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PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #0408/01 0390800
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080800Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3427
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 5810
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 000408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI (RSMYTH) 
STATE PASS USTR FOR SDONNELY, DBELL, KCLAYMAN 
TREASURY FOR SLEVEY, RWERNER, JHINDI, WLANGFORD, PBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/13/2015 
TAGS: EFIN PTER ETRD ECON AE
SUBJECT: TREASURY U/S LEVEY MEETS WITH ADIA 
 
REF: 05 ABU DHABI 4105 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHELE J. SISON FOR REASONS 1.4 B & D 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 9. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary.  On January 24, Treasury Under Secretary 
Stuart Levey met with Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) 
officials to discuss security of assets and tax issues in the 
context of ongoing U.S. - UAE FTA negotiations.  ADIA 
officials explained that they were not seeking a prohibition 
on freezing UAEG assets or even prior notification, but that 
they were seeking a transparent way to resolve any asset 
freezes that might occur.  In response to U/S Levey's 
questions, they acknowledged that the risk of asset freezing 
was slight, but stressed that they were dealing with a 
perception on the part of Emiratis that the risk was greater 
than it might be in reality.  They also implied that 
resolution could increase ADIA's investments in the U.S. 
(currently around a third of their portfolio).  End summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence Stuart Levey met with Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) Executive Director Salem Al-Mazroui, ADIA 
Senior Legal Advisor William Brown, and ADIA Tax Advisor 
Robert Peake on January 24 to discuss security of assets and 
tax issues related to the Free Trade Agreement being 
negotiated with the UAE.  Al-Mazroui noted that ADIA had had 
good discussions with representatives from Treasury,s Office 
of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) during the January 16-17 FTA 
finance discussions in Washington, but also wanted to explain 
their concerns to U/S Levey (Note: OFAC Director Werner was 
not at the Jan 16-17 meetings).  U/S Levey replied that the 
USG viewed the UAE as partners and that, even without an FTA, 
the UAE should always feel free to discuss its concerns with 
the USG.  Al-Mazroui stated that the tax discussions had gone 
well from ADIA's specific point of view, though he cautioned 
that he was not speaking for the UAEG as a whole on tax. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Al-Mazroui then turned the discussion to security of 
ADIA's assets from freezing or seizure.  He explained that he 
wanted ADIA and the UAEG in general to feel more comfort that 
the U.S. was a safe investment destination.  He emphasized 
that every time the U.S. froze assets it had an impact on 
investor confidence.  U/S Levey acknowledged the risk to 
investor confidence, but stated that he believed and knew 
that Treasury Secretary Snow believed that the U.S. was still 
a safe and appealing investment destination, and were 
committed to keeping it that way.  Levey added that -- 
statistically -- the risk of ADIA assets being frozen was 
slight, adding that he understood that the UAE had been 
affected when the U.S. froze the assets of ARBIFT.  Levey 
asked if Al-Mazroui could enlighten him on where ADIA saw the 
risk. 
 
¶5. (C) Al-Mazroui noted that as a global financial 
institution, ADIA invested everywhere and could wind up 
partnering with a country that the U.S. would later decide to 
act against.  He turned the discussion over to Brown to give 
a more detailed description of ADIA.  Brown explained that 
ADIA was the investment arm of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and 
the way that Abu Dhabi "monetized" surplus funds from its oil 
exports.  As such, he added, ADIA had a special status, 
participating as part of the UAE negotiating team in tax 
treaty or FTA negotiations, for example.  He said that ADIA 
was one of only three Abu Dhabi government entities that were 
responsible for the Emirate's revenues and expenditures.  The 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) sends surplus funds to 
ADIA.  ADIA invests and manages the funds -- and serves as a 
"checkbook" for the government.  The Abu Dhabi Department of 
Finance handles the budget for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and 
is the only organization that can draw from ADIA's assets. 
(Note: Brown's remarks track what the Under Secretary at the 
Department of Finance has told us.  ADIA gets any budget 
surplus and finances any deficit.  With recent high oil 
prices, Abu Dhabi's budget has moved back into surplus and 
Abu Dhabi is again paying into its investment fund.  Because 
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi directly and indirectly funds much 
of the UAE's federal expenditures, ADIA is by extension the 
"check book" for the UAE.  End Note.) 
 
¶6. (C) Brown acknowledged that the risk to ADIA of having its 
assets frozen was slight.  It was the perception of risk, 
however, that ADIA was trying to deal with.  Brown said that 
over 80% of ADIA's large portfolio was in market traded 
securities.  The rest was in real estate, private equities, 
and other alternative investments.  Generally, he said, 
 
ABU DHABI 00000408  002 OF 002 
 
 
ADIA's strategic plan called for investing about one-third of 
its assets in the U.S.  As the portfolio increased, however, 
he explained that ADIA had difficulties maintaining or 
expanding its U.S. investment base if it could not moderate 
its investment risk (including the risk of an asset freeze.) 
Peake added that as ADIA continues to develop its asset base, 
it could invest in a joint venture or private equity 
arrangement, where the USG had -- or developed -- concerns 
about some of the partners.  In that case, he said, ADIA's 
assets -- and reputation  -- could be compromised.  Ideally, 
the USG would let ADIA know of its concerns and ADIA could 
extricate itself.  He speculated that a lack of clear 
communication had hindered the UAEG's and the USG's ability 
to resolve the freeze of ARBIFT's assets. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Brown explained that ADIA was looking for a 
consultation mechanism should assets be frozen.  He noted 
that Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser Al-Suwaidi (a former 
ADIA employee) had wanted the U.S. to provide prior 
notification before freezing any assets, but that ADIA had 
argued that the USG would not be able to agree to this 
condition.  ADIA drafted a side letter to the FTA, which the 
UAEG presented in the May 2005 FTA negotiating round.  The 
letter states "No party shall continue to hold any such 
assets which it contends are subject to seizure for a period 
greater than 30 days without establishing the propriety of 
such seizure under standards and procedures to be mutually 
agreed upon not later than 180 days following the entry into 
force of the Agreement (FTA)."  Brown briefly described what 
he saw as the "standards and procedures."  What the UAE was 
asking for was an "obligation to consult" after assets were 
frozen, but not an "obligation to remedy."  If the U.S. 
wanted to continue to freeze the assets of an ally after 
high-level consultations, he noted, it could continue to do 
so.  The consultation mechanism, however, would give a 
transparent way for both sides to try and resolve the 
problem.  Brown suggested that the first round of 
consultation would be the "Financial Services Committee" 
provided for in the FTA.  The next level up would likely be 
at the undersecretary level (or possibly the ministerial 
level for the UAE) and the third level would be at the 
political level (i.e., the Secretary of Treasury for the 
U.S.). 
 
¶8. (SBU) U/S Levey said that he understood ADIA's concerns, 
althugh he stressed that the risk appeared to be 
"miiscule."  He said that he was open to the idea of rying 
to work something out that could address the UAE's concerns, 
but stressed that any decision would need to be an 
interagency one. 
 
¶9. (C) Action Request:  This continues to be an important 
issue for the UAE.  Post requests Washington interagency 
guidance as to whether the UAE's proposal is workable or 
desirable, both from a bilateral relations perspective and 
from the perspective of removing one of the UAE's concerns 
impeding negotiations of an FTA with the U.S.  End Action 
Request. 
SISON