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PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0136/01 0391630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081630Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0935
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0443
RUEHRO/USMISSION ROME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABIDJAN 000136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID ADM 
SIPDIS 
 
USAID FOR USAID/A, DCHA/AA, DCHA/FFP, DCHA/OTI 
USAID FOR DCHA/OFDA MMARX, CPRATT 
STATE FOR PRM, IO, AF 
NSC FOR JMELINE 
DAKAR FOR USAID/WARO/OFDA 
ACCRA FOR USAID/WARP 
USUN FOR TMALY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 
TAGS: EAID PREF PHUM WFP IV LI
SUBJECT: MORE ON VIOLENCE IN GUIGLO AND VULNERABILITY OF 
IDPS THERE 
 
REF: ABIDJAN 106 
 
Classified By: OFDA Principal Regional Advisor Regina Davis 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 -------- 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The humanitarian community is still reeling from the 
violent attacks that took place mid-January in Guiglo against 
their offices and staff.  Providing basic emergency 
assistance to the camps of refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) in Guiglo is the top priority, but security 
overshadows all efforts.  The protection of the IDPs is a 
critical concern at this juncture.  Although there are no 
good alternatives for them, all agree that the IDPs are not 
safe in Guiglo.  Hard choices regarding their future must be 
made before they potentially become the next targets of 
violence in Guiglo.  End Summary. 
 
----------- 
Background 
----------- 
 
¶2.  (U) USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA) Principal Regional Advisor (PRA) for West and North 
Africa visited Abidjan 30 January - 01 February to attend 
meetings concerning the mid-January violence in Guiglo.  A 
meeting of donors with heads of agencies took place on 30 
January, followed by an interagency humanitarian coordination 
meeting (IAHCC) on 31 January, which donors also attended. 
The meetings followed the UN's security assessment of Guiglo 
28-29 January and were chaired by the acting UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator (HC), Youssouf Oomar, the UNICEF country 
representative.  In addition, the PRA held side meetings with 
heads of UN agencies and NGOs. 
 
---------------------------- 
Security Concerns in Guiglo 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) In the donors meeting 30 January, the head of the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
presented a verbal summary of the findings of the UN security 
assessment.  The discussions with Guiglo authorities were 
described as sobering.  They relayed that the U.N. Office in 
Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) is not impartial and denied 
broadcasting any messages of hate or giving any directions 
for attacking humanitarian offices or staff.  They requested 
humanitarian organizations to return to Guiglo.  The 
authorities also asked the UN to make reparations to the 
families for the deaths of the five victims that were shot by 
UNOCI troops. 
 
¶4.  (C) The UN security mission also met with the youth, 
which was said to be the most difficult meeting.  The youth 
demanded that if the NGOs and UN returned that they be given 
jobs and that income-generating activities be created for 
them.  They also said the IDPs were not part of Guiglo. 
 
¶5.  (C) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
had conducted its own security assessment a few days prior 
and reported that it was troubled by the fact that the Guiglo 
authorities took no responsibility for their actions, nor 
realized the gravity of what had occurred. 
 
¶6.  (C) The UN Security Officer was present at the IAHCC and 
recommended to humanitarian organizations to get guarantees 
of security from the Guiglo authorities before returning. 
The PRA challenged this remark, as she felt guarantees of 
security from the same authorities who broadcast specific 
instructions for attacks are hollow.  The authorities would 
surely provide assurances, and if directed by Abidjan to do 
otherwise (as all agree that the directions came from 
Abidjan), they would follow those instructions regardless of 
any guarantees.  Likewise with the Armed Forces of Cote 
d'Ivoire (FANCI), which provided shelter to humanitarian 
staff in Guiglo, but turned a blind eye to the destruction. 
The FANCI would probably be helpful, unless or until they 
 
ABIDJAN 00000136  002 OF 003 
 
 
received other instructions from their headquarters.  ICRC 
stated that tangible guarantees should be sought.  In other 
words, don't tell me; show me. 
 
------------------------- 
The Quandary of the IDPs 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) outlined 
its plan to accelerate repatriation of the Liberian refugees 
from Peacetown Camp in Guiglo, as outlined in ref tel.  UNHCR 
also recognized that the Liberians have a particular 
relationship with their Ivoirian neighbors so their security 
is more assured than that of the IDPs. 
 
