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Viewing cable 06TELAVIV92, SCENESETTER FOR JANUARY 11, 2006 JOINT POL-MIL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06TELAVIV92 2006-01-06 16:41 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Tel Aviv
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 000092 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR PM ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILLEN 
STATE FOR NEA/IPA (MAHER) AND PM (RUGGIERO) 
PENTAGON FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RODMAN AND OSD (JAMES 
ANDERSON) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV PTER MASS OTRA PARM ISRAEL RELATIONS MILITARY RELATIONS GOI EXTERNAL GOI INTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JANUARY 11, 2006 JOINT POL-MIL 
GROUP (JPMG) MEETING 
 
Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz.  Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). 
 
1. (C) The Joint Pol-Mil Group (JPMG) meeting will be taking 
place at a time when Israel's domestic political situation is 
in flux and recent progress on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has stalled.  PM Sharon suffered a significant brain 
hemorrhage on January 4, and is now in critical condition, 
having undergone emergency surgery.  Alternate PM Ehud Olmert 
is running the country, but the normally dynamic political 
situation is in stasis as the country waits for more 
information about the PM's health.  Anxiety in Israel is high 
about Iran and its nuclear weapons program, political 
instability in Syria and Lebanon, and the terrorist threats 
that emanate from those two countries, as well as from 
Palestinian controlled areas.  Amid all of this, the 
U.S.-Israel relationship remains strong, based on our support 
for Israel since its formation in 1948, our shared cultural 
and political values, and our common strategic interests. 
Despite turbulence in the relationship over significant 
technology transfer scandals, which the GOI is taking some 
steps to redress, our cooperation in counterterrorism 
research areas involving the DOD has proceeded and is viewed 
positively by the USG and GOI. 
 
2. (C) MOD sources say that the Israeli side's aims during 
the JPMG are as follows: 
-- Export Controls: Present its bottom line on changes.  Note 
changes since September to export control legislation and 
regulations, and to the export control system's 
organizational structure. 
-- Defense Sales to Venezuela: Present Israel's bottom line. 
-- Iraq: Exchange views. 
-- Middle East and Iran:  Provide Israel's assessment of 
security challenges in the region, and touch on Palestinian 
issues.  The Israelis will want to exchange views on Iran and 
the way ahead. 
-- Qualitative Edge: Exchange views.  If Israel knows in 
advance of proposed U.S. defense sales to other Middle 
Eastern countries, it will want to comment on them. 
-- Joint Security Assistance Planning: Present Israel's plans 
on how it will use FMF over the long term. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
ISRAEL'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN FLUX 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Since the withdrawal of Jewish settlers, and the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) protecting them, from the Gaza 
Strip and four settlements in the northern West Bank in 
August, Israel's political situation has been in flux, with 
"rebels" from PM Ariel Sharon's own Likud Party -- and former 
PM Binyamin Netanyahu -- challenging Sharon's leadership.  In 
November, Labor Member of the Knesset (MK) Amir Peretz 
successfully challenged former PM Shimon Peres for the 
leadership of Labor, securing for himself leadership of the 
second largest party in PM Sharon's coalition government. 
Labor subsequently withdrew from the government.  In a bold 
response to the rebels within his own party, PM Sharon then 
left Likud and formed a new centrist party: Kadima ("Go 
Forward"), attracting to it defectors from Likud, Labor and 
other parties.  Labor's calls for early elections led to an 
agreement by all parties to hold general elections at the end 
of March.  The general election campaign is now in full 
swing.  PM Sharon's success to date in making Kadima a viable 
party to challenge Labor and Likud in the March elections 
could take a turn for the worse if Sharon is incapacitated or 
dies, but polls continue to show Kadima as the 
highest-polling party, by far. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
RECENT PROGRESS ON PALESTINIAN ISSUES HAS STALLED 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
4. (C) Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip and a 
portion of the northern West Bank went very smoothly and was 
broadly hailed as a bold and creative step.  As a result of 
disengagement and implementation of the November 15 Agreement 
on Movement and Access, brokered by Secretary Rice, the 
Palestinians now have a significant degree of control over 
the Gaza Strip and control its border crossing into Egypt. 
Other aspects of the agreement brokered by the Secretary 
remain gridlocked:  (a) the opening of the Rafah border 
crossing between Gaza and Egypt remains plagued by problems; 
(b) resuming convoys between Gaza and the West Bank; (c) 
increasing throughflow at crossing points between Israel and 
the occupied territories; (d) decreasing restrictions on 
movement within the West Bank, and (e) making progress on a 
seaport and airport for Gaza.  Forward movement on those 
issues has stalled as a result of Qassam rocket launches from 
the Gaza Strip, other attacks perpetrated by Palestinian 
terrorists in the wake of the agreement, and an assessment by 
the IDF that the reported increasingly active PIJ presence in 
the West Bank must be dealt with.  Any progress on these 
issues remains highly unlikely. 
 
