on issues that concern us." 
Levey explained that the forum could be used as a venue to 
discuss respective views and approaches.  The Governor said 
that the UAE team would consult internally and come back to 
us. 
 
Charities 
--------- 
¶5. (S) The representative from the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs (the UAE ministry that regulates charities) 
did not attend the JTFCC for reported health reasons.  As a 
result, the team was unable to have a full discussion of 
charity regulation and oversight.  Abdulrahim al-Awadi, the 
Executive Director of the Anti-Money Laundering and 
Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU), gave a brief overview of the 
1974 federal law governing charities.  He also noted that in 
1993 the Central Bank issued a regulation that requires 
charities to present their license from the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs in order to open bank accounts in the UAE. 
 Al-Awadi stated his belief that under Islam, end users of 
charitable donations should be identified, but that donors 
should be able to remain anonymous (Note:  It was established 
in a separate meeting reported septel that the rules of Islam 
do not prohibit the government from knowing the identity of 
the donating party).  FBI TFOS Chief Michael Morehart 
described the criminal side of charity enforcement in the 
United States to show that the U.S. brings all resources 
together to take necessary action.  U/S Levey expressed his 
desire to discuss CFT enforcement against charities with the 
UAE in the near future. 
 
¶6. (S) U/S Levey raised the issue of Human Appeal 
International (HAI) and briefly outlined the USG's concerns 
with this UAE-based charity.  Governor al Suweidi said he 
would discuss these concerns with the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs.  (Note: On January 28, SIMO passed a copy of 
the HAI paper to the federal State Security Department, and 
Ambassador provided a copy to the Central Bank Governor.  End 
note.) 
 
Cash Couriers 
------------- 
¶7. (C) Governor al-Suweidi explained that individuals must 
declare cash imports of more than 40,000 dirhams (USD 
10,900).  He stated that the UAE may need to revise the law 
due to the establishment of the GCC Customs Union, and that 
the UAE will include a requirement to declare exports as 
well.  Al-Awadi reported that the Central Bank has conducted 
trainings for customs officials, and he said that customs 
submitted a report indicating that there has been an increase 
in the number of declarations.  He stated that this increase 
indicates that the training and awareness campaigns have paid 
off.  Al-Awadi also noted that some cases of individuals 
failing to declare their imports have been referred to 
judicial authorities, but he was unable to provide any 
details on the cases.  During the January 25 meeting with SSO 
Chief, al-Qemzi noted that SSO and Dubai Customs have agreed 
that Customs officials will confiscate undeclared cash until 
the conclusion of the investigation.  Al-Qemzi noted that he 
has been working with Central Bank officials to close the 
loopholes in the law regarding cash imports, but he did not 
provide specifics on what needed to be changed. 
 
UNSCR 1267 
---------- 
¶8. (C) U/S Levey outlined that the USG is encouraging other 
countries to sponsor UN designations, noting that the UN 1267 
Committee issued a report stating that countries are not 
submitting enough names.  Levey explained the utility of 
naming terrorist supporters and financiers ) if banks do not 
have complete lists of these people and entities, we prevent 
our financial sectors from acting as full partners with us. 
Governor al Suweidi stated that the UAE does not have enough 
resources to be able to do the requisite research to submit a 
name for designation.  He observed that the UAE asked the UN 
a question about Viktor Bout two years ago, and is still 
awaiting an answer.  He noted that designations should not be 
taken lightly.  He also said that the UAE is a small country 
and that since the U.S. has the network, ability, and 
resources, it is logical that it has been able to submit the 
most names for designation. 
 
Iraq Insurgency 
--------------- 
¶9. (S)  Al-Suweidi opened the discussion of this agenda item 
by noting that the UAE has been working with FinCEN requests 
on the lists regarding Iraq insurgency members.  He said they 
are willing to cooperate if the U.S. will provide names of 
people who are potential insurgency members.  He said the UAE 
is willing to watch any individuals we are concerned about. 
U/S Levey mentioned Khalaf al-Dulaymi, an individual 
designated pursuant to UNSCR 1483, which calls on member 
states to freeze the assets of senior officials of the former 
Iraqi regime.  Levey thanked the Governor for his 
cooperation. 
 
