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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO ASEC IV
SUBJECT: GBAGBO USES ARTICLE 48 POWERS TO EXTEND NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY'S MANDATE 
 
REF: ABIDJAN 02078 
 
ABIDJAN 00000112  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Poloff Phaedra Gwyn for reasons 1.4(a) and (b) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The January 27 extension by Presidential 
decree of the Mandate of the National Assembly (NA) has 
further weakened Prime Minister Banny, and continued 
President Gbagbo's challenge to the International 
Community.  The New Forces, who do not have any deputies in 
the assembly, have declared for their part that there is no 
NA.  On January 31, on the heels of Prime Minister Banny's 
mission to South Africa, President Mbeki dispatched a 
"mediation" delegation to Cote d'Ivoire.  The press is 
reporting that the South African delegation considers the 
matter of the National Assembly to be a settled question. 
The New Forces have firmly rebuffed the delegation, 
refusing to meet with its members, it is unclear whether 
the South African visit will have any positive effect on 
the peace process.  End Summary 
 
¶2. (SBU) On January 28, Desire Tagro, President Gbagbo's 
spokesperson, announced on the government-owned television 
station, (RTI), that Gbagbo had invoked emergency powers 
under Article 48 of the Ivoirian constitution to extend the 
mandate of the National Assembly (NA).  In support of 
Gbagbo's action, Tagro cited the December 15 ruling by the 
Ivoirian Constitutional Council, which recommended 
extension of the NA's mandate to preserve the separation of 
powers enshrined in the Ivoirian Constitution.  The 
Constitutional Council also cited language in UNSC 
Resolution 1633, paragraph 11, which calls for the normal 
functioning of Ivoirian institutions until elections are 
held as an additional reason for the extension.  Tagro also 
stated that Gbagbo took this action based on the 
"understanding" he reached with Nigerian President Obasanjo 
and Prime Minister Banny during Obasanjo's visit to Abidjan 
on January 18. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) (Note:  To our knowledge, Gbagbo did not consult 
with Mbeki prior to invoking Article 48 as required by the 
Pretoria II Agreement.  SRSG Pierre Schori disagreed with 
the Constitutional Council's interpretation and publicly 
supported the IWG's subsequent recommendation on January 15 
to recommend that the Ivoirian government not renew the NA' 
s mandate in accordance with the IWG's interpretation of 
the Ivoirian constitution.  It was the January 15 decision 
of the IWG that sparked the mass demonstrations, and 
attacks on the UN Forces and UN Humanitarian sites.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Prime Minister Banny, who was in South Africa the 
day Tagro announced Gbagbo's decision, has not yet released 
a statement commenting on the extension.  However, 
according to the French Ambassador, Banny has stated that 
he was neither consulted nor would he protest the extension 
of the NA mandate.  This information from the French 
confirms the interpretation of the situation shared with us 
by the Secretary General of the UDPCI.  According to the 
UDPCI, Banny has stated that the question of the NA's 
mandate is a political question, and he is not here to 
resolve political questions. 
 
¶5. (C)  Based on Banny's visit to Pretoria, on January 31 
President Mbeki sent a delegation to Cote d'Ivoire.  The 
delegation described as part of the "mediation," which was 
under Mbeki's direction until the AU took back control in 
November 2005,  seems to be a unilateral effort by the 
South African President.  Defense Minister Mosiuoa Lekota 
and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, 
will lead the delegation.  The delegation's stated reason 
for its visit is to assess the "global situation in Cote d' 
Ivoire," which includes looking at progress toward 
elections.  The delegation will meet with President Gbagbo, 
Prime Minister Banny, the ruling FPI party and the main 
opposition parties.  It has also expressed an interest in 
traveling to Bouake to meet with the New Forces. 
 
¶6. (C) However, the New Forces, which declared that it 
"will not join a process in which the National Assembly 
continues its obstructionist role," have decided to be 
equally as obstructionist by refusing to receive the South 
African delegation in Bouake.  A New Forces communiquQ 
released January 31, referred to the restructuring of the 
international community's involvement in the peace process 
based on UNSC Resolution 1633 and invited South Africa to 
rejoin the IWG and AU efforts. 
 
¶7. (C) Opposition newspapers have been uncharacteristically 
understated in their denouncement of Gbagbo's decision.  If 
the NA were dissolved, opposition party deputies would also 
lose their salaries and benefits and the lack of vocal 
 
ABIDJAN 00000112  002 OF 002 
 
 
protest over the decree to extend the mandate reflects 
dissent among the rank and file of the opposition parties 
who want to keep their Assemblymen privileges.  The 
strongest protest against Gbagbo's decree has come from UN 
Sec. General Koffi Annan, who called the decree 
"surprising" and not in conformity with the report he 
received from Obasanjo and the UN SRSG on the outcome of 
Obasanjo's January 18 visit. 
 
¶8. (C) On January 30, the French Ambassador told Ambassador 
Hooks of his government's pique at Gbagbo's recent gambit. 
However, given that the International Working Group (IWG) 
will not meet again until February 17 and given the 
inaction of the IWG's Mediation Group, which is charged 
with daily monitoring of the peace process, Gbagbo is 
likely to get away with his move to reestablish the 
NA. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  Gbagbo's extension of the NA has once 
again undermined Banny's authority.  Banny seems neither 
willing nor able to acknowledge his reduced stature, and he 
seems unable to focus his government on the critical work 
of unifying the country, commencing DDR, and organizing 
elections.  Banny's decision to travel to South Africa 
immediately after the Jan 16-20 crisis instead of pushing 
his team to work with an increased sense of urgency only 
further increases the perception of drift.  End Comment 
 
Hooks