VZCZCXRO3639
RR RUEHHM RUEHPB
DE RUEHKO #0442/01 0270326
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 270326Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7872
INFO RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 4236
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 6891
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 7289
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000442 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/J 
DEPT FOR ISN/NESS BURKART AND COMELLA 
DOE FOR NNSA AOKI, GLASER AND C.STONE 
NRC FOR KANE AND R.WAY 
DOD FOR DTRA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2015 
TAGS: ENRG JA KNNP TRGY
SUBJECT: JAPAN CONDUCTS NUCLEAR TERRORISM DRILL AT PLANT ON 
SEA OF JAPAN COAST 
 
REF: A. 05 TOKYO 6816 
 
     ¶B. 05 TOKYO 5222 
     ¶C. 05 TOKYO 5052 
     ¶D. 05 OSAKA KOBE 367 
     ¶E. 05 TOKYO 689 
 
TOKYO 00000442  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: EST Minister-Counselor Joyce Rabens for 1.4 b, d-h 
 
--Summary-- 
 
¶1. (C) On November 27, the GOJ conducted a one-day 
large-scale drill to respond to a potential act of nuclear 
terrorism under the auspices of the Protection of Citizens 
Law or PCL.  The drill focused on the Mihama Nuclear Power 
Plant (NPP) that is located on the Sea of Japan coast in 
Fukui Prefecture.  The staged attack and the subsequent 
events were all part of the first ever on-site drill 
conducted by the GOJ under the PCL, which sets into place 
measures that all levels of government are required to take 
to protect Japan's citizens when attacked by a foreign 
country or responding to a large-scale terrorist attack.  The 
drill involved nearly 2,000 participants that included 
government officials, police, Self-Defense Forces, industry 
employees and local residents.  Because the drill focused 
primarily on evacuating local residents and strengthening the 
emergency response system, all available information 
indicated that there was no component to the drill resembling 
a Force-on-Force (FoF) exercise.  The drill itself went very 
smoothly, as the actions that various officials were required 
to take were listed down to the finest detail with no 
surprises thrown in.  Several nuclear emergency officials 
commented that this made the exercise a bit unrealistic. 
 
¶2. (S) Japan took positive steps forward to boost physical 
protection at its nuclear facilities in 2005 when a national 
DBT took effect on December 1.  Though this drill fell under 
the auspices of a different law, the drill did make clear 
that the GOJ is beginning to recognize that external threats 
do exist to its 54 units scattered throughout the country. 
Coordination between the prefectural governments and local 
police on security issues will have to be strengthened if 
Japan is to better prepare itself for such attacks as that 
envisioned in the drill scenario.  Though authorities would 
not publicly admit that any specific country was in mind when 
the drill was planned, some participants from Japan's nuclear 
industry admitted that North Korea fit the bill perfectly. 
Fukui Governor Nishikawa is concerned that there is a real 
threat from North Korean saboteurs and ship intrusions to the 
prefecture's 15 units.  End Summary. 
 
--Terrorists Attack Mihama: the Stage for the Drill-- 
 
¶3. (SBU) On November 27, the GOJ conducted a one-day 
large-scale drill in response to a potential act of nuclear 
terrorism under the auspices of the Protection of Citizens 
Law (Kokumin Hogo Hou) or the PCL.  The drill focused on the 
Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) that is located on the 
Wakasa Bay on the Sea of Japan coast near Tsuruga City in 
Fukui Prefecture.  The Mihama NPP is a pressurized water 
reactor (PWR) facility operated by the Kansai Electric Power 
Company (KEPCO) with three generating units and two central 
control rooms.  Total generating capacity for the plant is 
1,666MW and the plant site area totals 586,000 square meters. 
 The plant is located on a small land outcropping and is 
surrounded by water on three sides.  It is connected to 
Tsuruga Peninsula via a narrow bridge that is open only for 
 
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the use of plant employees and contractors.  The peninsula is 
also home to the nearby JAEA-run Monju Fast Breeder Reactor 
and JAEA's Fugen Plant that is currently in the state of 
decommissioning.  Other NPPs such as the Tsuruga, Takahama 
and Ohi plants are within a 30-minute to one hour drive of 
Mihama. 
 
--Catching the Terrorists was Assumed: Over-scripted Drill 
Focused on Evacuations-- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The staged attack on the Mihama NPP and the 
 
TOKYO 00000442  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
subsequent events were all part of the first ever on-site 
drill conducted by the GOJ under the auspices of the 
Protection of Citizens Law (PCL).  The PCL was established in 
June 2004 and went into effect in September of the same year. 
 The Law sets into place measures such as the provision of 
warnings and evacuations that the national, prefectural and 
local governments are required to take to protect Japan's 
citizens when attacked by a foreign country, when expecting 
an attack by a foreign power, and when responding to a 
large-scale terrorist attack.  Public service organizations 
such as local bus and train companies are required to 
cooperate with evacuation related activities, and other 
organizations such as the media and utilities are also called 
on to assist the government.  Under the Law, prefectural 
governments are required to have plans in place by the end of 
JFY2005 that include details on how to evacuate local 
populations if one of the above three events were to occur. 
Municipal and town governments have an additional year to put 
their plans into place.  Fukui Prefecture had its plans in 
place by late December 2004, far in advance of the deadline, 
and was likely selected to host the drill for that reason. 
 
