This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 000389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL GAZA DISENGAGEMENT SETTLEMENTS
SUBJECT: MISHLEV DISCUSSES PA ELECTIONS, KARNI AND RAFAH 
CROSSING, AND OUTPOSTS WITH THE AMBASSADOR 
 
REF: TEL AVIV 000296 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Major General Yosef Mishlev told the 
Ambassador January 24 that preparations for the Palestinian 
elections were going well, and that the GOI and the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) had established joint coordination 
rooms in the West Bank and Gaza for election day to handle 
security.  He said that although East Jerusalem was not his 
responsibility, he knew that special teams had been 
established with Israeli police and PA security services.  He 
mentioned that 50,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem 
would vote in the West Bank for fear of the GOI denying them 
access to city services in the future, and for fear of the 
GOI "spying" on them to see if they vote for Hamas.  On the 
Karni crossing, Mishlev explained that the Palestinians had 
dug a trench eight meters deep, as of January 24, and found a 
soft spot which could be the tunnel they have been searching 
for.  If it is, the crossing would be re-opened shortly, but 
otherwise, the PA would dig to 10-12 meters, possibly taking 
up to a week.  Mishlev claimed that he had spoken with PA 
Prisoner Affairs Minister Sufian Abu Zaida about using Kerem 
Shalom as an alternative, but said that Abu Zaida rejected 
the proposal because "he is speaking with Dahlan's voice." 
He also discussed issues of PA non-compliance with security 
at Rafah, mentioning items such as a 2-3 minute delay in the 
video feed, and a lack of personal details on travelers 
coming into and out of the Gaza Strip.  He provided copies of 
GOI letters written to EU/BAM Lt. Gen. Pistolese on this 
matter.  He mentioned that he had worked out the details for 
a pilot passenger convoy with the PA in December, but was 
waiting on the political echelon to make a decision on a 
start date.  Mishlev assured the Ambassador that Alternate 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is serious about moving on illegal 
outposts, and reported that the IDF is prepared to evacuate 
the Hebron market and Amona outpost after the Palestinian 
elections.  Mishlev also said that Defense Minister Shaul 
Mofaz had appointed him to look into the recent olive-tree 
cutting incidents.  Post will fax to NEA/IPA a presentation 
Mishlev gave on Palestinian economic performance in 2005. 
End summary. 
 
--------------------- 
Palestinian Elections 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Major General Yosef Mishlev told the Ambassador 
January 24 that preparations for the Palestinian elections 
were going well, and that the voting materials were in place. 
 He said that elections for the Palestinian security services 
had taken place the previous day, January 23, and that 58,000 
security personnel, approximately 81 percent of the services, 
had voted through special arrangements.  He reported that he 
met with Palestinian Authority (PA) Minister for Prisoner 
Affairs Sufian Abu Zaida on the night of the 22nd, and they 
coordinated the delivery of voting equipment through Sufa 
crossing for the Gaza Strip.  He also mentioned that the GOI 
and the PA had established on January 21 a joint coordination 
room in Bet El, near Ramallah, in the West Bank and two rooms 
in the Gaza Strip, and that the IDF had the authority to make 
the decisions necessary for elections to go smoothly.  He 
explained that IDF soldiers had been ordered to be on 
"special behavior," that there would be less IDF presence 
than normal in major population centers, and that the number 
of checkpoints would be reduced.  The Ambassador asked 
whether there was a quick reaction force established for any 
security problems that may arise, and Mishlev responded that 
there was one set up for the West Bank but there was no need 
for one in the Gaza Strip.  The Ambassador noted that one 
possibility was for election day to go well, but for violence 
to arise during the vote count if Fatah saw that it was not 
doing as well as it expected.  Mishlev acknowledged that this 
could be a big problem, especially in areas like Nablus, 
Jenin, Khan Yunis, and Rafah because they are typically 
violent.  He said, however, that he knew USSC General Dayton 
had advised PA Internal Security Minister Nasir Yusif to act 
against violence, and hoped that he would do so. 
 
