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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000134 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC EFIN IV
SUBJECT: COTE D,IVOIRE'S TRANSITION: STRUGGLING TO GET OFF 
THE GROUND 
 
REF: A) ABIDJAN 44 B) 2005 ABIDJAN 2071 C) 2005 
     ABIDJAN 2079 D) ABIDJAN 112 
 
Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The October 6 decision by the African Union 
(AU) that President Gbagbo should remain as head of state and 
a new Prime Minister be appointed to bring the country to 
disarmament and elections has failed to generate the 
hoped-for momentum among the Ivoirian actors.  The peace 
process remains chilled if not frozen.  Since the new Cabinet 
was announced on December 28, it has barely met and achieved 
little of substance.  President Gbagbo continues his 
maneuvering to undermine the Prime Minister's authority, just 
as he did with Banny's predecessor.  During the January 16-20 
street demonstrations (ref A), Gbagbo demonstrated how easily 
he could trump the two most important cards in Banny's deck: 
control over the Defense and Security forces (FDS) and 
Ivoirian Radio and Television (RTI).  Banny has yet to prove 
he can play his third important card, the Treasury.  The 
previous Finance Minister, a key Gbagbo supporter, refuses to 
vacate his office.  Banny's credibility has suffered, 
tensions and intimidation in the south are gradually 
increasing, and it is unlikely that presidential elections 
will be held by October 2006 as scheduled.  End summary. 
 
CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION 
 
¶2. (C) Banny's efforts to organize elections, disarm the 
rebels, and dismantle the militias take place within a 
climate characterized by fear and intimidation.  The January 
16-20 street violence in Abidjan and western Cote d'Ivoire by 
the Young Patriots, with complicity from the FDS, showed that 
Gbagbo remains in control.  The FDS ignored Banny's authority 
and he even had to go into hiding for a period.  And the 
Defense Minister, according to Banny, was practically held 
against his will for several hours by members of the FDS.  In 
the western town of Guiglo, which is nominally under military 
rule, Young Patriots chased away a UN Bangladeshi battalion 
and UN humanitarian agencies and carried out extensive 
looting, including of military materiel and ordnance and of 
7,000 tons of rice from the World Food Program. 
 
¶3. (C) In Abidjan, as has become their wont during periods of 
unrest, Gbagbo supporters took over state-owned RTI 
(broadcast authority), delivering a very public blow to 
Banny's authority.  Serges Koffi, the president of the 
thuggish, pro-Gbagbo student union, FESCI, who led the 
takeover, told us later that his actions were justified 
because RTI was not covering the protests.  He also warned 
ominously that Yacouba Kebe, the Director General of RTI, 
should be more careful in the future.  Koffi's threats and 
those of other Gbagbo supporters suggest increasing boldness 
on their part in attempting to intimidate the opposition. 
Should the Young Patriots take to the streets again, their 
actions will not only raise tensions and undermine the peace 
process and the prospects for elections by October, they will 
also further weaken the economy.  During the January 
protests, Ivoirian businessmen, particularly transporters and 
petty traders, suffered millions of dollars in losses.  More 
violence will sap business confidence and exacerbate 
unemployment. 
 
BUT THE (NON) GOVERNING CONTINUES 
 
¶4. (C) There is no sign that the government is seized with 
accomplishing its urgent mission.  Banny's first two 
priorities should be Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and organizing 
elections.  However, Banny did not even look at the DDR 
timetable prepared by the International Working Group (IWG) 
until January 12, over a month after taking up his post.  And 
when UN High Representative for Elections Monteiro met with 
Banny to consult on how to break the deadlock in the 
Independent Electoral Commission, Banny made clear, according 
to UN sources, that this was Monteiro's problem to solve. 
Nothing substantive has emerged from the few cabinet meetings 
that have been held.  According to Minister Mabri 
(Integration and Regional Cooperation), Banny has yet to 
create a team spirit or to mobilize ministers to work 
together.  Five ministers were absent from the last meeting, 
and though rebel leader Guillaume Soro was promoted to the 
second-ranking minister in the cabinet, he remains in the 
north. Banny has yet to release a budget for 2006, the 
country remains in non-accrual status with the World Bank 
(which is supposed to be a major source of financing for DDR) 
and international donors are unlikely to come forward to help 
finance elections in light of the lack of progress. 
 
 
 
ABIDJAN 00000134  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5.  Gbagbo has outmaneuvered Banny and the international 
community by invoking emergency powers to extend the mandate 
of the National Assembly, in which Gbagbo holds an effective 
majority.  His unilateral action is a slap in the face of the 
UN, the International Working Group, and Banny.  Banny has 
made no comment about Gbagbo's decree and has essentially 
acted as though nothing had happened. 
 
 
SNATCHING DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY 
 
¶6. (C)  Banny in short showed promise in forming his team in 
a reasonable period of time, but disappointment is replacing 
promise as he falls short of effectively governing.  Banny 
seeks to avoid confrontation to the point of failing to 
assert himself.  We find it surprising that he can state, and 
perhaps believe, that the January violence did not undermine 
his authority.  With fewer than nine months to go before 
presidential elections, each participant in the political 
process ought to be working urgently to prepare for them, but 
the opposite is happening.  Banny himself, instead of working 
to shore up his support at home, spent the early part of this 
week on a trip to South Africa and later in Republic of the 
Congo meeting with new AU chairman Sassou-Nguesso. 
(Congolese Foreign Minister Adada is expected in Abidjan 
later this week, suggesting that the Congolese, having 
assumed the AU chairmanship, now want to become involved in 
the peace process here.)  The DDR Commission, attached to the 
Prime Minister's office, appears dormant.  Cabinet meetings 
have been few and unproductive, and there is no sign that the 
ministries have accomplished much individually either, 
especially on the key issues of identification and voter 
registration, and redeployment of the civil service to the 
north.  Banny is dealing with a weak hand and it looks 
increasingly unlikely that he will be able to meet the key 
objectives of his government, most importantly elections. 
Hooks