¶5. (U) The drill involved nearly 2,000 participants that 
included local and national government officials, police, 
Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops, industry employees and local 
residents.  Its purpose was threefold: to verify the 
functionality of emergency measures and cooperation among 
relevant authorities and organizations; to verify the 
capabilities of these authorities and organizations through 
evaluation; and to enhance overall understanding of nuclear 
emergency preparedness at all levels of government and among 
the Japanese population.  The massive exercise focused on 
strengthening six areas of response: emergency communications 
and information collection; the establishment of an emergency 
countermeasures task force; the evacuation of residents; 
rescue operations for residents; public notification; and 
traffic control procedures in the hazard areas. 
 
¶6. (U) The exercise scenario began with an armed mortar 
attack on the Mihama NPP by an unknown number of terrorists 
of unknown origin at 0700.  The attack damaged Mihama Unit 
Number Two and led to the strong potential that large amounts 
of radiation were released into the atmosphere.  The unit 
automatically shut down and the operator informed the 
authorities of the abnormalities at the site.  At 0715, plant 
employees manually shutdown Unit One.  (Note: Mihama's Unit 
Three is currently shutdown due to an earlier pipe rupture 
accident.  See reftels C and D).  At approximately 0745, 
Fukui Prefecture, local municipalities and the national 
authorities established their emergency countermeasures task 
forces and the prefecture requested the mobilization of SDF 
troops per the conditions spelled out in the PCL.  Mihama 
employees evacuated the reactor building shortly thereafter. 
At 0800 a siren sounded throughout the area warning local 
residents of the emergency in Mihama.  (Note: Neither ESToff 
nor any of his companions were able to hear the siren in 
Tsuruga City -- it turns out the drill was conducted on the 
 
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assumption that a siren was sounded in the area). 
Authorities next ordered the nearby Tsuruga NPP to shutdown 
and gave the green light to mobilize SDF troops.  At 0920, 
government officials held a DVC and at 1010 a joint task 
force held its first meeting.  Thirty minutes later, five of 
the terrorists were spotted in the hills near the plant. 
(Note: most of the activities relating to the terrorists were 
listed in the official scenario as ""assumed"").  In the 
following hours, officials were flown in from Tokyo and the 
prefectural capital and the joint task force held several 
additional meetings with all relevant parties and conducted 
press briefings.  By 1145 evacuation measures and vehicles 
were in place, and within 45 minutes boats, helicopters and 
buses with an SDF escort evacuated 70 volunteer citizens to 
designated points.  Around 1250, three additional terrorists 
were spotted in boats off the coast and were captured by the 
Japan Coast Guard thirty minutes later.  Evacuation 
operations were completed by 1500 and evacuees were screened 
by medical teams for radiation exposure.  At approximately 
1600 the drill was concluded and organizers held a press 
 
TOKYO 00000442  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
conference. 
 
¶7. (C) Registered observers including ESToff -- the only 
non-Japanese participant observing the activities -- were 
shuttled back and forth by buses to observe the various parts 
of the drill, though access was not granted to the plant 
controlled areas themselves.  ESToff was unable to confirm 
firsthand whether the unarmed security force at the plant 
actually went through the motions of protecting the plant 
from the terrorists.  Because the drill focused primarily on 
evacuating local residents and strengthening the emergency 
response system, all available information indicated that 
there was no component to the drill resembling the 
Force-on-Force (FoF) exercises conducted in the United 
States.  Local residents not directly participating in the 
drill seemed to continue their regular daily routines and 
tourists visiting the area did not appear to be alarmed by 
the visible SDF presence.  Roadblocks for the drill were 
mostly placed off to the side of roads in what appeared to be 
an effort by police to not impose the drill on 
non-participants. 
 
¶8. (U) In a follow-up article run by the Yomiuri Newspaper, a 
moderate paper with national circulation, the paper 
criticized the fact that the drill was somewhat disconnected 
from the reality on the ground.  Most notably, the Yomiuri 
said that exercise did not take into account the large 
numbers of beachgoers that typically bathe in the waters near 
the plant and how these individuals would be evacuated if an 
attack were to take place in the summer.  The paper also 
called for strengthened joint police-SDF training and said 
that many local governments underestimate the need to beef up 
their ability to cope with a foreign military or guerrilla 
attack.  The Yomiuri noted that as of the end of November 
2005 when the drill was conducted, only Fukui and Tottori 
prefectures had completed operation manuals detailing how 
authorities would evacuate residents in such an emergency. 
 