¶3.  (C) In response to the DCM's question on voting in East 
Jerusalem, Mishlev responded that Jerusalem was not under his 
responsibility, but that he had made some recommendations to 
the Vice Prime Minister, on which he did not elaborate.  He 
said he knew, however, that special teams had been 
established with Israeli police and PA security services.  He 
continued that 1,000 Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem 
had voted for the PA presidential election in 2005, and that 
for this election, approximately 2,000 had recently picked up 
their voting cards allowing them to cast ballots in East 
Jerusalem.  Mishlev said that another 50,000 Palestinian 
residents of East Jerusalem would vote in the West Bank for 
fear of the GOI denying them access to city services in the 
future if they are known to have voted in Palestinian 
elections.  He said some may also be concerned that the GOI 
is "spying" on them to see whether they vote for Hamas.  The 
Ambassador asked whether these fears were unfounded, and 
Mishlev assured him that they were, and that the GOI had no 
intention of either spying on Palestinians or denying them 
access to Jerusalem in the future. 
 
-------------- 
Karni Crossing 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Mishlev reported to the Ambassador that Karni has 
been closed since January 15 in coordination with the PA 
after Israel obtained intelligence of a planned terror attack 
on the terminal through a tunnel.  He said that the PA has 
been digging to find this tunnel, and, as of January 24, has 
reached a depth of eight meters with the help of two Israeli 
backhoes.  He explained that at approximately 0400 hours 
January 24, the PA found a soft spot with sand of a different 
color that could be the tunnel they were looking for, in 
addition to a sewage pipe, discovered earlier, that had been 
blocked to prevent flooding.  He mentioned that if this newly 
identified spot was the tunnel, the crossing could be 
re-opened on January 25; if it was not the tunnel, however, 
the PA would continue digging to 10-12 meters, and this could 
take up to a week.  If no tunnel has been found by then, he 
indicated, the GOI would likely re-open Karni anyway.  He 
claimed that he had suggested to the IDF that the crossing be 
re-opened now, but the IDF said it was too risky because 
there are 20 civilians working there.  He explained that if 
an attack from such a tunnel kills Israelis at Karni now -- 
after disengagement -- the GOI would take a very long time 
before opening it again.  The Ambassador asked whether 
sensors could be installed underground to detect any digging, 
and Mishlev responded that any sensors would have to be 
installed on the Palestinian side, which would be 
problematic. 
 
¶5.  (C) PolCouns asked whether the Palestinians had been 
cooperative in their efforts to find the tunnel.  Mishlev 
replied that the PA is divided:  the National Security Forces 
under Ahmad Hillas have cooperated, but not the Preventive 
Security Organization under Muhammad Dahlan and Rashid Abu 
Shabak.  He continued that overall, however, the GOI is 
satisfied with the PA's efforts, and said that he hopes they 
find the tunnel so that the PA "doesn't think we made it up." 
 He said that opening the crossing was important for the 
Palestinians' quality of life, and that he wants the PA to be 
assured that the GOI is committed to keeping the crossings 
open, as Rafah and Erez have been despite three Qassam 
attacks that morning and other security threats.  According 
to Mishlev, Israel was acting in good faith by allowing 3,000 
laborers, 1,000 merchants, and 1,000 patients seeking medical 
treatment to cross into Israel regardless of any threats. 
(Note:  Mishlev also commented that 10,000 laborers and 
12,000 merchants entered Israel from the West Bank, and that 
16,000 Palestinians are allowed to work in the industrial 
zones of the settlements.  End note.)  Mishlev briefly cited 
the Erez Industrial Zone, which is to come under management 
by a Turkish firm, and said that the GOI is currently 
discussing security arrangements with Turkey.  He claimed 
"things are going well," and that the zone should be open in 
a year, after old factories have been demolished and replaced 
with new buildings. 
 