5. (C) Problems remain that could significantly affect 
progress on the Israel-Palestinian conflict.  The PA is 
having difficulty asserting its authority in Gaza and the 
West Bank as its ruling party, Fatah, is fractured by 
internal rivalries, and is being challenged by Hamas, 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other armed militias, 
including those affiliated with Fatah.  Palestinian Authority 
(PA) President Mahmud Abbas secured an agreement from Hamas 
in March to stop attacks in order to allow disengagement to 
proceed, but Hamas and PIJ have conducted some attacks since 
this Tahdiya ("calm") went into effect.  While the Tahdiya 
officially expired on December 31, Hamas appears to be 
holding its fire in anticipation of Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) elections scheduled for January 25.  The GOI 
continues to press PA President Abbas to assert his authority 
and dismantle the Palestinian terrorist groups as a condition 
for moving forward on the peace process.  The PA, fearful of 
provoking widespread clashes, prefers to address the 
situation more gradually.  The GOI has also called on the PA 
not to allow Hamas -- a terrorist group -- to run in the PLC 
elections, stating that it will neither hinder nor help with 
the elections if Hamas runs.  It is unclear whether the 
Palestinian elections will take place in January, due to (a) 
lack of agreed modalities between Israel and the PA on 
Palestinian voting in East Jerusalem, and (b) widespread 
security concerns originating from armed groups associated 
with Fatah, in some cases representing senior Fatah members 
who do not believe they will be elected.  Meanwhile, the IDF 
continues to conduct extensive unilateral operations in the 
West Bank, and also continues to play a security role in Gaza 
via airstrikes and artillery barrages intended to counter 
Qassam rocket launchings. 
 
6. (U) U.S. policy remains firmly anchored in President 
Bush's historic vision -- first enunciated in June 2002 -- of 
two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in 
peace and security.  The USG remains committed to the 
performance-based road map under the auspices of the Quartet 
(the U.S., Russia, UN and EU) as the means for achieving the 
President's vision.  The Israeli and Palestinian sides have 
endorsed the road map -- both with reservations -- but need 
to take additional steps.  Israel must continue to work with 
Palestinian leaders to improve the daily lives of 
Palestinians, while avoiding any activity that prejudices 
final status negotiations.  As the President has noted, this 
means that Israel must remove unauthorized West Bank outposts 
and stop settlement expansion.  It also means that the 
barrier now being built to protect Israelis from terrorist 
attacks must be a security barrier, rather than a political 
one, and take into account its impact on Palestinians who do 
not threaten Israel's security.  On the other side, the 
Palestinians must stop terrorism, dismantle the terrorist 
infrastructure within their society, and take steps to ensure 
that a democratic society -- with open and transparent 
governance -- takes root. 
 
7. (C) Another tangible sign of U.S. commitment to peace in 
the region is the U.S. Security Coordination (USSC) Mission, 
recently take over by LTG Keith Dayton.  General Dayton's 
mission is to work Palestinian security sector reform issues, 
and his multinational team works to ensure coordination and 
communication between the PA and the GOI.  General Dayton 
returned to the region on January 6 after having met with 
President Bush and Secretary Rice on the way forward for the 
USSC. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORHOOD PRESENTS CHALLENGES 
----------------------------------------- 
 
8. (C) Israel maintains that the greatest existential threat 
it faces is a nuclear-armed Iran.  Israel's position is that 
the international community should press Iran harder -- 
diplomatically and via the threat of sanctions -- to get it 
to abandon its weapons program, and there has been an 
intensification of the threat to Israel voiced in public by 
officials during the past several weeks.  Israeli officials 
accept that the USG continues to support the EU3 process, but 
Israel is frustrated by what it believes is the EU3's record 
of concessions to Iran (e.g., uranium conversion) for little 
in return.  Privately, GOI and IDF contacts have said that, 
at best, we can slow down Iran's program, but probably cannot 
stop it.  Most Israeli officials also do not believe at this 
stage that anyone could successfully confront Iran 
militarily, noting that elements of Iran's nuclear program 
are dispersed throughout Iran and, in some cases, probably 
are hidden. 
 