--Comment-- 
 
¶9. (C) The drill itself went very smoothly.  Though the buzz 
and whirl of overhead helicopters ferrying evacuees to a 
flotilla of Japan Coast Guard ships just off the coast and a 
small army of medical officials in masks and gowns with 
Geiger counters was an exciting site to see, the drill was a 
bit too scripted and perfect.  The actions that the various 
officials were required to take wQAuQ1Qc+Xjcy officials who were observing the 
drill 
commented to ESToff that this made the exercise a bit 
unrealistic and that it was important to not run drills 
strictly according to the scenario.  Expressing a somewhat 
different opinion, one participant explained that the minute 
details were important given the fact that so many players 
were involved in the first-time drill -- the simple fact that 
the multiple agencies and industry officials were able to 
communicate as smoothly as they did was an accomplishment in 
and of itself, according to the official. 
 
¶10. (C) Japan took positive steps forward to boost physical 
protection at its nuclear facilities in 2005 when a national 
DBT took effect on December 1.  Though this drill fell under 
the auspices of a different law and focused primarily on the 
logistics of ensuring that surrounding communities were kept 
safe after a terrorist incident at a nuclear facility, the 
drill did make clear that the GOJ is beginning to recognize 
that, at a minimum, external threats do exist to its 54 
nuclear units scattered throughout the country.  This 
specific drill did not test the operator's security response 
to the terrorist attack on the plant.  However, there does 
appear to be some movement in the direction of introducing 
Force-on-Force drills as part of the regulatory structure in 
Japan.  In planning for bilateral consultations to follow-up 
on the August 2005 interagency physical protection 
discussions held in Tokyo (see reftel), a MEXT official told 
ESToff that the GOJ was planning to create FoF drills for its 
 
TOKYO 00000442  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
licensees to be used in the future. 
 
¶11. (S) Coordination between the prefectural governments and 
local police on security issues will have to be strengthened 
if Japan is to better prepare itself for attacks as 
envisioned in the drill scenario.  A senior nuclear safety 
official in the Fukui government -- the prefecture with the 
most reactors -- admitted in confidence that his office had 
no contact with the local police on plant security issues. 
He lamented that the local government could do only so much, 
and argued that it was important to involve the SDF in the 
protection of the facilities as well.  (Note: The Fukui 
Prefectural government is significantly involved in 
overseeing the nuclear facilities on its territory and 
imposes regulatory obligations on the operators in addition 
to those set by central government regulators.  In this 
sense, the above comment is coming from an official in the 
most prepared of Japan's prefectures.) 
 
¶12. (S) Though authorities would not publicly admit that they 
had any specific country in mind when the drill was planned, 
participants from Japan's nuclear industry admitted to ESToff 
that North Korea fit the bill perfectly.  In an earlier visit 
to nuclear facilities in the region, ESToff met with Fukui 
Prefecture nuclear safety officials who confided that 
Governor Issei Nishikawa was concerned that there was a real 
threat from North Korean saboteurs and ship intrusions to the 
prefecture's 15 plants.  The officials explained that DPRK 
subs had been spotted in the area in the past, and noted that 
abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korean agents had 
occurred from the prefecture's beaches. 
 
¶13. (S) The prefecture's concerns are reasonable given the 
location of the plant on the Sea of Japan coast in a 
relatively sparsely populated hilly area and the fact that 
contract guards at Japan's nuclear facilities are unarmed. 
ESToff had visited the Mihama NPP several months prior to the 
drill to discuss the pipe rupture accident that occurred in 
2004 and to tour the plant's facilities.  During that time, 
security was present, but appeared to have shortcomings. 
Vehicular access is restricted to the main facility, and 
pre-registered visitors are asked to park at a public 
relations facility that is located on the main peninsula just 
on the other side of the bridge.  The PR facilities are an 
approach that nuclear operators have taken across Japan to 
balance the need of relating information on the safety and 
economic benefits of the plant to the public, while 
increasing plant security by cutting back on the number of 
visitors who actually enter restricted areas.  After crossing 
a first checkpoint and the bridge, visitors are then 
processed through a second access point that has movable 
barriers and radiation monitoring equipment.  At this point a 
guard makes a cursory check of the visitor's picture ID. 
Plant officials explained that KEPCO was planning to further 
boost Mihama's security by installing bag-screening equipment 
(similar to those found at airports) to check visitors' bags 
at this location. 
 
¶14. (S) Senior plant officials admitted to ESToff that the 
plant occasionally has problems with fisherman coming close 
to its shores given the fact that water temperatures are 
slightly higher near the NPP due to the plant's discharge 
water which leads to the growth of larger fish.  When this 
occurs, plant security usually gets on a loud horn and warns 
the fishermen to leave the restricted waters.  In addition, 
thousands of sun seekers swim in the waters next to the 
plant, so it would be fairly difficult to immediately 
distinguish something out of the ordinary.  These two facts 
combined made the Mihama NPP a good facility to hold the 
drill at.  Officials also admitted to ESToff that the plant's 
intruder detection system often has false alarms due to wild 
boars and other animals encroaching into the area.  On the 
day of the visit, ESToff spotted the typical police presence 
at commercial nuclear facilities -- a lightly armored police 
vehicle with up to six police officers -- some of them fast 
asleep.  End comment. 
SCHIEFFER