This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 WARSAW 000149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR A/S 
SECDEF FOR ASD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 
EUCOM FOR ECJ5/ECJ4 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2016 
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP MASS PGOV OVIP PL
SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO POLISH NON-PAPER REQUESTING 
ADDITIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
 
Classified By: DCM Ken Hillas for reasons 1.4(B)&(D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Post received January 24 a non-paper 
apparently prepared personally by DefMin Sikorski, revising 
the non-paper he had handed to Secretary Rumsfeld December 7 
in Washington.  Unless otherwise instructed Embassy intends 
to use talking points at para. 7 in responding to GOP 
officials.  See 
 
¶2. (C) On January 24Polish MFA Americas Director Henryk 
Szlajfer presented to Embassy a non-paper from the Polish MOD 
entitled "Further Development of the Polish-American Defense 
Cooperation."  MFA officials told us informally that the 
non-paper had been prepared personally by DefMin Radoslaw 
Sikorski.  According to MOD U/S Stanislaw Koziej, this 
non-paper replaces the earlier version that Sikorski 
presented to Secretary Rumsfeld during their bilateral 
meeting at the Pentagon on December 7. 
 
¶3. (C)  According to MOD officials, the new non-paper is 
based on the principal directions established by the ongoing 
Strategic Defense Review (SDR) and the modernization 
priorities it lays out will be reflected in the forthcoming 
"2007-2012 Program for the Development of the Polish Armed 
Forces."  Considerably reduced in scope from the December 7 
version, the non-paper focuses on four key capabilities that 
the Polish Armed Forces seek to acquire as part of their 
transformation process:  six Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
systems, specifically SHADOW 200 reconnaissance systems, five 
Mobile Command and Control Centers (MC2C) for Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), 260 additional High Mobility 
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) for the 
expeditionary-oriented 16th Airborne Battalion, and 300 sets 
of the Land Warrior System individual soldier equipment for 
expeditionary units. 
 
¶4. (C)  During dinner on January 25 with EUR A/S Fried and 
ASD/ISP Flory, Sikorski made clear his expectation that 
increased levels of U.S. Security Assistance funding (i.e., 
Foreign Military Financing -  FMF) would be needed for these 
acquisitions.  The non-paper,s unsubstantiated and likely 
low-sided estimates fix the total cost of these acquisitions 
at USD 301 million.  According to the non-paper, funds from 
Poland's current (FY05/06) FMF account have been committed to 
partially fill two of the four acquisition priorities (USD 50 
million to purchase two UAV systems and USD 11.7 million 
toward the purchase of 27 HMMWVs), leaving an unfunded 
balance of approximately USD 240 million.  Pending 
Congressional approval, Poland's FMF level is projected at 
USD 30 million in FY07 and is expected to remain at or below 
that level in the out-years. 
 
¶5. (C)  In preparation for Polish President Lech Kaczynski,s 
visit to the U.S. for a February 9 meeting with President 
Bush, Sikorski continues to press for a U.S. commitment to 
fund the priority acquisitions listed in the new non-paper. 
Essentially, he is seeking a U.S. "deliverable"  for 
President Kaczynski,s visit of at least USD 240 million 
(based on the low-end Polish cost estimates in the 
non-paper).  While the non-paper does not specify timelines 
for acquiring these capabilities, Sikorski likely expects it 
would occur within the next five years. 
 
¶6. (C)  Embassy Warsaw expects that Polish officials will 
look for a USG response in the coming days.  In order to 
allow time for a constructive dialogue and to pre-empt the 
emergence of unrealistic expectations for the Kaczynski 
visit, we will need to make clear the limits of U.S. FMF 
funding.  We also see the need for political discussions of 
GOP plans to expend national funds on these acquisitions, but 
those discussions will have to take place after President 
Kaczynski's visit, as we will need to verify through USG 
sources the non-paper's purported costs.  Unless otherwise 
instructed, U.S. Embassy proposes to use the Talking Points 
at para 7 in addressing this issue. 
 
¶7. (C) BEGIN TEXT: 
 
-  We appreciate the efforts of the Government of Poland, 
particularly the Ministry of National Defense, to develop a 
framework for our bilateral defense cooperation that promotes 
transformation and development within the Polish Armed 
Forces.  The non-paper provided during the Strategic Dialogue 
is a useful indication of the acquisition priorities of the 
Polish Armed Forces and of the capabilities required to 
enhance their inter-operability within NATO. 
 
-  We understand that the priorities outlined in the 
non-paper will be consistent with the findings and 
recommendations of your Strategic Defense Review, as well as 
with the broader context of the forthcoming 2007-2012 
Development and Modernization Program for the Polish Armed 
Forces.  We agree that the cooperation objectives and 
capabilities requirements presented in the non-paper will 
advance the Polish Armed Forces, ability to participate 
effectively in future Alliance and coalition operations, a 
goal which we share. 
 
-  We have been advised informally that our Security 
Assistance would have to be increased to fund procurement of 
the equipment.  Poland is at present the leading recipient of 
our Security Assistance in Europe and Eurasia, and we are 
maintaining that level of support at a time when other most 
European recipients' levels have declined .  There is no 
reason to expect that Four grant aid will increase in the 
coming years. 
 
- We are now in the process of studying the non-paper, 
including the estimated costs of this equipment at the 
specified quantities.  That said, it appears unlikely that 
Poland's current or projected FMF funding levels will allow 
near-term acquisition of this materiel solely with FMF. 
 
- Acquisition of the equipment listed in the non-paper would 
therefore require the use of Polish national funds to 
supplement Poland's annual FMF allocations, which will, at 
best, remain at the current level. 
 
END TEXT. 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT: We recommend that Washington convey the same 
message to the Polish Embassy, so as to maximize the 
prospects of a constructive discussion around President 
Kaczynski's visit. 
ASHE