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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNAUS IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FOURTH MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
WORKING GROUP 
 
REF: A. ABIDJAN 180 
     ¶B. 05 ABIDJAN 1333 
     ¶C. 05 ABIDJAN 1177 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Jim Wojtasiewicz, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary.   Prime Minister Banny briefed the fourth 
meeting of the International Working Group (IWG) on his plans 
to adopt the IWG's road map as his government's work plan. 
In light of the four days of street disturbances in reaction 
to the previous IWG's stance on the National Assembly, it was 
decided to echo the UN Secretary General's January 29 
statement, expressing disappointment that President Gbagbo 
extended the Assembly's mandate with full legislative powers, 
and reiterating the importance of implementing both UNSCR 
1633 and the decisions of the IWG.  Members of the IWG 
criticized UN High Representative for Elections (HRE) 
Monteiro for taking so long to issue a ruling on whether the 
disputed election for the internal officers of the 
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) was valid, and then 
not coming down squarely on one side of the question. 
However, the IWG endorsed Monteiro's ruling and his call for 
a political compromise on this issue to be reached urgently. 
The Mediation Group, tasked with day-to-day mediation on 
behalf of the IWG, was criticized for not doing enough actual 
mediation, but defended itself by saying it had been rebuffed 
by Prime Minister Banny.  The French sought to insert into 
the communique a call for the Security Council to increase UN 
troop levels, but this was removed at U.S. request.  It is a 
welcome development that Prime Minister Banny is adopting the 
IWG's road map as his government's work plan, but the group 
risks losing its effectiveness unless the Mediation Group 
becomes more active.  Monthly meetings at the ministerial 
level are not enough to have a significant impact on the 
Ivoirian political process.  End Summary. 
 
 ¶2. (U) The IWG held its fourth meeting in Abidjan on 
February 17.  With the passing of the AU chairmanship last 
month to Republic of the Congo President Dennis 
Sassou-Nguesso, for the first time Congolese Foreign Minister 
Rudolphe Adada co-chaired the IWG together with Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Pierre Schori. 
 Also in attendance were French Minister Delegate for 
Cooperation, Development and the French Speaking Countries 
Brigitte Girardin; Ghanaian Foreign Minister Nana Akufo-Addo; 
Guinean Foreign Minister Fatouma Sidibe Kaba; Nigeran Foreign 
Minister Aichatou Mindaoudou; Nigerian Foreign Minister 
Oluyemi Adeniji; South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana 
Dlamini Zuma; ECOWAS Executive Secretary Mohamed Ibn Chambas; 
UN High Representative for Elections in Cote d'Ivoire (HRE) 
Antonio Monteiro; and representatives from the United States, 
Benin, the United Kingdom, the AU, the EU, the International 
Organization of French Speaking Countries, and the World Bank. 
 
¶3. (C) The meeting was once again preceded by a breakfast for 
heads of delegation.  French Minister Girardin felt the need 
to emphasize to the other delegation heads that France has no 
economic interests whatsoever in the three most important 
sectors of Cote d'Ivoire's economy -- cocoa, coffee and 
petroleum -- and therefore clearly does not have 
imperialistic designs here.   SRSG Schori noted the delicacy 
of the National Assembly issue, after pro-Gbagbo militias 
blocked streets and attacked UN installations for four days 
after last month's meeting to protest the IWG's stance on 
this issue.  South African Foreign Ministe Zuma said she 
could go along with making a statment on this issue in the 
communique but it woul need to be carefully discussed. 
 
¶4. (C) As at te previous two meetings, after the 
introductory peeches Prime Minister Banny addressed the 
group. Banny briefed in detail on the seminar he chaired 
February 9-11 in Yamoussoukro to discuss with hi cabinet the 
implementation of the IWG's road ma (ref A).  Indeed, Banny 
said the purpose of theseminar was for his government to 
appropriate the road map as its own work plan for bringing 
the country out of its political crisis.  He was upbeat about 
the results: all ministers attended except a few who were 
traveling, and actively participated. Most notably New Forces 
(FN) leader Guillaume Soro was there, for the first time 
attending a cabinet meeting of the Banny government.  Banny 
promised he would soon hold a second seminar devoted to the 
country's economic problems.  He spoke at length about the 
need to restore trust, reconciliation and compromise in the 
country, but he branded the National Assembly as an obstacle 
to peace and indicated he would seek to marginalize it. 
Banny said he would personally take charge of the process of 
issuing identity cards and registering voters.  He insisted 
that his "tandem" with President Gbagbo is working well -- 
Gbagbo likes what Banny is doing and supports him. 
 
