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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000150 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV
SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: MOVING THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD 
 
REF: ABIDJAN 00134 
 
Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4 b&d 
 
¶1. (C) Since 2002, the Cote d'Ivoire peace process has gone 
through multiple mediators and mediations including Lome, 
Linas-Marcoussis, Accra, and Pretoria.  Each has petered out 
in turn, leaving Cote d'Ivoire far short of reunification, 
disarmament, and elections.  Per reftel, the new government 
has been slow to launch its agenda, though Prime Minister 
Banny's February 10 seminar in Yamoussoukro to establish the 
responsibilities and priorities of the government, which is 
being attended by the New Forces leader Guillaume Soro, could 
be a positive beginning.  The central theme of any future 
engagement must contain the core message that President 
Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny make their partnership work 
for peace.  While we recognize that USG assistance is limited 
by resource constraints, there are low-cost ways for the US 
to maintain and deepen its engagement in advancing the peace 
process.  We offer the following recommendations: 
 
Political Engagement: 
 
¶2. (C) The new AU President Sassou has indicated that he will 
relaunch the AU mediation effort with the arrival in Abidjan 
of Foreign Minister Adada next week.  It is unclear what form 
Sassou's efforts will take and whether Presidents Mbeki and 
Obasanjo will be central to that mediation.  The USG can 
signal to Sassou that we strongly support the AU mediation 
but the AU needs to be consistent in its message and not 
subject to internal tugs of war. 
 
¶3. (C) Both Washington and the Post should continue to engage 
in the political process with all parties, as we are one of 
the few international actors that is seen as impartial and 
respected by all sides.  The Ambassador will travel to 
rebel-held territory February 12 to press the New Forces on 
the need to participate in the government and move to 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation (DDR).  PM 
Banny and President Gbagbo support this visit. 
 
¶4. (C) The US should continue to be an active participant in 
the International Working Group (IWG) to promote the 
Gbagbo/Banny partnership. 
 
¶5. (C) We understand that UN Secretary General Koffi Annan 
may invite President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny to New 
York as early as February 20.   We should encourage the 
Secretary General to host this meeting. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶6. (C) The New York meeting may also be an opportunity for 
Secretary Rice to meet with President Gbagbo and PM Banny as 
 
SIPDIS 
well to reinforce the importance that the USG places on 
making progress towards reunification, DDR, and free, fair, 
and transparent elections. 
 
¶7. (C) We recommend that Washington consider demarches in 
Ouagadougou and capitals of Cote d'Ivoire's other regional 
neighbors to emphasize the importance of their playing a 
helpful role in the peace process.  The Government of Burkina 
Faso in particular could influence the New Forces to move 
toward disarmament and reunification of the country. 
 
Elections 
 
¶8. (C) We should help the UN to identify a proactive, strong, 
senior-level official as a replacement for the departing UN 
High Representative for Elections Antonio Monteiro. 
 
¶9. (C) We should consider funding for organizations such as 
IFES or NDI to assist with elections support. 
 
¶10. (C) We should also encourage involvement by organizations 
such as the Carter Center. 
 
Identification 
 
¶11. (C) Identification is central to the peace process as 
well as to elections and is of particular concern to the NF. 
We should reinforce the need to complete the identification 
process and to issue new national identification cards in all 
of our discussions, and consider how we might assist this 
process. 
 
Disarmament Demobilization and Reunification 
 
¶12. (C) We believe that US support in the area of 
reintegration and community reconciliation would be 
particularly useful.  We could explore ways of doing this 
through the NGO community or more directly should elections 
be held and 508 sanctions lifted. 
 
ABIDJAN 00000150  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶13. (C) DOD should also consider committing a small 
transformation study team from the US Joint Forces Command to 
work with the FANCI Chief-of-Staff and the New Forces 
Chief-of-Staff to develop a shared vision for the army's 
reunification. 
 
¶14. (C) DOD should also consider a combined civil-military 
team to work on the need to reinsert former combatants into 
civil society.  Current disarmament plans focus on 
disarmament and demobilization but give little attention to 
reintegration. 
 
ONUCI 
 
¶15. (C) The redeployment of civil servants to the north is 
critical to the reunification of the country.  Both in 
Abidjan and in New York we should urge the UN to exercise 
greater flexibility in the redeployment of troops from the 
Zone of Confidence to the north to facilitate the return of 
the civil servants. 
 
¶16. (C) UNDPKO should work to develop a more rapid 
redeployment process to provide greater flexibility in moving 
troops from missions outside Cote d'Ivoire to backfill gaps 
in ONUCI's coverage, particularly in times of crisis. 
 
¶17. (C) Though it is a bit premature at this point, we should 
also begin to look at our post-election engagement, which 
will include the need to expeditiously lift 508 sanctions so 
that we can resume assistance programs and DOD can resume 
cooperation programs with a new Ivoirian military. 
 
¶18. (C) Immediately following credible elections, we should 
hold an extraordinary AGOA review for Cote d'Ivoire. 
Bringing Cote d'Ivoire back into AGOA based largely on the 
tremendous political progress that elections represent would 
be a strong endorsement of the newly elected government. 
Hooks