¶8.  (C) The two Nicla camps housing almost 7,000 IDPs (of 
Burkina and Malian descent) pose a much greater problem in 
terms of security and their future.  For the last three 
years, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) has 
been managing the two camps and although all its local staff 
were evacuated to Abidjan, its office in Abidjan has 
maintained daily contact with the IDPs via telephone.  The 
IDPs have also sent IOM a letter.  In meetings during the 
three days, various options for the IDPs were discussed, but 
with no conclusions.  The PRA stressed the following two 
points to IOM and others: 
 
¶A.  (C) The international community (IC) needs to have a 
frank discussion with the IDPs regarding their security and 
their options.  After the violence that occurred in Guiglo 
and the departure of the UNOCI Battalion, they should have no 
illusions that the IC can provide protection for them.  Even 
though this is a difficult message to deliver, it is our 
responsibility to say it. 
 
A.1.  (C) Comment:  In our global discussions about 
protection for IDPs, such a message goes against the 
humanitarian community's philosophy and against the spirit of 
The Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement, but in this 
scenario, the IC has a responsibility to be honest with these 
people.  At the moment, the IC has a very limited presence in 
Guiglo (only Medecins Sans Frontieres/France (MSF/F) and 
Caritas remain), and the PRA would estimate it would be quite 
some time before humanitarian organizations re-establish any 
full-time presence in Guiglo.  End Comment. 
 
¶B.  (C) The IDPs must make a difficult, but necessary, 
realistic decision about their future.  The IC will try to 
help them as best as it can to support their choice, but hard 
choices must be taken in the very near future, as we are all 
concerned about their safety.  The IDPs may be the next 
target in Guiglo.  We have known that this camp is not 
tenable in the long term.  The IC has been avoiding making 
decisions about these people, but now it must be done. 
 
¶B. 1. (C) Comment.  The IDPs have no good alternatives.  They 
state in their letter to IOM that they cannot return to their 
ancestral countries because their spirit is in Cote d'Ivoire 
and their plantations.  They say it is still too unsafe for 
them to return to the plantations (further west of Guiglo) 
they fled in 2002 and that they are tired of seeing their 
families and friends being killed by machetes of the Guere. 
They are afraid to stay where they are-and so should they be. 
 They ask IOM to direct them to a country where they can work 
in peace.  "Our sole wish is to leave this country," states 
the letter.  (Apparently, the IDPs are ignoring the 
contradiction between declining to return to their ancestral 
countries because their spirit is in Cote d'Ivoire and 
expressing the strong desire to leave the country.)  The PRA 
suspects they are hoping to be moved to a third country, just 
as the Liberian refugees do.  End Comment. 
 
--------------- 
Some Progress 
---------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) A subsequent smaller meeting was held 3 February with 
ICRC, UNHCR, IOM, UN World Food Program (WFP), and European 
Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), as ECHO is funding IOM. 
 In this meeting, the group decided that it would be 
 
ABIDJAN 00000136  003 OF 003 
 
 
impossible in the immediate future to evacuate the IDPs from 
Guiglo because of the "political implications," and that 
urgent humanitarian assistance would be provided in the short 
term (through February) while searching for a long-term 
solution.  At the same time, the HC should condemn the hate 
messages broadcast via radio and put in place measures to 
control the radio transmissions.  The HC should also convey 
the concerns of the humanitarian community to the highest 
levels of the Ivoirian government.  The UN hopes to use the 
upcoming visit of Jan Egland, the Under-Secretary-General of 
OCHA, to reinforce these messages during his visit to Cote 
d'Ivoire February 14 and 15. 
 
¶10.  (C) Lastly, the group stated that the UNOCI Force 
Commander should immediately obtain from the Chief of Staff 
of the FANCI and the Commander of the Gendarmerie a plan to 
put in place a mechanism to physically secure the Nicla 
camps.  The group will also ask ONUCI to organize a mechanism 
by which to call forward the Quick Reaction Forces of the 
French Licorne, if needed. 
 
-------------- 
Final Comment 
-------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Finding a solution for the IDPs and refugees is not 
going to be easy, and may even be a bit messy, but is 
something that must be pushed at this juncture.  The UN has 
demonstrated that it cannot protect the 
Burkinabe/Malian-origin IDPs and the Liberians are a 
potential source of mercenary recruits for the Ivoirian 
conflict.  The UN should consider providing a package of 
incentives to encourage the refugees to return to Liberia and 
the IDPs to return to their homes or ancestral countries or 
resettle elsewhere in Cote d'Ivoire.  Not to do so would 
leave the international community responsible for their 
welfare but unable to provide for it. 
HOOKS 
Hooks