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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000179 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV
SUBJECT: ECHOES OF ARETHA FRANKLIN: THE REBELS WANT RESPECT 
 
 
Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  The Ambassador made a three-day trip to 
Bouake and Korhogo, in New Forces (FN) territory in the 
North, to urge the ex-rebels to help move the political 
process forward.  We found a relatively relaxed security 
environment and a population whose most pressing concerns 
were not the FN, but the lack of water and the continued 
postponement of school exams.  The FN received the Ambassador 
warmly and were receptive to his message.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador made a three-day trip to Bouake and 
Korhogo, in New Forces (FN) territory in the North, February 
12-14. Since the 2002 coup attempt that divided the country, 
no other ambassador accredited to Cote d'Ivoire has made the 
trip to rebel territory by road, spending the night in both 
Bouake and Korhogo.  The Ambassador had discussed this trip 
with both Prime Minister Banny and President Gbagbo, who 
supported the visit as a chance to help move the political 
process forward.  The Ambassador's message to the FN was 
clear:  engage more fully in the peace process, disarm, 
assist in the reunification of the country and help lead Cote 
d'Ivoire out of the current crisis through free, fair, and 
transparent elections.  The Ambassador communicated these 
points to Guillaume Soro, Secretary General of the FN; Hamed 
Bakayoko, FN Army (FAFN) Chief of Staff; his deputy Commander 
Issiaka "Wattao" Ouattarra; Bouake Zone Commander Cherif 
Ousmane; Korhogo Zone Commander Martin Fofie (who was one of 
the three Ivoirians recently sanctioned by the United 
Nations); and other key leaders of the FN. 
 
¶3. (C) The message resonated very well with all parties. 
Soro promised to come to Abidjan to begin participating in 
cabinet meetings within two weeks.  Soro also urged that the 
UN and the international community work with him to address 
his security concerns.  Indeed, the FN's message to the 
Ambassador was that they want to be taken seriously as 
partners in the process; i.e. they want respect.  Soro noted 
that UN SRSG Pierre Schori's recent comments, describing the 
FN as warlords, were not helpful. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador also met with humanitarian workers, 
municipal authorities, imams, the traditional chief of 
Korhogo, and other community leaders.  All parties agreed on 
the need to move forward in the political process but pointed 
out the importance of issuing identification cards to all 
Ivoirians before elections can take place.  When asked about 
their relations with the FN, no community leaders expressed 
any serious grievances.  In Bouake, the FN capital, the 
community leaders seemed to distance themselves somewhat from 
the FN, willing to work with them but not necessarily 
identifying with them.  However, in the predominantly Muslim 
northern city of Korhogo, community leaders seemed proud of 
the FN and pleased that the rebels had taken up their cause. 
 
¶5. (C) Though there had been isolated security incidents, 
security was not a major concern for the community leaders. 
The security environment in Korhogo and Bouake was more 
favorable than that of Abidjan.  The ambiance of both towns 
was peaceful and the motorcades of armed FAFN soldiers were 
regarded with passive stares and occasional waves by the 
townspeople.  We passed more road checkpoints in Abidjan 
between the city limit and the embassy than we encountered 
during our entire trip to the FN zone.  We also did not see 
the same long lines of truckers in the FN zone as in the 
government zone, waiting for hours or even days to get their 
goods through the omnipresent checkpoints. 
 
¶6. (C) While physical security is not a pressing issue for 
the communities, water security clearly is and was raised in 
each meeting.  The water pumps have not been maintained since 
the outbreak of the rebellion and the government in Abidjan 
has refused to send civil servants to repair the pumps that 
are owned by the state.  During the frequent water shortages, 
the population has survived by using local wells. 
 
¶7. (C) Education is also a major concern for the residents of 
Bouake and Korhogo.  The government has not held exams for 
the children in the FN-controlled zone since 2003.  After the 
2002 coup attempt, the government recalled teachers from the 
North, and has not called on them to return.  Communities are 
keeping schools open with the help of volunteer teachers, but 
the numbers of students enrolled are diminishing. Though the 
government cites security as the reason for not redeploying 
the teachers, community leaders in the North are convinced 
that the reasons are more political.  The Minister of 
Education, who is from President Gbagbo's Ivoirian Popular 
Front (FPI) party, has rejected repeated attempts by 
international humanitarian organizations and northern 
community leaders to resolve the government's security 
concerns. 
 
 
ABIDJAN 00000179  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶8. (C) Around town, we noticed that the FN have made an 
effort to keep up a minimum of maintenance, noticeably more 
so in Korhogo than in Bouake.  The road from Bouake to 
Korhogo was recently repaved and was better than the 
government-controlled road north from Abidjan toward Bouake. 
The streets were cleaner in both northern cities, and in 
Korhogo there was significant new construction going on. 
Fofie was proud to show us a cultural center that will soon 
open, brightly covered with murals depicting Senufo culture. 
 
¶9. (C) The hospitality we received in the FN-zone was 
exemplary.  We were met at the entrances to both towns and 
escorted to the offices of the FN, then to our 
accommodations.   FN security was present but not oppressive. 
 During meetings that did not involve the FN, the soldiers 
were not intrusive and left us to meet in private.  Both 
nights we were the honored guests at dinners where numerous 
troupes of dancers from the surrounding areas performed. 
Humanitarian workers were also invited to the dinners, giving 
us a chance to continue our conversations with them in a 
social setting.  Indeed, the FN bent over backwards to make 
sure every element of our visit was a success. 
 
¶10. (U) The Ambassador's visit to the North received 
prominent press coverage in the Ivoirian media and was picked 
up by several international press agencies.  The independent 
and pro-opposition press hailed the length of the visit as a 
strong, visible sign of U.S. engagement in the Ivoirian 
crisis.  The FPI-owned Notre Voie noted that while the U.S. 
Ambassador was looking for solutions to the crisis, the 
French Ambassador was showing his country's support for the 
rebellion. 
 
¶11. (C) COMMENT:  The FN are now trying to persuade the 
population in the North, as well as the other actors in the 
political process, to take them seriously.  While Soro 
himself has not come to Abidjan to participate in the new 
government, all of the other FN ministers have been visible 
in their work and more fully engaged than in the previous 
government.  While the rebels have told PM Banny that they 
will not run as the FN in the next parliamentary elections, 
that does not preclude FN members from running on the tickets 
of opposition political parties.  Indeed, their eagerness for 
respect and a chance to carve out a political future for 
themselves could result in progress for the peace process. 
END COMMENT 
Hooks