¶6.  (C) Mishlev noted that the Sufa crossing was being used 
to bring in humanitarian goods, and that the GOI was aware of 
the problem of trying to get agricultural goods out of Gaza. 
He said he had suggested to Abu Zaida that Kerem Shalom be 
used as an alternative to Karni because a scanner could be 
transferred there within 24 hours, and the crossing has the 
capacity to scan 35 trucks per day.  He claimed, however, 
that Abu Zaida rejected this proposal because "he is speaking 
with Dahlan's voice."  The Ambassador asked why Kerem Shalom 
could not be opened now for imports from Egypt since it is 
going to be open in the future.  Mishlev agreed, but said 
there is "nothing on the ground." 
 
----- 
Rafah 
----- 
 
¶7.  (C) Mishlev discussed several issues of non-compliance 
with security at the Rafah crossing.  His first point was 
that the PA (specifically Dahlan) has refused to recognize 
the validity of the security protocol, which he characterized 
as essential.  He also said that there is a 2-3 minute delay 
in the data feed, and that the PA is not transmitting video 
24 hours a day, but only when the crossing is open.  Acting 
Defense Attache asked why the GOI needs a constant stream of 
video, even when the crossing is not open, and Mishlev 
claimed that "they are opening the gates at night," so 
unprocessed travelers are getting into Gaza.  Mishlev 
continued that the GOI is not receiving the full details of 
travelers coming into Gaza, such as nationalities and 
passport numbers, and is not receiving any notification of 
travelers leaving Gaza for Egypt.  PolCouns asked whether the 
IDF is able to synchronize the data it receives on computers 
with the travelers it sees on the video screen.  Mishlev 
responded that it cannot do this because the GOI's room in 
the liaison center "doesn't get the details" and therefore 
"can't process because the data isn't coming across."  He 
provided the Ambassador a package of GOI letters to EU/BAM 
Lt. Gen. Pistolese with six examples of alleged 
non-compliance. 
 
¶8.  (C) Mishlev also mentioned that particular difficulties 
have arisen with Palestinians who arrived in Gaza in 1995 
with visiting permits under the Interim Agreement.  He 
explained that 60,000 Palestinians stayed illegally after 
their permits expired, and this has proven problematic 
because the GOI has no record of them if or when they try to 
cross into Israel as laborers.  He said half stayed in Gaza 
and half stayed in the West Bank, but the GOI does not have 
current registration for them and thus cannot process them if 
they try to exit Gaza.  (Comment:  Since these Palestinian 
illegals do not possess ID numbers, they may be the source of 
Israeli claims that "foreigners" are being allowed into Gaza 
through Rafah.  End comment.) 
 