Freezing vs. Closing Accounts 
----------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) After the JTFCC meeting, the Central Bank Governor 
hosted a lunch for the delegation.  During lunch, U/S Levey, 
Ambassador, and the Central Bank Governor discussed 
non-proliferation and Iran.  U/S Levey proposed that the 
Central Bank take the initiative in recommending to banks 
that they close off business with entities known or believed 
to be engaging in illicit financial activity with regard to 
WMD.  The Governor was receptive to this possibility, noting 
that it is considerably easier for the Central Bank to close 
an account than it is to freeze an account. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Dubai State Security - Shamsi, Muslim Brotherhood 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶11. (S) On January 25, U/S Levey met with Dubai State 
Security Organization (SSO) Chief Mohammed al-Qemzi. 
Ambassador opened the meeting by outlining the JTFCC meeting 
and noting her disappointment that no one from Dubai 
attended.  Al-Qemzi noted that the SSO would have 
participated had they been invited by the federal 
authorities.  Al-Qemzi outlined a computer software program 
that SSO has developed for the Central Bank that tracks 
transactions of the small exchange houses and hawalas.  He 
said that the software is a database with search tools, but 
he noted that the Central Bank "needs to be convinced" to 
implement it. 
 
¶12. (S) U/S Levey raised his concerns about al-Qa'ida 
financier Salah Salim Muhammad Ghanim al-Shamsi.  Al-Qemzi, 
confirming that al-Shamsi is an admitted financier of 
al-Qa'ida and UBL, noted that since Shamsi's activities 
predated the UAE's 2004 law criminalizing terrorist 
financing, the UAE regrettably could not prosecute him for 
his actions.  Al-Qemzi, clearly prepared to respond, read 
verbatim from a notebook the terms of Shamsi's release (NOTE: 
Shamsi spent a combined 15 months in detention according to 
Dubai SSO).  According to al-Qemzi, Shamsi cannot leave the 
country, he has to report on a regular basis to an officer, 
he was forced to change his phone numbers so that his past 
associates cannot contact him, the license for his religious 
education center in Sharjah was cancelled, he cannot leave 
Dubai without permission of the SSO, and he is not allowed to 
visit the bookstore that he previously owned. Al-Qemzi noted 
that Shamsi needed financial assistance to pay off his debts, 
which was provided by the Ruler of Sharjah. Al-Qemzi stated 
that Shamsi no longer had intelligence value, as Dubai SSO 
has debriefed him on everything he knows. U/S Levey, 
referencing Shamsi's substantial post-9/11 support for 
terrorism, pressed al-Qemzi on the idea of designating 
Shamsi. U/S Levey explained that the USG wants to hold people 
like him accountable to send a message that it is 
unacceptable to finance terrorism.  Al-Qemzi stated that he 
thinks the provisions of Shamsi's parole are very "strict and 
severe."  U/S Levey pointed out that Shamsi would have likely 
received a 15 year prison sentence had his acts been 
committed after the terrorism law took effect. Al-Qemzi said 
that the UAE community associated with Shamsi knows about his 
actions and that they are unacceptable, and he said he does 
not see why the UAE needs to make the case public in the 
international area.  "This would just show people that there 
are extremists in the UAE, and that does not benefit us." 
Al-Qemzi also said that making Shamsi's actions public could 
cause extremists to view him as a hero, and therefore 
al-Qemzi believes that imposing restrictions is more 
effective than publicly designating, adding "I think he is 
suffering enough."  U/S Levey made his disagreement clear. 
 
¶13. (S/NF) Ambassador asked al-Qemzi if there have been any 
financial prosecutions under the 2004 CT law.  Al-Qemzi said 
that in 2005 Ali Sa'id al-Kindi was sentenced to a seven year 
imprisonment, but he observed that the case has not been made 
public. 
 