 
ABIDJAN 00000190  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (C) In the IWG itself there was extensive discussion of 
how to treat the issue of the National Assembly in the 
meeting's communique.  Some delegations -- Ghana, Spain, 
Niger -- were emphatic that the IWG must stick to its 
principles, not let the pro-Ggbagbo street militias hold a 
veto over everything the IWG does.  Others, most notably 
South Africa, argued for a more cautious approach.  South 
African Foreign Minister Zuma recalled that on January 18 
Nigerian President Obasanjo, as then-AU chairman, appeared to 
back away from the January 15 IWG's stance on this issue, 
issuing a joint communique with President Gbagbo that said 
the IWG had no authority to dissolve the National Assembly 
and did not dissolve it.  Several delegations responded that 
of course the IWG didn't dissolve the National Assembly -- 
its mandate expired December 16.  SRSG Schori elaborated that 
at the January 18 meeting, which he attended, President 
Obasanjo was very clear that the National Assembly should 
remain as only a consultative body, without legislative 
powers, and President Gbagbo seemed to accept this.  This is 
why on January 29 the Secretary General issued a statement 
expressing his disappointment that Gbagbo had subsequently 
used his decree authority to extend the Assembly with full 
legislative powers.  The statement also called on all parties 
to refrain from unilateral action, and reiterated the 
importance of implementing UNSCR 1633 as well as the 
decisions of the IWG.  In the end, consensus was reached that 
the communique should not ignore the issue of the National 
Assembly but should also not return to the question of the 
expiration of its mandate.  Accordingly, it was decided to 
incorporate language from the Secretary General's January 29 
statement. 
 
¶6. (C) There was also considerable discussion about the 
continued, five-month deadlock in the Independent Electoral 
Commission (CEI).  (President Gbagbo's Ivoirian Popular Front 
(FPI) party, backed by a Supreme Court ruling, refuses to 
accept as legitimate the October internal election of CEI 
officers because consultative members were not allowed to 
vote, and the opposition refuses to allow consultative 
members to vote for internal officers or to cede another 
senior position to Gbagbo's camp.)  The previous day, HRE 
Monteiro had issued a ruling that the election was fully 
consistent with the Pretoria agreement, but was not 
consistent with President Gbagbo's July decree enacting the 
necessary legislation to set up the new CEI (ref C). 
(Monteiro's ruling explicitly acknowledged that this means 
Gbagbo's decree is not consistent with the Pretoria agreement 
even though South African President Mbeki as mediator ruled 
that it is (ref B).)  Monteiro declined to rule on whether 
the Pretoria agreement should take precedence over the Gbagbo 
decree, but rather called for President Gbagbo and Prime 
Minister Banny to find a political solution. 
 
¶7. (C) At the IWG, Monteiro came under sharp criticism, 
especially from Nigerian Foreign Minister Adeniji, for taking 
so long to come out with a ruling -- he promised at both the 
January and February IWG's that a ruling was imminent -- and 
then not coming down clearly on one side of the question. 
Monteiro defended his actions animatedly, saying he put a 
compromise solution on the table (an additional senior 
leadership position for FPI) and spent weeks trying to 
persuade the Ivoirian political parties to accept it, but 
they refused.  He had done all he could do.  Monteiro also 
protested that it was unfair to single out the CEI issue when 
all the other elements of the peace process also remain 
stalled.  Congolese co-chair Foreign Minister Adada noted 
that he had met recently with FPI parliamentary leaders, and 
they had indicated they might be willing to accept Monteiro's 
compromise on a one-time basis, only for these upcoming 
presidential and legislative elections.  (Note: However, it 
was clear from Monteiro's presentation that there are also 
opposition parties that turned down his proposal.)  In the 
end it was decided that the communique should explicitly 
endorse Monteiro's ruling that the CEI election was 
consistent with the Pretoria Agreement, and should also 
endorse his call for the Ivoirian parties to reach a 
political compromise urgently (the communique says before the 
beginning of March). 
 
¶8. (C) There was also a heated discussion about the Mediation 
Group's report.  (The Mediation Group is chaired by South 
African Mediation Special Envoy Sokupa, and the other members 
are SRSG Schori, HRE Monteiro, and the local representatives 
of ECOWAS and the AU.  It is tasked with carrying out 
day-to-day mediation on behalf of the IWG, to facilitate the 
implementation of UNSCR 1633.)  Members of the IWG noted that 
while the Mediation Group's report was an excellent review of 
the current situation and the various significant events that 
had taken place since the last IWG meeting, there was nothing 
in it to indicate that the Mediation Group had done any 
 
ABIDJAN 00000190  003 OF 003 
 
 
actual mediation.  SRSG Schori (Sokupa was not present) 
replied that immediately in the wake of the last IWG, 
conditions were not conducive to mediation because of the 
street disturbances.  After that, the group tried to set up 
regular weekly meetings with Prime Minister Banny, as they 
had done with his predecessor, but he declined.  Schori noted 
that there were several recommendations at the end of the 
report suggesting ways that the IWG could task the Mediation 
Group with reinserting itself into the process.  IWG members 
then pointed out that there were six recommendations but only 
one had anything to do with the Mediation Group.  Schori 
reiterated the group's frustration at having been rebuffed by 
Prime Minister Banny.  No mention of the Mediation Group was 
included in the communique. 
 
¶9. (C) France once again sought to insert a paragraph into 
the communique calling on the Security Council to increase UN 
troop levels in Cote d'Ivoire but this was deleted at U.S. 
request. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment.  It is a welcome development that Prime 
Minister Banny plans to adopt the IWG road map as his 
government's work plan.  Beyond that, the IWG was able to 
work out reasonably good, strong but not overly inflammatory, 
communique language on the National Assembly and the CEI, as 
well as a number of other important but less potentially 
explosive issues.  However, the group risks losing its 
effectiveness unless the Mediation Group becomes more active. 
 Communiques emanating from monthly IWG meetings at the 
ministerial level are not enough to have a significant impact 
on the Ivoirian political process. End Comment. 
Hooks