------- 
Convoys 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Mishlev told the Ambassador that he has met with 
former PA Planning Minister Ghassan al-Khatib, and that they 
have "bridged all the gaps" with respect to convoys.  (Note: 
He said the last time they met was in December.  End note.) 
Mishlev said that they have agreed to a pilot program of a 
convoy with five buses, and that al-Khatib said he would meet 
with PA President Mahmud Abbas to see if the plan is 
acceptable.  According to Mishlev, Tarqumiya and Erez are 
ready for the convoys to begin.  From the GOI's perspective, 
the MOD/IDF is simply waiting for a decision from the 
political echelon for a date on which to start the convoys. 
PolCouns asked what would be required for the government to 
decide on a start date, and Mishlev responded "nothing 
special" besides security considerations.  He claimed that 
the GOI would review the convoys issue after the Palestinian 
elections.  The DCM asked about allowing  West Bankers to 
visit Gaza, and about the possibility of establishing a 
special category for students.  Mishlev replied that for now, 
the first phase is a pilot program only, and the convoys 
could be expanded later.  He also said that the issue of 
students is currently in the High Court, but assured the DCM 
that he has "enlarged the categories" to allow more people 
than had originally been planned to travel.  The Ambassador 
emphasized to Mishlev that starting the convoys as soon as 
possible is important because Palestinians would see convoys 
as a benefit that could be taken away in the event of a 
terrorist attack, which might reduce popular support for 
terrorism.  Morever, implementing convoys would prove to them 
that the GOI is operating in good faith. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Hebron and Amona, Olive Tree Incidents 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The Ambassador asked Mishlev about the IDF's plan to 
evacuate settlers from the Hebron market and to demolish nine 
permanent houses in Amona outpost, given Alternate Prime 
Minister Ehud Olmert's recent announcement (reftel).  Mishlev 
assured the Ambassador that the evacuations would take place 
very soon because Olmert wants immediate action on these 
outposts.  He said, "We are going to act in the market, 
Amona, and others," but mentioned that the IDF operations 
have been postponed until after the Palestinian elections. 
Mishlev commented that Olmert has been very clear on his 
expectations with respect to outposts, and that last month he 
"began a policy of enforcing the law" in the West Bank.  As 
part of his policy, Olmert wants to prevent any Israeli 
building on private Palestinian land, and wants to demolish 
any construction in the very beginning phases, such as when 
concrete is laid down for foundations, according to Mishlev. 
He mentioned the recent demolitions of a foundation in Neve 
Daniel in the Gush Etzion bloc, and in Revava in the Ariel 
bloc as examples of Olmert's policy in action.  The 
Ambassador asked whether there is any date set for the 
evacuations, and Mishlev responded that it would be after the 
elections because the GOI did not want to interrupt the 
process.  He reiterated that "something will happen," and 
replied affirmatively when the Ambassador asked whether this 
included the 20 post-March 2001 outposts that Olmert 
mentioned in his speech.  The Ambassador asked about reports 
that Head of Central Command Major General Yair Naveh is 
negotiating with the Hebron settlers to leave peacefully now 
in exchange for being allowed to return "legally" in a few 
months.  Mishlev confirmed that this was the case, and that 
the GOI is currently looking into canceling the Palestinian 
shop-owners' protected status because the land "is Jewish." 
(Comment:  The result of this would be for the shop-owners to 
lose their buildings.  Press reports suggest that the GOI 
would then rent the buildings back to the settlers.  Mishlev 
was vague on who actually owned the land, but claimed it was 
privately held.  End comment.) 
 
¶11.  (C) Mishlev briefly mentioned the incidents of 
olive-tree cutting in the West Bank.  He said Minister of 
Defense Shaul Mofaz had appointed him to check into this 
issue, and that he had recently visited the farmers.  Mishlev 
claimed that in a committee meeting on January 23, he made 
recommendations to compensate the farmers, to demolish the 
outposts near the affected areas, and to increase the IDF, 
police, and Shin Bet presence in order to take weapons from 
settlers and to arrest settlers who perpetrate these acts. 
He noted that in one of the fields where olive trees were 
cut, the GOI had found an identity card belonging to a 
settler from Elon Moreh; the settler first denied the card 
was his, and later said it had been stolen from him and 
dropped in the field, according to Mishlev. 
 
------------------------------- 
Land Confiscations in al-Tuwani 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The Ambassador asked about recent orders to 
confiscate approximately 54 dunams of land near the 
Palestinian village of al-Tuwani for the construction of a 
secondary fence along Rt. 317 from Karmel settlement to Susya 
settlement, south of Hebron.  (Note:  ConGen poloffs and 
Embassy econoff visited the area January 20 and will report 
on the trip septel).  The Ambassador noted that the villagers 
would have to travel an additional 10 kilometers to the town 
of Yattah for services, and that the fence would place them 
in a seam zone between that fence and the separation barrier 
running along the Green Line in the southern West Bank. 
Mishlev asked that further details be sent to his deputy, Lt. 
Col. Daniel Beaudoin; econoff will follow up with Beaudoin. 
 
¶13.  (C) Mishlev concluded the meeting with a presentation on 
the trends of the Palestinian economy in 2005.  Post will fax 
a copy of the slides to NEA/IPA. 
 
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