¶14. (S) When U/S Levey provided al-Qemzi with a copy of the 
HAI paper, al-Qemzi glanced at it and immediately responded 
"Yes, they are run by the Muslim Brotherhood."  He then 
provided an overview of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the 
UAE, noting that they have a secret network and agenda, 
dealing with terrorists privately while presenting a moderate 
face publicly. Al-Qemzi complained that the MB has 
unjustifiably enjoyed a great deal of political support in 
Europe and the U.S. as a moderate Muslim organization. "I do 
not worry about takfiris, because I know what they look like. 
 I worry about the Muslim Brotherhood."  He said that the MB 
has worked to infiltrate the UAE's NGOs (specifically the 
teachers, judges, and jurists associations), businesses and 
government institutions to try to have some influence and 
control over them.  He said that local MB members were part 
of a much larger, hierarchical MB network, under the 
direction of the International Muslim Brotherhood and its 
General Guide Muhammad Akif, dedicated to the establishment 
of an Islamic empire. Al-Qemzi noted that the groups 
associated with the MB actively try to frustrate steps the 
UAE takes to counter the jihad extremist ideology, for 
example MB groups complain publicly over things like the 
UAE's moderate, unified sermons in the mosques.  He concluded 
by saying that one of the challenges in tracking and 
targeting the MB network internationally is that it is good 
at isolating itself.  "When a part of the organization wants 
to engage more directly in violence, they create a breakaway 
group, and this makes it hard to connect the group directly 
to the MB." As such, Dubai SSO considers the MB to be &very 
dangerous8 and offered to share information with the USG on 
its international activities. (Comment: In the past, Embassy 
and SIMO officers have felt that UAE officials remarks about 
the MB in the UAE were references to extremists in general -- 
and not to a specific, organized group.  Al-Qemzi's comments 
indicate the SSO is concerned about the MB as an 
organization.  SIMO in Dubai will follow up with the SSO to 
get more details on SSO's perception of the MB in the UAE. 
End comment.) 
¶15. (S) U/S Levey told al-Qemzi that the U.S. is concerned 
about unidentified al-Qa'ida financier Saleh al Suweidi, who 
is reportedly in the UAE. U/S Levey told al-Qemzi that the 
Saudis raised al Suweidi with him during his January 21-22 
visit to KSA, offering that they had a phone number 
associated with him (Note: FBI TFOS will try to obtain and 
pass this number to UAEG.  End note.).  U/S Levey noted that 
the Saudis said the UAE knew of Saleh al-Suweidi.  Al-Qemzi 
clearly did not seem to understand who U/S Levey was talking 
about, but he said he would check into the matter and follow 
up with liaison.  (Note: The discussion between al-Qemzi and 
U/S Levey on nonproliferation financing issues will be 
reported septel.) 
 
 
---------------------- 
Comment and Next Steps 
---------------------- 
 
¶16. (S) Comment.  When Homeland Security Advisor Fran 
Townsend initially proposed the idea of a JTFCC to Governor 
al-Suweidi during her February 2005 meeting, the Governor 
expressed skepticism, asking how we found the current 
relationship with the Central Bank "lacking" (ref B).  Once 
the proposal for the JTFCC had been passed to the UAEG, 
Ambassador again discussed it with the Central Bank Governor 
(ref C).  Governor al-Suweidi said that the political 
leadership would decide whether a JTFCC was established or 
not.  In order to obtain the support of the UAE's senior 
leaders, Ambassador discussed the JTFCC with ruling family 
members Sheikhs Abdullah bin Zayed, Hamdan bin Zayed, and 
Mohammed bin Zayed.  MinState for Foreign Affairs Sheikh 
Hamdan instructed the Central Bank to form the committee, and 
he specified which federal agencies were to participate. 
Despite these instructions, the Central Bank Governor clearly 
was not on board with the concept at the beginning of the 
JTFCC meeting.  Although the JTFCC got off to a rocky start, 
Governor al-Suweidi acknowledged at the conclusion of the 
lunch that there are subjects of mutual interest worth 
discussing in a forum like this. 
 
¶17. (S/NF) Next Steps.  Ambassador will continue to work with 
members of the ruling al-Nahyan family to maintain momentum 
for the JTFCC.  She will note disappointment with the fact 
that no one from Dubai was present at the meeting (despite 
Dubai being the financial center of the UAE) and that we were 
unable to discuss charity regulation due to the absence of a 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs representative. 
Meanwhile, LEGAT and SIMO will put in the pipeline a series 
of requests to liaison and law enforcement officials, framing 
the requests "as a follow-up to the JTFCC..."  This will set 
the marker so that at the next JTFCC meeting we can measure 
progress (or lack thereof) on actions and responses.  If the 
Governor continues to request "formalizing" the committee's 
role and putting in "transparency," Embassy will explain that 
this is to be a brainstorming and coordinating committee, and 
that (as outlined in the JTFCC proposal paper) day-to-day 
interaction between the USG and the UAEG will continue as it 
did before. 
 
¶18. (C) Embassy proposes that the second JTFCC meeting be 
held in May, and that it should focus on enforcement, in 
order to focus the discussion on actions taken rather than 
lists of laws and regulations.  Embassy suggests proposing 
three subgroups for the JTFCC - Enforcement, Charities, and 
Measures Against Financiers in order to focus the 
participants and facilitate discussion by other UAEG 
agencies. 
SISON