9. (C) Israel's northern border with Lebanon and Syria 
remains tense, and flared up on November 21 with attempted 
Hizballah incursions into Israel with the likely aim of 
kidnapping Israeli soldiers.  IDF units positioned along the 
border -- operating under strict orders to show restraint in 
responding to Hizballah challenges -- successfully repelled 
the November 21 attacks, killing four Hizballah fighters. 
Israel returned the bodies of the fighters to the Lebanese 
government with the assistance of the Red Cross.  On December 
28, Palestinian terrorists (possibly the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command) fired Katyusha 
rockets from Lebanon into Israel, damaging several civilian 
homes.  The border is currently calm.  Since Israel's 
withdrawal in 2000 from southern Lebanon, the GOL has 
consistently resisted all international pressure to move 
Lebanese Armed Forces into areas along the border occupied by 
Hizballah.  A proposal to incorporate the divided village of 
Ghajar completely into Israel was recently rejected but 
highlights the difficulty the Israelis have had without an 
effective Lebanese force.  For the time being, UN 
peacekeepers assigned to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) try to maintain an uneasy calm on the Lebanese side 
of the Israel-Lebanon border, often times within eyeshot of 
Hizballah positions -- a situation that causes consternation 
within the GOI and IDF. 
 
10. (C) As the Mehlis investigation into the assassination of 
former Lebanese PM Hariri gets closer to supporters of Syrian 
President Al-Assad, there is concern within the GOI that 
Syria will lash out at Israel to deflect international 
attention away from the investigation.  Indeed, the general 
consensus within the GOI is that this was the reason for the 
recent Hizballah attacks.  GOI and IDF officials maintain 
that Al-Assad needs to be pressured into behaving 
according to international norms, but should not be pushed to 
the point of collapse, as this would -- in their view -- 
likely result in his regime's replacement by what they see as 
the growing Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. 
 
11. (C) While the "cold peace" with respect to interaction 
between the two peoples persists, Egyptian and Israeli 
official relations have seen some improvement as a result of 
Egyptian-Israeli coordination over the Egypt-Gaza border 
during and after disengagement.  Israeli defense planners 
maintain that Egypt remains a serious potential military 
threat, and note that President Mubarak could in the future 
be replaced by a leader less friendly to Israel.  As a 
result, GOI officials frequently complain about U.S. military 
sales to Egypt. 
 
12. (C) Relations between Israel and Jordan are good.  Jordan 
has control of its border with Israel and prevents terrorist 
infiltration in either direction. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IS EXCELLENT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) The U.S. enjoys a strategic partnership with Israel, 
and overall relations between our two countries are 
excellent, based on U.S. support for Israel since its 
formation in 1948.  The relationship has suffered turbulence 
due to high-profile tech transfer scandals that the USG 
maintains helped to put U.S. and allied forces at risk.  In 
response to our concern about these transfers, Israel signed 
a Statement of Understanding (SOU) in August requiring 
coordination on future sensitive defense sales to third 
countries.  Since then, GOI and IDF officials have pushed to 
gain USG agreement with their position that the technology 
transfer scandals are water under the bridge.  The USG 
position has been that Israel still has much work to do in 
order to restore the USG's trust in Israel's export control 
system -- a position consistent with the SOU.  Israel could 
benefit from USG encouragement for the positive steps it has 
taken so far to make changes to its export control 
legislation and the organization of its system, per the SOU. 
14. (C) Israel and the U.S. exchange information and 
coordinate on policy through our annual Strategic Dialogue, 
the Joint Political-Military Working Group (JPMG), and the 
Defense Policy Advisory Group (DPAG).  The GOI was pleased 
with the last round of the Strategic Dialogue, which took 
place in Washington, D.C. November 28-29, after a lapse of 
more than two years. 
 
15. (S) The fallout over the technology transfer scandals has 
not affected cooperation between various USG and GOI agencies 
on research and development in counterterrorism (CT) 
technologies.  Practical, joint R&D and testing through the 
Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) continues, yielding 
technologies that are being fielded by U.S. forces in Iraq. 
The USG has noted its gratitude in the past for Israeli 
contributions to counter-IED technology.  The Department of 
Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission continue 
cooperation with their Israeli counterparts to enhance 
Israel's ability to prevent and mitigate the effects of 
radiological device attacks.  Israel and the U.S. signed an 
MOU in December that allows the U.S. to assist Israel in 
setting up a radiation detection system at its main port in 
Haifa under the U.S. Megaports Initiative. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MFO: ISRAEL TO PRESS FOR NO CHANGES 
----------------------------------- 
 
16. (C) As your schedule includes a visit to Multinational 
Forces and Observers (MFO) North Camp and a discussion of 
MFO-related issues, you need to be aware that the USG 
decision to phase out the MFO's UH-1 helos in exchange for 
Blackhawks is a source of consternation within the GOI due to 
the additional costs it entails for Israel and Egypt.  Israel 
views the MFO as a vital part of its strategic defense in 
depth, and will resist USG efforts to attempt to reduce or 
alter the MFO's force structure.  Israel believes that the 
MFO's presence provides stability in the Sinai at a time when 
Egypt appears to face difficulty with terrorist activities 
there.  The MFO also monitors the Egyptian Border Guard Force 
established in support of the Egypt-Gaza border agreement 
that was signed in August. 
 
17. (U) This cable has been cleared with State's NEA/IPA. 
 
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JONES